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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects of negotiation context on the performance of 
member states in intergovernmental negotiations in the European 
Union. Drawing on the case of the Stability and Growth Pact, this thesis 
considers the distinction between negotiations that aim to establish original 
EU-level policy, versus those that aim to reform existing EU-level policy, 
and the impact this has on the outcome of negotiations vis-à-vis states' 
positions. The original, policy-making negotiations are referred to as 
‘uploading’ negotiations, and the reform negotiations are referred to as 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. The main research question to be answered is:  
Do differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
affect member state negotiation performance in each?  
While the EU literature has tended to reveal a disproportionate level of 
influence by big member states, there is a lack of consideration given to the 
context in which negotiations take place, and how that impacts on the 
potential for states to influence negotiation outcomes, as well as to the 
specific mechanisms for influence. This project fills that gap, using an in-
depth, qualitative study of the performance of Belgium, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP, in order to draw conclusions regarding the effects of specific 
bargaining resources on the potential for member states to influence 
negotiations, as well as the way in which negotiation context mediates the 
utility of those resources. In so doing, this thesis generates a host of 
interesting conclusions, and contributes to a wide range of literatures, from 
empirical, conceptual and theoretical standpoints, ultimately demonstrating 
that it is essential to consider both bargaining resources and negotiation 
context, in order to understand negotiation outcomes, and the influence of 
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Section 1 - Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The decisions and policies that emerge from the European Union (EU) are 
often the result of negotiations, both between member states in the Council 
of Ministers, and between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the 
European Parliament. Thus, in order to understand why the EU pursues a 
particular course of action or establishes a certain policy, it is useful to 
examine the preceding negotiations, and consider the positions of negotiating 
parties. Along those lines, it is also crucial to consider which parties are more 
or less influential in negotiations, as well as when and why this is the case. 
Drawing on the case of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the aim of this 
thesis is to demonstrate whether EU negotiations under different 
circumstances, and the resultant policies, can be expected to reflect the 
positions of some parties more than others. In other words, this thesis 
examines how the potential for negotiating parties to influence the outcome 
of negotiations relates to the negotiation context, considering the specific 
distinction between negotiations that take place to establish EU-level policy, 
and those that aim to reform existing EU-level policy, and analyzing the 
impact of these distinct negotiation contexts on the potential for member 
states to influence the outcome agreement. The original, policy-making 
negotiations are referred to as ‘uploading’ (Börzel in Bulmer and Lequesne, 
2005) negotiations, and the reform negotiations are referred to as 
‘reuploading’ (Kaarlejärvi, 2007) negotiations. Focusing on 
intergovernmental negotiations between EU member states, this thesis 
answers the following research question: 
Do differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
affect member state performance in each? 
In so doing, it makes an empirical contribution to studies of the SGP, a 
conceptual contribution to understanding the contexts of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, as well as differences between them and a 
theoretical contribution, through combining a rational choice institutionalist 
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approach with in-depth analysis of the role of specific bargaining resources 
for explaining states’ influence in intergovernmental negotiations.  
 Despite important changes between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, little attention has been given to studying the effects of these 
changes on the distributional outcome of negotiations. One important 
contribution on the subject is a study by Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000), 
in which the authors argue that the individual status quo of each member 
state party to Council negotiations, rather than one status quo common to all, 
a change that results from the distinct default condition in original and 
reform negotiations, respectively, should be considered when modeling a 
range of acceptable outcomes to negotiation parties, and hence the likelihood 
of reaching agreement on EU-level policy. Another contribution is a study by 
Fritz Scharpf (1988) of the effects on decision-making in the German Federal 
system and the then European Community, of changing default condition 
from original to reform negotiations, with the default condition in the former 
negotiations being no established policy and in the latter being the same 
policy as that established in original negotiations. Scharpf argues that in both 
systems, under conditions of unanimity, any actor benefitting comparatively 
from the status quo, relative to outcomes contained in the zone of agreement, 
will resist policy change, with the implication that, once established, it is 
difficult to reform existing policies even when they are clearly suboptimal. 
Crucially, in contrast to the study at hand, which focuses on the distributional 
outcome of negotiations and the specific resources states can rely on to 
secure a favorable distributional outcome, the studies by Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg, and Scharpf, focus on the effects of changing default condition 
for negotiation outcomes generally. 
 On the subject of individual member state performance, or influence, 
research has tended to reveal a disproportionate level of influence by big 
member states in EU negotiations (for example Moravcsik, 1998; Thomson 
et al., 2006), though aside from formal procedural effects such as voting 
rules and legislative process, there is a general lack of attention to the 
specific context in which negotiations take place, and how that serves to 
heighten or diminish the influence of states generally found to succeed in EU 
negotiations. Further to that, it is essential to understand the specific causal 
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processes through which member states influence negotiation outcomes, 
regardless whether it is the case that big member states dominate 
negotiations under any context. While Moravcsik (1998), Beach (2005), 
Bailer (2004; 2006; 2008) and Tallberg (2008) have made particularly useful 
contributions to understanding the role of certain bargaining resources in 
lending influence to national and supranational actors in EU negotiations, 
questions remain over the specific causal processes at work, and the extent to 
which these are mediated by changing context in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. Thus, this thesis undertakes a qualitative, 
process-tracing analysis of the negotiation performance of Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, which took place between 1995-97 and 2004-05, 
respectively, in order to draw conclusions regarding the effects of specific 
bargaining resources on the potential for member states to influence 
negotiations, as well as the way in which negotiation context mediates the 
utility of those resources.  
 Negotiation performance, the dependent variable in this study, is 
defined as the extent to which a member state influences negotiations to 
affect the outcome agreement (Bailer, 2004; Thomson et al., 2006). Where a 
member state has deliberately influenced negotiations to achieve an outcome 
that is close to, or similar to, own policy positions over the issues negotiated, 
this is considered to be negotiation success. The independent variables that 
are expected to impact on the outcome of negotiation performance include 
various bargaining resources member states might rely on to wield influence. 
Specifically, the bargaining resources this thesis analyzes are preference 
intensity, information, content expertise and process expertise. Preference 
intensity is defined as “the relative value [a state] places on an agreement 
compared to the status quo alternative,” (Moravcsik, 1998: 62); information 
is defined as knowledge about participants’ policy positions, the reasons 
behind those positions, and the level of salience attached to them (Naurin, 
2009); content expertise is defined as “technical knowledge of the issues 
under negotiation” (Tallberg, 2008: 701); and process expertise is defined as 
“knowledge of the institutional framework of negotiations” (Tallberg, 2008: 
701). While some of the negotiation literature groups information, content 
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expertise and process expertise together as a subset of information or 
expertise (see Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008), I consider that a negotiating 
party can possess information about other parties’ preferences, yet lack 
content expertise, for instance, which is why this thesis considers each of 
these bargaining resources separately.  
 The expectation is that a lower preference intensity, increased 
information, increased content expertise or increased process expertise, will 
all have the general effect of improving member state negotiation 
performance. This is in line with findings from previous contributions 
regarding preference intensity (for example Moravscik, 1998), information 
(for example Beach, 2005), content expertise (for example Tallberg, 2008) 
and process expertise (for example Tallberg, 2008) as bargaining resources 
in EU negotiations. What these contributions do not address, though, is the 
contextual conditions surrounding the utility of preference intensity, 
information, content expertise and process expertise, insofar as those 
contextual features differ between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations. The argument this thesis advances is that the incidence of 
‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ negotiations is an important intervening 
variable, impacting on the relationship between bargaining resources and 
negotiation performance, with the expected result that preference intensity 
will be less relevant for negotiation success in the context of ‘reuploading’ 
than ‘uploading’, while information, content expertise and process expertise 
will be less relevant for negotiation success in the context of ‘uploading’ 
than ‘reuploading’.  
 In tracing the specific causal processes through which these resources 
lend influence to the states that utilize them, and examining the mediating 
effects of negotiation context on those causal processes, this thesis generates 
a host of interesting conclusions. Among these are the finding that preference 
intensity is essential for negotiations success in ‘uploading’, though largely 
irrelevant in ‘reuploading’, where content expertise and process expertise are 
seen to be highly effective for achieving negotiation success. However, the 
utility of content expertise and process expertise for negotiating successfully 
is found to be minimal in the context of ‘uploading‘ negotiations. Similarly, 
the negotiation context in ‘uploading’ serves to diminish the relevance of 
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information, yet neither is information found to be a particularly useful 
bargaining resource in ‘reuploading‘ negotiations.  
 This thesis also contributes to a wide range of literatures, from 
empirical, conceptual and theoretical standpoints. To begin with the 
empirical contribution, this thesis undertakes a study of the SGP as an 
instance of intergovernmental negotiation in a densely institutionalized 
context. Conclusions from this case are relevant to additional instances of 
intergovernmental negotiation in the EU, as well as other settings for 
institutionalized cooperation between states, beyond the EU. Findings from 
this analysis also have important policy implications regarding past and 
future implementation of the SGP, and Eurozone governance more broadly. 
The debt crisis in the Eurozone, ongoing since 2010, has laid bare not only 
flaws in the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but in the 
process of intergovernmental decision-making in the EU more generally. In 
undertaking a detailed analysis of intergovernmental negotiations over the 
SGP, this study identifies some important obstacles to arriving at agreement, 
as well as the role of negotiation context in shaping those obstacles, all of 
which has implications for the current state of affairs in the Eurozone.  
 Crucially, this thesis provides important analytical leverage over the 
question of influence, and which member states can be expected to influence 
the outcome of negotiations over the design of a banking union, the balance 
between national fiscal discipline and increasing solidarity among Eurozone 
members and a host of other questions integral to the future of the single 
currency. In addition to this, the detailed analysis this thesis conducts of the 
process of negotiations that led to the original and reformed SGP, provides 
for heightened understanding of the political and practical difficulty of 
addressing design flaws in the Eurozone that are so apparent today, and 
which can be traced back to past compromises required for completion of the 
single currency. Thus, as the concluding chapter elaborates, this thesis can 
contribute policy advice, regarding the state of affairs in the Eurozone and 
the potential to improve upon the design of EMU, to both individual member 
states and the supranational composition of the EU.  
 Related to the policy implications, this thesis makes a significant 
empirical contribution to studies of the SGP. The SGP has thus far been the 
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focus of a wide range of literature. It has been treated as a case of rules-based 
fiscal policy, and hence assessed with regard to a criteria of desirables for 
fiscal rules (for example Buti et al., 2003; Begg and Schelkle, 2004). Along 
similar lines, there is a body of literature that sought to contribute to the 
debate over SGP reform that began in late 2003, identifying weaknesses and 
resultant targets for change in an updated SGP (for example Buti et al., 2003; 
Begg and Schelkle, 2004; Hallerberg, 2004; see Begg and Schelkle, 2004; 
Heipertz and Verdun, 2010 for an overview of this literature). Yet another 
strand of literature treated the SGP as one element in the design of EMU, 
analyzing it as a component in overarching assessments of the EMU 
architecture, particularly regarding the national-level impact of that 
supranational architecture, on Eurozone members (for example Dyson, 2002; 
2008). Finally, there are contributions that seek to explain the SGP as an 
example of international cooperation, focusing on the politics surrounding its 
establishment and reform (for example Brunila et al., 2001; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2004; 2005; 2010). While there is, thus, plentiful literature on the 
broad topic of the SGP, there is as yet no comparative analysis of the 
changing context between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP, and the extent to which this mediates the relative influence of 
member states or the process through which they seek to influence the 
outcome agreement. This thesis contributes such an analysis, which adds 
value beyond the realm of empirical studies of the SGP. 
 In addition to contributing a distinct approach to empirical studies of 
the SGP, this thesis also builds on existing conceptualization of negotiation 
context, and distinctions between policy creating and policy reform 
negotiations in the EU. In distinguishing between negotiations that take place 
in the absence of established EU-level policy, and those that take place in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, this thesis draws on the 
Europeanization literature, as described in chapter 3. The Europeanization 
literature emphasizes the relationship between national and supranational 
levels in examining the EU, and along those lines, identifies ‘uploading’ as a 
crucial stage in the EU policy process. The concept of ‘uploading’ as applied 
in the Europeanization literature, refers to the process whereby national 
actors attempt to shape EU policy through negotiations both across member 
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states and between member states and Brussels, eventually resulting in the 
establishment of policy at EU-level, which member states then ‘download’ 
for implementation at national level (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 34; 
Börzel, 2001; Bulmer and Burch, 2001 in Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 
34). While the majority of Europeanization literature highlights only 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ stages in the EU policy process, one 
contribution questioned this approach, on the basis that failed 
implementation may lead to another stage, of ‘reuploading’, which is the 
process of negotiating reforms to existing EU-level policy, following a failed 
‘downloading’ stage (Kaarlejärvi, 2007: 127). In conducting a detailed, 
comparative analysis of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP, this thesis builds on existing conceptualizations of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, in order to identify differences between these negotiation 
contexts, and the impact of those differences on negotiation processes and 
outcomes, neither of which questions receive sufficient treatment in existing 
literature. 
 The theoretical framework through which these changes between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations are analyzed represents yet 
another contribution of the study at hand. This thesis adopts a rational choice 
institutionalist approach to analyze the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, which provides the opportunity not only to test 
theoretical arguments derived in line with the approach, but also to refine 
those arguments. Specifically, the rational choice institutionalist approach is 
essential for highlighting how contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations can be expected to impact on the strategies 
adopted by rational actors pursuing the goal of negotiations success, in each 
case (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). In other words, the expectation is that 
rational actors pursuing the fixed goal of negotiation success, will privilege 
distinct bargaining resources in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
in response to the differential utility of a given resource under each context. 
However, the theory is not specific regarding the causal processes through 
which these contextual changes will interact with specific bargaining 
resources, to affect states’ negotiation performance. In providing an answer 
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to this question, this thesis can enhance the potential for rational choice 
institutionalist analyses to explain negotiation outcomes more generally.  
 Further to that, in focusing on states’ bargaining resources, namely 
preference intensity, information, content expertise and process expertise as 
explanatory factors for negotiation success, whilst simultaneously 
considering the effects of negotiation context in mediating the utility of these 
resources for negotiation success, this thesis joins, synthesizes and 
contributes important findings to a long-standing debate that spans the 
various literatures on negotiation.  For example, conclusions drawn here can 
address questions regarding which of these bargaining resources are most 
important to wield influence in international negotiations, how exactly states 
can deploy these resources to influence negotiations and the extent to which 
answers to the preceding questions are conditional on the circumstances of a 
given negotiation situation, to name but a few (for example Cox et al., 1975; 
Zartman and Berman, 1982; Mastenbroek, 1989; Bailer, 2004; 2006; 2008; 
Tallberg, 2008). In a world where ever more policy areas are subject to, or 
could benefit from, international cooperation, there is a great deal of 
academic and practical importance to enhancing understanding of 
intergovernmental negotiation processes and outcomes, which is a central 
aim of this study.  
 
 
1.2 Plan of the Thesis 
 
1.2a Introductory Chapters 
In addition to the current chapter, this introductory section of the thesis 
contains chapter 2, which provides an introduction to the SGP. Chapter 2 
explains the role of the SGP as the main architecture for fiscal policy in 
EMU, operationalizing fiscal policy targets set in the Maastricht Treaty to 
gain single currency membership, for the period after the single currency was 
launched. Chapter 2 also describes key changes to the SGP, resulting from its 
most recent reform in 2011, with the intended results that it can address more 
effectively trends in both private and public debt in member states, carry a 
more potent threat of sanction for member states with excessive public 
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deficits and deal with a wider range of macroeconomic indicators of 
economic health, than previous iterations of the pact have been designed to 
address.  
 Following this contemporary discussion, chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the historical process of economic and monetary integration in 
the EU, beginning with the collapse of Bretton Woods, at which point many 
states decided to float their currencies, while most European states had an 
interest in maintaining fixed exchange rates, and decided to establish a 
regional system that some hoped would lay the groundwork for deepening 
integration, with the ultimate goal of establishing a single currency (Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999). In addition to describing the various steps in the 
process to EMU, chapter 2 introduces a debate that has run through the 
history of economic and monetary integration, namely that between 
advocates of a single currency absent strict preconditions regarding 
economic convergence, and those advocating prior economic convergence as 
an essential step for the success of a single currency (Moravcsik, 1998; 
Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). This debate was reflected in negotiations 
over the SGP, which the German government proposed in 1995 partly in 
response to the question of economic convergence, especially regarding 
continued convergence once the single currency was established (Stark, 
2001).  
 The following sections of chapter 2 address the implementation 
record of the SGP, beginning with that of the original pact, from the launch 
of the euro in 1999, and drawing the conclusion that, while the pact 
benefitted from benign economic circumstances at the time of the euro’s 
launch, it was soon revealed to suffer from considerable flaws, not least its 
ineffective sanction mechanism that was thwarted by the machinations of 
France and Germany in November 2003 (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). While 
onlookers were pessimistic (for example Agence France Presse, 2005; 
Smith, 2005; Thornton, 2005), and flaws remained apparent, the 2005 reform 
agreement that resulted from ‘reuploading’ negotiations did not have much 
opportunity anyway to prove its worth, or otherwise, because, despite benign 
circumstances immediately after its launch, the economic climate then 
deteriorated so far, so fast, with the onset of financial crisis not long after 
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(Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). This is the general conclusion advanced in 
chapter 2, on the record of the reformed SGP. The final section of chapter 2 
describes the empirical contribution the thesis makes to studies of the SGP, 
namely in treating it as a case of intergovernmental negotiations under the 
separate contexts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, with the aim of analyzing 
why the SGP looks the way it does from an explicitly negotiation-centric, 
rational choice institutionalist approach. 
 
1.2b Theoretical Framework Chapters 
The subsequent section of the thesis, composed of chapters 3 and 4, 
describes the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 provides conceptual 
foundations, including discussion of the Europeanization literature that 
introduced the concepts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, though has not 
given much consideration to differences between these negotiation contexts, 
or the extent to which such differences might impact on the potential for 
member states to influence the outcome of negotiations in each. After 
reviewing the contributions by Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000) and 
Scharpf (1988), which, while not from a Europeanization perspective, do 
identify the potential impact of differences between these negotiation 
contexts for the general outcome of negotiations, I reiterate how this thesis 
contributes a distinct approach, in analyzing the effects of negotiation 
context on the distributional outcomes of negotiations for individual member 
states, rather than features of the collective outcome. Further to that, both of 
these aforementioned contributions focus solely on default condition, with 
Scharpf (1988), for example, arguing that a change in default condition 
between original and reform negotiations, from no EU-level policy being the 
default condition in the former to existing EU-level policy being the default 
condition in the latter, will impact on the likelihood of securing a negotiated 
agreement. While also considering default condition along similar lines to 
Scharpf (1988) and Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000), this thesis considers 
additional features of distinction between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, 
which are introduced in chapter 3, and which represent value added from the 
contribution at hand.  
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 Chapter 3 describes how four key features of negotiations, namely 
default condition, preference composition, interdependence and 
distributional conflict, differ between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, insofar as default condition in ‘uploading’ is maintenance of 
different national policies, while default condition in ‘reuploading’ is 
maintenance of existing EU-level policy, preferences in ‘uploading’ are 
composed of whether to establish EU-level policy and how that potential 
policy should look, while preferences in ‘reuploading’ are about whether to 
reform existing EU-level policy and how it should look, interdependence is 
more symmetrical in ‘reuploading’ than ‘uploading’ and the level of 
distributional conflict is higher in the latter than the former. Chapter 3 links 
this characterization of the two negotiation contexts with the expectation that 
particular bargaining resources will be differentially useful for influencing 
the outcome agreement in each one, due to the four features of distinction 
highlighted. Thus, in addition to laying the foundations for the rational 
choice institutionalist analysis of member state negotiation performance in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, chapter 3 details an important conceptual 
contribution this thesis makes, in clarifying understanding of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, different stages in the EU policy process whose distinct 
qualities have not received sufficient consideration in the literature to date, 
particularly regarding the implications of these distinctions for the 
distributional outcome of negotiations under each context.   
 Chapter 4 picks up where chapter 3 concludes, describing the rational 
choice institutionalist approach through which this thesis analyzes the effects 
of differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, on member state 
negotiation performance in each context. In addition to the utility of a 
rational choice institutionalist approach for theorizing the effects of changing 
context between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ on the strategies states will 
pursue to achieve negotiation success, chapter 4 explains how the theoretical 
framework combines a rational choice institutionalist approach with an 
analysis of the specific bargaining resources that can be expected to lend 
influence to states that possess them, in a given negotiation setting. 
Crucially, the focus on distinct context in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
leads to the expectation, derived from the rational choice institutionalist 
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approach, that specific bargaining resources will be more or less relevant for 
negotiation success in each context, with preference intensity dominating 
‘uploading’ negotiations, and information, content expertise and process 
expertise prevailing in ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
 Chapter 4 also provides important conceptual information, including 
a review of various approaches to conceptualizing negotiation performance, 
the dependent variable in this study, as well as preference intensity, 
information, content expertise and process expertise, the independent 
variables, and clarifies how each of these concepts are defined for the 
purposes of the study at hand. Beyond clarifying key concepts, chapter 4 
introduces the causal argument regarding each of the bargaining resources 
under analysis, justifying not only the expectation that possessing these 
bargaining resources will improve member state negotiation performance in 
general, but also the further prediction that changing context between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations will mediate the causal role of 
each bargaining resource, in affecting states’ negotiation performance. Thus, 
chapter 4 articulates the eight hypotheses to be tested, which are derived 
from the preceding causal arguments regarding each of the independent 
variables. 
 Along those lines, drawing on key contributions by Moravcsik 
(1998), Naurin (2009), Tallberg (2008) and Beach (2005), among others, an 
essential step in chapter 4 is to set out the specific causal processes through 
which preference intensity, information, content expertise and process 
expertise are posited to affect negotiation performance generally. Integrating 
the predictions derived in line with the rational choice institutionalist 
approach, the chapter then presents the posited causal processes taking 
account of the intervening effects of ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, whereby a low preference intensity is not expected to improve 
states’ negotiation performance in ‘reuploading’, while it is in ‘uploading’, 
and a high level of information, content expertise or process expertise, while 
expected to impact positively on negotiation performance in ‘reuploading’, is 
not predicted to impact on negotiation performance in ‘uploading’. Finally, 
chapter 4 articulates the theoretical contribution this thesis makes, which lies 
in specifying, testing and refining predictions that would elude a rational 
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choice institutionalist analysis alone, yet are made possible by combining 
this approach with in-depth examination of specific bargaining resources. 
Related to this, an additional theoretical contribution is made through the 
synthesis of a wide and diverse body of negotiation literature, to address 
questions variously pursued by all. 
 
1.2c Research Design Chapter 
Following chapter 4 is the research design section of the thesis, which 
includes chapter 5 on concept measurement, data collection and analysis, as 
well as case selection. This chapter explains how the variables described in 
the preceding section are operationalized so as to generate empirical 
evidence, beginning with the dependent variable, negotiation performance, 
which is evaluated in light of the qualitative distance between states’ policy 
positions and the outcome agreement, for each issue debated in the 
negotiations. The data requirements and relevant sources are described, for 
assessing the negotiation performance of each member state, which include a 
variety of secondary sources, media reports, primary sources from the EU as 
well as national archives and interviews with negotiation participants, all of 
which contribute toward establishing the content of member state positions, 
such that these can be compared with the final issue outcomes to assess 
states’ negotiation performance.  
 Chapter 5 goes on to describe how each of the independent variables 
is operationalized using multiple indicators, which, while presenting a 
challenge in terms of data collection and analysis, was essential to enhance 
the validity of measurement for such abstract concepts as this thesis 
examines. Again, sources included an array of primary and secondary 
material, as well as further interviews with negotiation participants. After 
explaining the data collection and analysis carried out to arrive at values of 
the independent variables, chapter 5 describes the data requirements for the 
process-tracing analysis, including additional primary and secondary sources, 
media and further interviews, the latter being particularly important for this 
component of the study. 
 Given the particular challenges involved in process tracing, 
researchers have identified a case study approach as complementary to 
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process-tracing analysis (for example Gerring, 2004), which chapter 5 
discusses in justifying case selection. In addition to satisfying important 
requirements for research design, which chapter 5 details, the SGP meets a 
most basic requirement of the study, having been through both ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Further to this, chapter 5 explains the utility 
of the SGP in providing the opportunity to select nested cases for analysis, 
namely the four member states this thesis examines, including Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. In line with Gerring (2004) and 
Vennesson (2008), the chapter justifies selection of these states on the 
grounds that process-tracing analyses require a certain amount of case 
comparability, which would not hold if all member states that participated in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, were included in 
the analysis.  
 Beyond justifying the decision to focus on a select group of member 
states, chapter 5 details the process involved in identifying Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands specifically, for study, which rests on the need 
to introduce variation in the independent variables of interest, whilst 
controlling for certain extraneous variables, such as membership length, that, 
though not the subject of analysis, could be argued to impact on a state’s 
negotiation performance (Tallberg, 2008). Finally, chapter 5 articulates the 
particular value added in tracing the process through which these states 
influenced, or failed to influence, the outcome of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. It is through the in-depth study of 
these states’ negotiation performance, capturing the process through which 
they attempt to wield influence, rather than only the outcome of negotiation 
success or failure, that this thesis can enhance understanding of the specific 
causal mechanisms through which the bargaining resources examined, 
operate in practice. 
 
1.2d Empirical Chapters 
The empirical section of the thesis, including chapters 6 through 10, follows 
the research design section. Chapter 6 presents findings regarding the 
independent and dependent variables, for each of the four member states 
under analysis, in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
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SGP. Thus, the aim of chapter 6 is to provide an overview of the empirical 
evidence, which is referenced over the duration of the empirical section of 
the thesis. While chapter 6 answers some important questions, such as which 
member states negotiated successfully, which states had the lowest 
preference intensity, or the most information, content expertise and process 
expertise in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, and therefore alludes to the 
answers of such questions as whether preference intensity is differentially 
useful for negotiation success in different contexts, it also leaves a great deal 
to be explained. Notably, chapter 6 does not address the causal mechanisms 
linking the independent variables with the dependent variable, leaving the 
heavy lifting of distilling findings from the process-tracing analysis to 
chapters 7 through 10. 
 Chapter 7 presents findings for the independent variable preference 
intensity, including the key findings that Germany had the lowest preference 
intensity for reaching agreement in ‘uploading’ negotiations, and relied on 
this to negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’, while Belgium had the lowest 
preference intensity in ‘reuploading’, though this did not afford the Belgian 
delegation what influence they wielded in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. In 
addition to these findings, chapter 7 tests predictions advanced in line with 
each of the four states’ values for preference intensity, derived from 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between preference intensity and 
negotiation performance, as well as the hypothesized effects of context in 
mediating that relationship. Thus, chapter 7 discusses some of the processes 
through which states sought to influence negotiations in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, which serves to confirm a number of the predictions advanced 
regarding preference intensity, and is also supportive of the causal process 
through which preference intensity was posited to affect negotiation 
performance, subject to the impact of changing context between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’.  
 The picture that emerges from this chapter is of the incredible import 
of a low preference intensity for negotiating successfully in ‘uploading’, as 
seen in the success of Germany and, to a slightly lesser extent France, the 
latter state also having a low preference intensity for agreement in 
‘uploading’ negotiations. Also apparent, though, is the irrelevance of 
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preference intensity for negotiation performance in the context of 
‘reuploading’. The implications of these findings for literature on preference 
intensity, namely that the utility of preference intensity is more conditional 
than typically appreciated (for example Moravcsik, 1998), and for the 
literature that aims to characterize negotiation tactics and bargaining styles, 
namely that it is important to consider both context and resource capabilities, 
rather than emphasizing one or the other (for example Dür and Mateo, 2010; 
Elgström and Jönson, 2000), are considered before the chapter concludes.  
 Chapter 8 discusses the independent variable information, detailing 
findings regarding the effects of information in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, including that Germany and France had the joint 
highest levels of information in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, yet this 
variable played only a secondary role in explaining the negotiation 
performance of these states.  Further to that, chapter 8 reports that the 
process-tracing analysis largely disconfirms the causal mechanisms through 
which information was posited to affect negotiation performance, indicating 
the need for additional research to enhance understanding of the role of 
information in intergovernmental negotiations. Despite these disconfirmatory 
findings, the hypothesized effects of negotiation context to limit the utility of 
information as a bargaining resource in ‘uploading’ negotiations were 
confirmed. Thus, before concluding, chapter 8 reflects on potential 
contributions to existing literature on information as a bargaining resource 
(for example Mastenbroek, 1989; Bailer, 2006; Tallberg, 2006; 2008; 
Naurin, 2009), including that findings from the case at hand suggest a need 
to refine understanding of exactly how information operates as a resource for 
influence in intergovernmental negotiations.   
 Chapter 9, on the independent variable content expertise, reveals that 
while France, Germany and the Netherlands possessed similarly high levels 
of content expertise in ‘uploading’ negotiations, none of these states relied 
on content expertise to achieve negotiation success, whilst the Belgian 
delegation, despite having the most content expertise in ‘reuploading’, relied 
on a different resource to achieve the successes they did in ‘reuploading’. 
Rather than concluding that content expertise is not in fact an effective 
bargaining resource in intergovernmental negotiations, the process-tracing 
  21 
analysis demonstrates that the Dutch delegation relied on a high level of 
content expertise to achieve considerable success in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, confirming that this is a useful bargaining resource under the 
right conditions. Along those lines, analysis of member state negotiation 
performance in ‘uploading’, in line with predictions derived from the 
hypothesized effects of content expertise, and the intervening effects of 
negotiation context, indicate that content expertise was not an effective 
bargaining resource in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. This is as 
expected, and chapter 9 discusses how these confirmatory findings regarding 
the conditional utility of content expertise as determined by negotiation 
context, question literature that emphasizes resource capabilities alone as the 
determinant of member state bargaining tactics (for example Dür and Mateo, 
2010). Also on the subject of contributions to existing literature, chapter 9 
suggests the need for additional research to clarify the causal mechanisms 
linking content expertise with negotiation performance, given that these 
remain underspecified, and findings regarding the role of content expertise in 
Dutch success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, cannot be 
generalized in the absence of further research.  
 The final chapter in the empirical section of the thesis, chapter 10, 
discusses findings for the independent variable process expertise, including 
that Belgium had the most process expertise in both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, yet failed to negotiate successfully in 
‘uploading’, whilst achieving considerable success in ‘reuploading’. This is 
supportive of the argument that negotiation context conditions the utility of a 
given bargaining resource, with process expertise, specifically, expected to 
be less relevant for success under the context of ‘uploading’ than 
‘reuploading’. The posited mechanisms linking process expertise with 
negotiation success are only partly confirmed in the case of Belgian success 
in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, though the posited process whereby context 
limits the effectiveness of process expertise for achieving success in 
‘uploading’, yet does not limit the exercise of influence with recourse to 
process expertise, is apparent in the finding that Belgium was instrumental in 
forging the compromise agreement over the original SGP in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. In other words, Belgium was able to wield influence in 
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‘uploading’ negotiations by deploying process expertise, yet, as predicted, 
this did not lead to negotiation success, given that the compromise proposal 
did not reflect a uniquely Belgian position, rather representing a middle way 
between the opposing positions of France and Germany, the two states who 
dominated ‘uploading’ negotiations owing to their low preference intensities.  
 These findings presented in chapter 10 represent important 
contributions to the literature on process expertise as a bargaining resource 
(for example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008), notably in demonstrating the 
need to consider contextual limitations on the utility of process expertise to 
affect negotiation performance. They also contribute to the debate 
surrounding whether negotiations should be characterized collectively on the 
basis of the circumstances surrounding them (see Elgström and Jönsson), or 
viewed through the lens of individual parties’ bargaining resources (see Dür 
and Mateo, 2010), with the conclusion from this chapter being that there is a 
need to consider both elements in analyzing intergovernmental negotiations.  
 
1.2e Concluding Chapter 
After summarizing preceding chapters, the concluding chapter of the thesis 
departs from a focus on the role of specific bargaining resources, and their 
relationship with states’ negotiation performance as mediated by context, to 
present an overarching comparison of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, and to 
consider the most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, in 2011, as 
well as how the context of these negotiations compares with that of the 
‘uploading‘ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations that have been the subject of 
analysis throughout. The main conclusion is that the most recent 
‘reuploading’ negotiations share important similarities with the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, owing to the real possibility of collapse or partial dissolution of 
the Eurozone that formed the backdrop of the 2011, though certainly not the 
2004-05 ‘reuploading’ negotiations. This comparison provides for the 
elaboration of policy implications, which emerge from the analysis 
undertaken over the course of the thesis, regarding the sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone and the potential to find a lasting solution to design flaws in 
the single currency, which the crisis has made so apparent.  
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 Specifically, analysis of the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations reveals that where the political difficulty of reaching 
compromise is so great as to threaten the breakdown of negotiations, the 
response is to compromise in such a way as to sacrifice clarity of content, so 
that states not prepared to cross a certain line, are not explicitly forced to do 
so. This was seen in the case of ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, as 
described in the empirical section of the thesis, though it was less notable in 
the case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, owing partly to the fact that states 
were locked into cooperation and thus had little choice but to prepare to cross 
most lines in aid of reforming a dysfunctional policy.  
 To the extent that the threat to exit negotiations, rather than cross 
certain lines, was a feature of the most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations in 
2011, and is hanging over the ongoing process of reforming Eurozone 
governance, it is apparent how the current situation mirrors a context in 
‘uploading’ negotiations more so than in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. In other 
words, the specific situation resulting from the Eurozone crisis, whereby 
continued existence of the single currency, and of all current states’ 
membership in the single currency, is far from certain, has the effect of 
making the 2011 ‘reuploading’ negotiations, and any ongoing attempts to 
reform Eurozone governance, more similar to ‘uploading’, where the larger 
question of completing the single currency hung over negotiations, than to a 
typical ‘reuploading’ situation, as seen in the 2005 ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, where policy has already been established and its maintenance 
is not in question. One implication of this is that, as mentioned above, 
politically expedient, yet ultimately incomplete compromises may continue 
to emerge in response to EMU’s failings. Thus, to simplify greatly what is 
covered at length in the conclusion, this leads to the prognosis that the only 
chance to definitively solve the crisis in the Eurozone is to eschew politically 
convenient compromises, and tackle the ambiguity surrounding the 
economics of EMU.   
 Following this discussion, the concluding chapter of the thesis speaks 
to wider implications of findings herein, considering how this case, as an 
example of intergovernmental negotiations, might apply to additional EU 
policy areas subject to intergovernmental negotiation. This concluding 
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chapter also looks beyond the EU, to consider how findings from this study 
can apply to other institutionalized settings for intergovernmental 
cooperation, such as the WTO or IMF, which, while arguably differing from 
the EU in density of cooperation, size and scope, among other things, do 
feature decision-making through intergovernmental negotiations. This 
chapter also draws attention to questions that have been raised rather than 
answered, over the course of the analysis, and where future research could be 
particularly fruitful. Finally, the concluding chapter reiterates the central 
message of the thesis, that both bargaining resources and negotiation context 
matter, and should be taken into account, in order to enhance understanding 
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Chapter 2 - Historical Context 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by describing the role of the SGP as the main 
architecture for fiscal policy in EMU, highlighting its central components 
that include limits on permissible levels of public debt and deficits for 
member states, and a sanctioning mechanism intended to penalize states that 
breach those ceilings, among other elements. Particular attention is given to 
detailing the most recent reforms to the SGP, in 2011. From there, the 
chapter sets the historical context surrounding establishment of the SGP, 
addressing previous, failed attempts at European monetary integration, prior 
to the Maastricht Treaty that enshrined a commitment to full economic and 
monetary union, and highlighting how the SGP was partly a response to 
flaws in the design of EMU that emerged from Maastricht. In so doing, this 
section of the chapter engages with literature that has sought to explain the 
process of economic and monetary integration in Europe, with a focus on 
motivations for this process, as well as explanation of why the EMU 
institutions look the way they do (for example Dyson, 1994; Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998; Frieden et al., 1998; Frieden, 2002). 
An understanding of the debates that have surrounded economic and 
monetary integration, particularly regarding economic convergence, and 
whether this was a necessary precondition for successful monetary union, 
were central to negotiations over the SGP, insofar as this policy represented 
some recognition that lasting economic convergence was indeed essential to 
the stability of a single currency.  
 Following the historical discussion, attention turns to implementation 
of the original SGP, which benefitted from benign economic circumstances 
early on, though ultimately failed to compel the budgetary sustainability 
from Eurozone members that it was intended to deliver, a point articulated 
through focus on the events of November 2003 that precipitated SGP reform. 
Along those lines, literature is addressed that has sought to analyze the 
design and implementation of the SGP, from both economic and political 
perspectives, with the former focusing in particular on design features, or 
flaws, of the original pact; examples of this literature abound in the period 
following the SGP crisis of 2003, as experts sought to contribute to the 
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reform debate (see Buti et al., 2003; Buti and van den Noord, 2004; Begg 
and Schelkle, 2004). The latter body of literature tends to consider how 
design of the pact relates to economic trends among Eurozone states, as well 
as the politics of implementation (for example Dyson, 2002; 2008; Heipertz 
and Verdun, 2004; 2010), and such studies are also covered in reviewing the 
implementation record of the original pact. The chapter then discusses the 
implementation record of the reformed pact, including consideration of how 
the SGP relates to the sovereign debt crisis that has gripped the currency 
union since 2010, and attention is drawn to the focus on deficits, at the 
expense of debt, by which the SGP was characterized, as well as failure to 
account for the potential dangers of excessive private debt, both of which 
features of the pact arguably contributed to the crisis still ongoing in the 
Eurozone.  
 The final section of the chapter highlights the empirical contribution 
of the thesis, which marks a departure from existing studies in its explicitly 
comparative approach to considering member state influence in the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. This approach to 
the SGP is unique in its in-depth examination of member state influence, and 
of the specific mechanisms utilized to wield influence in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Before concluding, the chapter 
notes that this thesis has important policy implications, with regard to the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, which represents a particularly timely 
contribution of the analysis undertaken here.  
 
 
2.1 The Role of the SGP in EMU 
The SGP is the backbone of fiscal policy coordination in EMU. It is an 
example of ‘hard coordination’, using sanctions and specific quantitative 
indicators to compel economic convergence amongst Eurozone members, 
with the aim of safeguarding the stability of the single currency (Linsenmann 
et al., 2007). The pact, originally established in 1997, consists of a preventive 
and a corrective mechanism. The preventive mechanism is intended to 
address fiscal imbalances in member states before they become excessive, 
thus a central procedure under this component of the pact is the submission 
by member states of annual programs detailing how they will either achieve 
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or maintain sound fiscal positions in the medium term (Hallerberg and 
Bridwell, 2008). These programs are referred to as either stability or 
convergence programs, depending on whether the submitting state is an 
EMU member or non-member, respectively. Both the Commission and 
Council examine these programs, though the Commission only offers an 
assessment, while the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) 
issues a formal opinion on the program of each member state. The stability 
(convergence) programs require multi-annual planning, according to 
common accounting standards throughout the EU (Savage, 2007).  
 These programs are not, however, the only element of the preventive 
mechanism of the SGP, which includes two further policy instruments. The 
first of these is known as the early warning, which the Council can address to 
a member state, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission (Hallerberg 
and Bridwell, 2008). The purpose of this instrument is to prevent the 
occurrence of an excessive deficit, where the fiscal trend in a member state 
appears excessive. The second instrument is known as policy advice, and is 
used by the Commission to address policy recommendations to member 
states, regarding the broad implications of their fiscal policies. As opposed to 
most Commission functions under the pact, which involve providing 
information and recommendations to Ecofin, rather than to member states 
directly, the policy advice instrument is an opportunity for the Commission 
to bypass Ecofin (Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008). Still, the power of the 
Commission to affect the policy choices of Member States is constrained by 
the position of Ecofin in handling the disciplinary process under the 
corrective arm of the pact. The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is the 
central process governed by the corrective arm, and is triggered when a 
member state’s national deficit exceeds the 3% of GDP threshold, as agreed 
under the Maastricht Treaty (Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008). If it is 
determined that a member state has exceeded the deficit ceiling, the Council 
has the responsibility of issuing recommendations to the state, aimed at 
reducing their deficit in a given time period. If the member state fails to 
observe these recommendations, the corrective arm provides for further 
measures, including the possibility of monetary sanctions for Eurozone 
members.  
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Following the most recent agreement, in December 2011, there are 
important changes to the functioning of the SGP and Eurozone economic 
governance more generally.
1
 Regarding the preventive arm, in order to 
facilitate progress toward the medium-term objective (MTO) that states have 
been required to pursue since the establishment of the SGP, the MTO defined 
as an annual structural deficit that does not exceed .5% of nominal GDP will 
be integrated into member states’ national legal systems, with a sanctioning 
mechanism for states failing to make sufficient progress toward the 
accompanying expenditure benchmarks (European Council, 2011). Further to 
that, the new agreement sets minimum requirements for budgetary 
frameworks at national level, so as to ensure that all administrative levels of 
government are contributing to efforts to meet the MTO and comply with 
debt and deficit limits.  
A key change to the corrective arm of the pact is that member states 
can now be sanctioned for failing to observe the debt target of 60% of GDP, 
whereas in past, sanctions were only possible in the case of violating the 
deficit ceiling. This is part of a broader initiative to rebalance the pact, which 
has been criticized for its singular focus on budget deficits (for example 
Heipertz, 2003). Along those lines, the new rules establish a macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP), which provides for the sanctioning of states that 
fail to observe targets aimed at enhanced competitiveness and other 
indicators of a country’s macroeconomic health. This procedure relies on a 
new scoreboard system of indicators, coupled with in-depth analyses of 
member state economies, in order to capture emerging imbalances and, 
where necessary, force their correction with recourse to the MIP.  
Finally, the new agreement includes a key change to decision-making 
procedures, whereby sanctions will now be imposed under the corrective 
elements of the pact, unless a qualified majority of states votes against this. 
Whereas the decision-making process bound up with the previous pact, 
regarding imposition of fines under the EDP, required that a qualified 
majority of member states in Ecofin voted in favor of sanctions, it is now 
                                       
1
 See European Commission website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/ for a detailed description of the 
updated SGP and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. 
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necessary to have a qualified majority vote against sanctions in order to 
prevent that step in the process. This is intended to make it more difficult for 
states to escape the sanctions procedure, and is viewed as a big step in the 
direction toward automaticity of fines, wich was notably lacking in previous 
iterations of the SGP (interview, Council secretariat b).  
 
 
2.2 Economic and Monetary Integration from Bretton Woods to Maastricht 
The Maastricht Treaty that enshrined a commitment to full economic and 
monetary union, and the SGP that emerged in response to some gaps in the 
design of EMU set out in Maastricht, were only two steps in a long process 
of European monetary integration that began in the 1960s, with the decline of 
the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime. In response to the impending 
collapse of Bretton Woods, Europe’s leaders began considering a regional 
exchange rate regime (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). As analyses of the 
path to European economic and monetary union have sought to demonstrate, 
there were a number of reasons why then European Community (EC) 
members preferred to maintain a fixed rate system, despite the flaws that had 
become apparent with Bretton Woods. These included such motivations as 
limiting trade disruptions caused by exchange rate instability, facilitating 
administration of the Common Agricultural Policy, which would be 
complicated by currency fluctuation, and the political goal of furthering 
cooperation and stability on the continent through a shared currency (for 
example Frieden, 2002; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999).  
 Thus, in 1970, the Werner Plan was drawn up by a group of experts 
chaired by then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner. The plan set 
a timetable for the completion of full economic and monetary union, which, 
though endorsed by EC leaders in 1971, was never fully implemented 
(McNamara, 2005). A key reason for this was French opposition to 
relinquishing sovereignty as far as would have been required by the 
agreement as it was, and another reason behind the failure of this original 
plan was the unworkability of the ‘snake-in-the-tunnel’ fixed exchange rate 
regime, which began in 1973 with the participation of the Benelux countries, 
France, Italy, Germany, Denmark and the UK. Although Germany and the 
Benelux countries managed to maintain relatively stable exchange rates, the 
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other participants struggled as a result of economic divergence, and the 
system fell apart after 1976, when the French franc was forced out, at which 
point the snake ceased to be a viable route to full economic and monetary 
union (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999).  
 Despite this early failure, the European Monetary System (EMS) was 
proposed in the late 1970s, as a new exchange-rate regime with a great deal 
of similarity to the defunct snake. However, one important change had 
occurred in the run up to the EMS, which made a fixed exchange rate regime 
more feasible than it had been at the time of the previous, failed attempt. 
Specifically, there was increasing movement away from Keynesianism, with 
convergence instead around German-held ideas about the importance of 
controlling inflation. This policy convergence, which was particularly 
pronounced in France during 1976-81, had the effect of making economic 
convergence, and the related goal of monetary integration, somewhat more 
achievable (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999).  
Whether as a result of policy convergence or economic demands for 
the removal of exchange rate instability to facilitate trade (Frieden, 2002), or 
some combination therein, the EMS, which began in March 1979 with 
membership that included all EC members excepting the UK, did not meet 
with early success. Indicating that any policy convergence had been 
insufficient to make the EMS more workable than its failed predecessor, the 
same states that had struggled to maintain fixed rates under the snake, 
notably France and Italy, also struggled early in the EMS, a condition that 
continued until 1987 (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). From that point on, 
though, the EMS system worked relatively well, and an important goal of the 
Commission headed by Jacques Delors was to strengthen and extend the 
EMS. In conjunction with this, the European Council had finalized the Single 
European Act in 1985, which included a commitment to monetary union, and 
in 1988, the European Council tasked Delors with chairing a Committee to 
develop a plan for completing the single currency. The group’s report, which 
was delivered to the Madrid European Council in 1989, formed the basis for 
the eventual design of EMU contained in the Maastricht Treaty (McNamara, 
2005).  
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As has been the case throughout European monetary integration, a 
central debate surrounding Maastricht was between those states, such as 
Germany, that wanted a stable single currency, which would come into force 
only in the case of sufficient economic convergence amongst its members 
and a stability-oriented monetary policy implemented by a fully independent 
central bank, and those states, such as France, that emphasized economic 
goals such as limiting unemployment and the need for an economic 
government to counterbalance an independent central bank (for example 
Dyson, 1994; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998).
2
 While these 
competing goals rested on distinct orientations regarding the utility and 
appropriate politicization, or otherwise, of monetary policy, as well as highly 
varied experiences with inflation, the process through which these goals were 
reconciled into an agreement for the design of a single European currency, 
was unquestionably political (see Moravcsik, 1998; Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999). The eventual compromise reflected German influence to a great 
extent, in that five convergence criteria were set, which any states wishing to 
adopt the single currency must first meet. 
 However, there was a lack of detail surrounding exactly how the 
final decision on membership in the single currency would be taken, leaving 
room for political maneuver by Heads of State and Government, in the 
absence of a state fully satisfying these convergence criteria (Moravcsik, 
1998). The convergence criteria were as follows: no potential member may 
have an inflation rate more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the 
average of the three lowest inflation states; no potential member may have a 
deficit to GDP ratio in excess of 3%; no potential member may have a debt 
to GDP ratio in excess of 60%; prior to adopting the single currency, 
potential members must have first been member of the exchange-rate 
mechanism for two consecutive years; the nominal long-term interest rate of 
any potential member must be within 2 percentage points of that of the three 
states with lowest inflation (OJ C, 1992). Thus, the design of the single 
currency laid out in Maastricht, placed a great deal of emphasis on price 
stability, as seen in both the convergence criteria and the independent ECB 
with a treaty mandate to prevent inflation.  
                                       
2
 For in-depth analysis of Maastricht, see Dyson and Featherstone, 1999. 
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One open question in the EMU arrangement that emerged from 
Maastricht was how to maintain economic convergence after the launch of 
the single currency (Stark, 2001). In other words, while the convergence 
criteria were a boon for inflation-wary states, notably Germany, there was no 
mechanism in Maastricht to ensure that these criteria would be observed after 
states had passed the membership test (Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008). Thus, 
there was no guarantee that the euro would remain a stable currency, given 
that inflation-prone states might adhere to the convergence criteria just long 
enough to gain membership, but not after. Further to that, leaving room for 
maneuver in the final decision over single currency membership, which was 
a feature of Maastricht (Boyes, and Bremner, 1995), served to increase the 
risk that states with poor stability credentials would be allowed into the 
single currency (Financial Times, 1996a), implicating further threats to its 
stability in the absence of some measures to compel continued economic 
convergence. The need to address these gaps in the Maastricht agreement 
prompted the German Bundesbank to request that some further guarantees be 
provided, regarding the lasting stability of any future single currency, before 
they could give their support for completing the project and, related, before 
public support could be gained for the single currency (interviews, British 
treasury and German finance ministry a; Stark, 2001). Thus began work on 
the German finance ministry’s proposal for a stability pact.   
 
 
2.3 Origins and Implementation of the SGP 
At the urging of the Bundesbank, the German finance ministry began work in 
1995 on proposals for an additional component to the EMU framework, 
which would deliver some guarantee that the single currency would be at 
least as stable as the D-Mark (Stark, 2001). After conducting extensive 
analysis based on historical trends and in-depth country studies, as well as 
projections for the impact of unexpected shocks, among other factors, the 
German finance ministry drew up their proposal for a stability pact, which 
set strict rules and guidelines for the budgetary policies of any future single 
currency members, and entailed automatic sanctions in the case that states 
violated these rules (interview, German finance ministry a; Stark, 2001). 
Before formally unveiling this proposal in November 1995, representatives 
  33 
of the German finance ministry visited their counterparts in all EU member 
states, as well as consulting with Commission officials, in order to gauge 
initial reactions to the proposal, and to underline the importance of such an 
agreement for Germany’s participation in the single currency.  
 The evidence is mixed in terms of how others responded. For 
example, one Commission official has said that reactions to the proposal 
were very negative, and in fact the whole idea would have been brushed off 
had it been proposed by any state other than Germany (interview, 
Commission a). In contrast to this, others have said that they reacted 
favorably to the idea of some mechanism to ensure continued convergence 
after the launch of the single currency, especially in light of the 
incompleteness of Maastricht on that score, though noting that positive 
reactions to the idea of a stability pact were combined with opposition to the 
stringency of the specific agreement proposed by Germany (for example 
interviews, Belgian finance ministry a; Dutch finance ministry b; British 
treasury; Stark, 2001). There was also concern over whether the Maastricht 
Treaty would need to be reopened in order to accommodate the German 
proposal, which was widely opposed (interview, Commission a; Traynor, 
1995; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). In any event, then German Finance 
Minister, Theo Waigel, went ahead with the proposal, officially unveiling the 
idea for a stability pact at an Ecofin meeting in November 1995, and the 
Commission circulated a proposal in January 1996, which was based on the 
German one, though absent the same stringency by which the former version 
was characterized. From there, the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP 
officially began.  
 Final agreement over the original SGP was reached at the Amsterdam 
European Council in June 1997. A deal had been struck over nearly all 
outstanding issues surrounding the SGP, during the Dublin European 
Council of December 1996, and the intention was to finalize the legal 
agreement at Amsterdam, though it became necessary to revisit the political 
agreement following the June 1997 electoral victory of the French Socialists, 
who had campaigned on a promise to reopen the agreement reached in 
Dublin (Stark, 2001). It was this final step in the negotiation process, the 
Amsterdam summit, that led to the addition of a resolution on growth and 
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employment to the pact agreement, which was a concession to the French 
socialists, who required some political victory to sell their domestic public, if 
they were to agree to the pact at that point (interviews, British treasury 
official and Dutch finance ministry a; Barber, 1997).   
 Implementation of the original SGP began with the launch of the 
single currency in 1999, and continued until November 2003, at which point 
failure to initiate the EDP against France and Germany, and the subsequent 
decision by the Commission to take the Council to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) over this failure, marked the end of the original SGP and paved 
the way for SGP reform. Early implementation of the pact was fairly 
successful, aided by the benign economic circumstances that prevailed in the 
late 1990s, which also facilitated economic convergence amongst EU 
member states, in advance of the euro’s launch (Bearce, 2009). However, the 
change in economic conditions from the time of the US recession in 2001 
meant that, having ceded control of monetary policy, Eurozone governments 
were limited in their potential to combat the effects of recession, with fiscal 
policy the only tool at their disposal (Bearce, 2009). It was at this point that 
failings in the SGP began to emerge. 
 One flaw of the SGP that was revealed by the economic downturn 
was its asymmetrical design (Buti et al., 2003). The SGP imposed strict 
limits on Eurozone states, with regard to deficit levels, but was far less 
specific on the question of imposing budgetary discipline in good times, so 
as to protect against fiscal overruns in bad times. The result of this was that 
member states found themselves with too little room for maneuver, and the 
choice was between enacting expansionary fiscal policy to combat recession, 
on one hand, or abiding by the rules of the SGP on the other, but not both. At 
this point, a second, related flaw in the SGP became apparent, which was the 
practical difficulty of implementing the corrective arm of the pact (Buti et 
al., 2003).  
 While some states, such as Portugal and the Netherlands, violated the 
SGP ceiling in the short term, yet responded to initiation of the EDP by 
lowering deficits in a timely manner, despite difficult economic 
circumstances, this was not the case for all states (Heipertz and Verdun, 
2010). Both France and Germany initially violated the 3% ceiling set by the 
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SGP in 2002, and did so for the subsequent two years, in the case of the 
former, and four years, in the case of the latter. Not only did these states fail 
to respond to repeated warnings from the Commission, but when the time 
came, in November 2003, to escalate the EDP toward imposing sanctions for 
continued violation of the pact, France and Germany relied on political 
maneuvers to ensure that the Commission’s recommendation to impose 
sanctions did not receive the necessary support in the Council, for passage 
(interview, Commission d; Evans-Pritchard, 2005; Heipertz and Verdun, 
2010). As Chapter 8 discusses in greater detail, while the French and 
Germans played similar roles in the 2003 crisis, their motivations were very 
different, with the Germans seeking exception for the negative short-term 
effects of structural reforms that Chancellor Schroeder was undertaking, 
which were expected to benefit the economy considerably in the long-term, 
while France was displaying a more characteristic lack of engagement with 
the SGP (interview, German finance ministry b; Howarth, 2007).   
 Apart from the motivations of these states for failing to abide by the 
pact, and undertaking political machinations to avoid sanction, which is a 
crucial point to consider and one returned to in later chapters, the events 
surrounding failure by Ecofin to uphold the Commission recommendation 
that France and Germany be sanctioned, made apparent the unworkability of 
the pact in its then current form. Thus, the political implications of SGP 
design rendered largely irrelevant any positive elements of its design, for 
economic policy. In other words, while Buti et al. (2003) arrive at a fairly 
favorable assessment of SGP design, against a benchmark of desirable 
criteria for fiscal rules (see Kopits and Symansky, 1998), and Dyson (2002) 
identifies positive effects of the SGP, for Eurozone members’ budgetary 
orientations, the politics surrounding implementation of the corrective arm of 
the pact, which became clear with the experience of France and Germany in 
2003, necessitated reform of that aspect, at a minimum. Specifically, if some 
states could repeatedly violate the pact, and rely, for instance, on the 
ambivalence of fellow states, or fear of other states that they might soon 
breach the pact and require good will in return, to avoid sanction, then the 
SGP could no longer be considered an effective tool for ensuring lasting 
economic convergence amongst Eurozone members. Further to that, the 
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Commission decided to take the Council to the ECJ for violating their 
institutional responsibility under the SGP, which effectively prevented the 
pact from functioning until a decision was reached over the legality or 
otherwise of the events that had taken place, in what was to be known as the 
SGP crisis of November 2003 (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010).  
 Returning to analyses of the more explicitly economic aspects of SGP 
design, in addition to flaws that became most apparent under the negative 
economic conditions of the early 2000s, there were various other 
weaknesses, which at the very least complicated the functioning of the pact, 
and potentially made it unworkable, even in the absence of the 2003 crisis. 
First, the medium-term budgetary objective that all states were required to 
aim for under the SGP did not, being a common target, take into 
consideration the highly varied economic conditions in different Eurozone 
states. For example, a state such as Italy, which had long been running a very 
high public debt, and a state such as Germany, with a comparatively low 
level of public debt, were required to aim for the same medium-term 
budgetary target of close to balance or surplus, despite the fact that Italy 
would require years of considerably higher surplus than Germany, in order to 
bring their debt in line with the 60% ceiling under the SGP, no less ensure 
long-term sustainability.  
 Along similar lines, there was no mention of special efforts required 
from certain states, depending on, for example, their specific pension burden 
or demographic composition. Neither was there any recourse for the pact to 
accommodate states undertaking structural reforms that had a negative 
budgetary effect in the short-term, but beneficial long-term effects. This is to 
name only a few points, but the general conclusion is that the disappointing 
implementation record of the original SGP resulted from an economic 
downturn just after the launch of the single currency, flaws in the design of 
its preventive arm, and the political difficulty surrounding implementation of 
its corrective arm, which arguably necessitated a stronger preventive arm 
(Dyson, 2002; Buti et al., 2003; Begg and Schelkle, 2004; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010). Thus, following the SGP crisis of 2003, and a ruling from the 
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ECJ
3
 in 2004, which served to confirm the unworkability of the pact as it 
was, it became clear that the SGP had to be reformed.  
 
 
2.4 The Reformed SGP: From Implementation to Financial Crisis 
Reform of the SGP technically began with a Commission proposal in 
September 2004, though the bulk of reform negotiations took place between 
January and March 2005, with political agreement concluded at the European 
Council of 22-23 March. While there was general satisfaction amongst the 
Commission and member states in the Council, over the SGP reform 
agreement, the ECB publicly criticized the proposed reforms in the 
immediate run up to agreement, and expressed concerns about the final 
outcome agreement as well (interview, Commission d; Evans-Pritchard, 
2005; Agence France Presse, 2005). Thus, the reformed SGP was greeted 
with skepticism, and there was considerable doubt about its potential to 
compel fiscal convergence between Eurozone states, from the very start. 
Nonetheless, benign economic circumstances flattered the new pact, just as 
they had flattered the old pact early in its tenure, and most states respected 
the budget limits set by the new SGP. A notable exception to this positive 
trend was Greece, which had been found to be submitting inaccurate budget 
data, both to qualify for entry to EMU, and to respect the rules of the SGP 
once admitted (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). While the need to ensure that 
member states were submitting accurate statistics had been addressed in 
parallel to the SGP reform negotiations, Eurostat, the statistics agency of the 
European Commission, was given only moderately enhanced power to check 
figures, and so unreliable data remained an issue, as in the Greek case 
(interview, Council secretariat b).  
 An important weakness of the pact that was improved upon only 
moderately with the 2005 reforms was the lack of attention to debt levels and 
states’ progress toward the 60% of GDP limit that the pact envisaged for 
Eurozone members’ public debt. Under the reformed pact, as under the 
original pact, states like Belgium and Italy ran incredibly high public debts, 
without sanction from the SGP, which continued to focus almost exclusively 
                                       
3
 See Heipertz and Verdun (2010) for in-depth discussion of the ECJ ruling. 
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on member state deficit levels. Neither did the pact consider private debt as a 
factor in the economic health of member states. For this reason, Spain was 
judged a success, consistently observing the rules of the pact and maintaining 
low public debt and deficit levels, despite the fact that Spanish consumers 
were racking up a dangerous amount of private debt that would ultimately be 
transferred to the public balance sheet after the financial crisis of 2008 (BBC, 
2012).  
 Along those lines, it is worth noting that any review of the 
implementation record of the reformed SGP must be seen in the context of 
the extreme circumstances surrounding the financial crisis and related fiscal 
crisis that gripped Europe from 2008, only three years after the launch of the 
reformed pact. This is the case not only because the severe recession that 
resulted from the financial crisis made it unlikely and even undesirable for 
states to abide by the pact, but also because design flaws in the reformed pact 
that are so apparent in light of the crises that have plagued the Eurozone 
since 2008, might not have figured in an analysis of the pact prior to to that 
point. For example, the exclusive focus of the pact on public, rather than 
private debt, was not a frequent criticism prior to the financial crisis, though 
with the benefit of hindsight, it is highly apparent that considering public 
debt levels alone is problematic in light of potential risks to budgetary 
sustainability from excessive private debt, as seen in the cases of Spain and 
Ireland. 
 With the onset of financial crisis in 2008, member state responses 
initially diverged, in terms of whether to implement significant stimulus 
measures to counteract the downturn, and the German government under the 
leadership of Angela Merkel was hesitant to go beyond relatively small 
stimulus measures, ultimately implementing bolder spending only after 
repeated criticism, domestic and international, that her response to the 
downturn had been too conservative (for example Dempsey, 2009; Dempsey 
and Kulish, 2009; Kurbjuweit and Neukirch, 2009). The Commission urged 
all member states to enact stimulus measures so as to produce a coordinated 
EU stimulus, which there was no common budget for, and also 
acknowledged that violation of the SGP deficit limits would be a likely 
byproduct of such stimulus programs (Council of the European Union, 2009; 
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Commission of the European Communities, 2009). While it was not yet 
known at the time, this marked the end of the reformed SGP, given that the 
economic circumstances under which states might again be expected to 
observe the pact’s rules, would not return until after the Eurozone debt crisis 
was in full swing, and another reform of the pact had been undertaken. 
 In the way of a general conclusion, then, the reformed pact did not 
really have a chance to be assessed in any meaningful sense. Judging from 
the process of the Eurozone debt crisis to date, the pact clearly failed to 
produce lasting economic convergence among Eurozone member states.  Its 
focus on deficits rather than debts is symptomatic of the assumption, prior to 
the current crisis, that budgets close to balance or in surplus would lead 
automatically to debt sustainability (interview, Luxembourgish finance 
ministry), and its failure to consider more general economic imbalances, 
beyond the question of public debt levels, meant that Spain was judged a 
Eurozone success story, a difficult judgment to maintain in light of its current 
economic position. Reforms to the pact, in its most recent iteration, go some 
way toward addressing these failings in the preventive side of the pact, as 
well as making it easier for states to be sanctioned under the corrective arm.  
 It remains to be seen when economic conditions may be ripe for the 
newest version of the pact, agreed in 2011, to be implemented fully and 
without exception. Regardless, it seems that the course of events surrounding 
the Eurozone debt crisis have revealed that even an improved SGP is not 
sufficient to ensure the success of the single currency, absent more of the 
common features of long-lasting currency unions, such as mutualized debt, 
fiscal transfers, common banking regulation and a bank resolution 
mechanism, among others (Whyte, 2011). Further to this, the failure of the 
SGP to effectively produce the lasting economic convergence it was intended 
to deliver, which might, if realized, have precluded a debt crisis of the sort 
currently underway, is due in part to the politicization of SGP design, a point 
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2.5 The SGP as a Case of Intergovernmental Negotiations In two Contexts 
This thesis treats the SGP as a case of intergovernmental negotiations in the 
two contexts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, with analysis of each of these 
negotiations as nested cases, providing for diachronic variation (Gerring, 
2004). In order to introduce synchronic variation (Gerring, 2004), this thesis 
analyzes the performance of four member states, namely Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. These negotiations took place mainly at three 
levels in the intergovernmental configuration of the EU: the Monetary 
Committee (MC)/Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)
4
, with 
representatives from each member state typically being the highest official in 
the national finance ministry; Ecofin and the Eurogroup5, composed, 
respectively, of all member state finance ministers and finance ministers only 
from Eurozone member states; and the European Council, composed of 
Heads of State and Government.  
 While the technical process of negotiations was largely similar in 
both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, one important change that had occurred 
between these negotiations was that the introduction of the euro had led to a 
divide between Eurozone and non-Eurozone members. Thus, the bulk of 
negotiations at ministerial level in ‘reuploading’ took place in the Eurogroup, 
which is an alternative formation of Ecofin composed only of those states 
whose currency is the euro. Chapter 5 expands on this point in discussing 
case selection.  
Another difference between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ is that, 
from the start of 2005, negotiations at the level of civil servants in the EFC 
were conducted in a working group chaired by the Luxembourgish EFC 
representative
6
, whose state then held the Council Presidency, rather than in 
the formal configuration of the EFC, then chaired by the German 
representative. The reason for this was a perceived need to conclude 
                                       
4
 Since the start of stage III of EMU, the Monetary Committee has been renamed the 
Economic and Financial Committee. 
5
 The Eurogroup was not yet in operation at the time of ‘uploading’ negotiations. 
6
 One result of this change is that the standards applied to the formal EFC grouping, for 
providing minutes, are not upheld for the working group, which precluded access to EFC 
minutes for the purpose of data collection. This was unproblematic, given the variety of 
additional sources, as well as access to multiple negotiation participants, for in-depth 
interviews. 
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negotiations as quickly as possible, for which participants deemed the formal 
EFC configuration to be sub-optimal, not least because it was chaired by a 
German representative, while Luxembourg held the Council Presidency at 
that time (interviews, Luxembourgish finance ministry, Council secretariat 
b). Thus, coordination between the three levels was facilitated with the 
adoption by the Luxembourgish EFC representative of the chairmanship of 
an EFC working group that could meet as frequently as necessary, to address 
only the SGP dossier. Notwithstanding these minor technical differences 
between the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, they 
are highly comparable, and this thesis thus departs from existing studies of 
the SGP, to undertake a comparative, process-tracing analysis of member 
state performance in these two negotiation contexts. 
 The SGP has previously been the focus of a wide range of literature. 
As a case of rules-based fiscal policy, it has been analyzed against a criteria 
of desirables for fiscal rules, namely the Kopits-Symansky criteria
7
, in order 
to assess the effectiveness of its design (for example Buti et al., 2003; Begg 
and Schelkle, 2004). In a similar vein, such contributions sought to build on 
assessments of the original SGP, with the aim of contributing to debate over 
SGP reform. Thus, these analyses of SGP design aimed at identifying 
weaknesses and hence targets for change in any reformed policy (for 
example Buti et al., 2003; Begg and Schelkle, 2004; Hallerberg, 2004; see 
Begg and Schelkle, 2004; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010 for an overview of 
literature that contributed to the reform debate). Again, these analyses 
focused on economic dimensions, treating the SGP as a case of rules-based 
fiscal policy, to be assessed in terms of the extent to which it delivered, or 
could be reformed to better deliver, desirable economic outcomes.  
 In addition to being an example of fiscal policy rules, the SGP is also 
one element in the design of EMU, and it has thus been the subject of 
consideration in analyses of the whole architecture of EMU (for example 
Dyson, 2002; 2008; Linsenmann et al., 2007). These aim to assess the 
viability and/or performance of the single currency through consideration of 
its various facets, which include the SGP as one feature of EMU design, and 
                                       
7
 See Kopits, G. and Symansky, S. (1998) ‘Fiscal Policy Rules’, IMF Occasional Paper, 
162. 
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extend to employment coordination, the Lisbon process and the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines, among other things that figure in the operation 
of the single currency. Such contributions share with the initial category of 
economic analyses, a focus more on the effects of the SGP, than on its 
causes. In other words, the aim is to explain how the SGP, either 
independently, or as part of the policy architecture of the euro, impacts on 
economic policy-making and performance across the Eurozone.  
 On the other hand, there is a body of literature that treats the SGP as 
an example of international cooperation, requiring explanation for why 
sovereign states agreed to such an endeavor (for example Brunila et al., 
2001; Heipertz and Verdun, 2004; 2005; 2010). These contributions tend to 
focus on the legislative process that led to establishment and reform of the 
SGP. While the contributions of Heipertz and Verdun, in particular, focus on 
explaining the outcomes of SGP negotiations, in terms of identifying the 
theoretical framework most useful for understanding these outcomes, others 
emphasize the positions of various member states over SGP design, rather 
than considering how and why these positions are reflected differentially in 
the outcome agreements (for example Chang, 2006; Howarth, 2007). While 
departing in that regard, these contributions nonetheless share a focus on the 
politics of the SGP, and on its causes more so than its effects.  
 This thesis is very much in the category of these latter contributions, 
applying a political lens through which to view the process of negotiations 
between EU member states that led to the establishment and reform of the 
SGP, so as to answer the main research question of whether differences 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations impact on member state 
performance in each. While it is essential to consider the economic 
motivations for member state positions, and the extent to which states’ 
potential to influence SGP negotiations derived from features of their 
national economies (Moravcsik, 1998), this thesis does not aim to assess the 
economic impacts of the original or reformed SGP. Nonetheless, the analysis 
herein departs from previous political approaches to explaining the SGP, in a 
number of ways.  
 First, the negotiation-centered approach to explaining the outcome of 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP is a unique 
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contribution, which provides for useful dialogue with the wider body of 
negotiation literature, both on the subject of the EU and more widely (see 
chapter 4). Further to that, the comparative approach this thesis takes to 
considering the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
marks an important departure from Heipertz and Verdun (2004; 2005; 2010), 
in particular, whose contributions have analyzed negotiations that led to the 
original and reformed SGP, though absent a comparative inquiry into how 
differences between these negotiation contexts are representative of a 
categorical shift from ‘uploading’ to ‘reuploading’ negotiations, with 
implications for the process and outcome of each, beyond the case of the 
SGP. To be sure, these authors highlight differences between the original and 
reform negotiations over the SGP, though this is aimed at explaining the 
outcomes of these particular negotiations, rather than testing a theoretical 
argument regarding contextual changes between original and reform, or 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, which is central to this thesis. 
 A second, related contribution of this study lies in the analysis of 
various bargaining resources for influence in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, as opposed to an analysis that identifies which 
member states were influential and sets out to explain the reasons behind this 
influence. In other words, while this thesis does aim to identify causal 
processes through which member states influenced the outcome of 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the member states 
under analysis are identified on the basis of variation in possessing 
bargaining resources of interest, rather than any a priori assessment of their 
influence, derived from political and economic power explanations, for 
instance. This latter approach has tended to place France and Germany at the 
center of analyses of economic and monetary integration in the EU, while 
smaller states in particular receive little consideration (for example 
Moravcsik, 1998; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). By focusing on bargaining 
resources such as information and process expertise that are not explicitly 
linked with economic or population size, as well as the context under which 
these resources are likely to be most relevant, namely ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, this thesis marks an important contribution on the role of 
smaller member states, namely Belgium and the Netherlands, in influencing 
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the SGP negotiations. Nonetheless, rather than analyzing small states at the 
expense of large states, notably France and Germany, which are rightly 
considered central to any explanation of the SGP agreements, this thesis 
combines a focus on small and large states, and clarifies understanding of 
how each of these states wielded the influence they did, in the ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
 A final empirical contribution is in relation to the situation in the 
Eurozone, namely the sovereign debt crisis that began in 2010 and is still 
ongoing. Given the current situation in the Eurozone and the recent 
completion of additional ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, in 2011, 
this thesis offers a theoretical framework through which to examine the 
process and outcome of those negotiations, which have incredible import for 
the future direction of the Eurozone. Further to that, and as discussed in 
detail in the concluding chapter of the thesis, an understanding of the 
negotiation dynamics that led to the original SGP, and the distinct dynamics 
that led to the reformed SGP in 2005, as well as the 2011 reforms, speaks to 
the causes of the Eurozone debt crisis, as well as the difficulty facing 
political leaders in trying to solve it. As a result, this thesis can contribute 
policy recommendations, in terms of where best to focus efforts at 
negotiating reforms to Eurozone governance, and which resources 
negotiating parties should rely on to heighten influence in such negotiations, 





This chapter provided a brief introduction to the operation of the SGP, 
highlighting recent changes that have resulted from the 2011 reforms, which 
aim, generally, to better integrate these EU-level fiscal policy rules into 
member state legal systems, to facilitate use of the sanctioning mechanism 
and to broaden the scope so that potentially harmful imbalances in national 
economies, beyond the realm of excessive deficits, can be addressed. 
Discussion was then presented of the historical context surrounding the 
emergence of the SGP, including processes of European economic and 
monetary integration that began in the 1960s, and culminated in the 
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Maastricht Treaty of 1992, emphasizing the way in which agreement over 
the provisions for a single currency contained in Maastricht necessitated a 
compromise between opposing positions, one of which prioritized a stable 
single currency to be secured through budgetary discipline and low inflation, 
and the other an economic government dimension to EMU, tasked with 
targeting such goals as full employment, to counterbalance a focus on price 
stability (Dyson, 1994). While the twelve member states present at the 
signing of Maastricht subscribed to each position to varying degrees, and 
with nuances related to their own domestic circumstances, these opposing 
camps can generally be understood to have been represented by Germany, on 
the former side, and France on the latter (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; 
Howarth, 2007). Thus, the German proposal for a SGP, or stability pact as it 
was originally called, emerged out of a lasting concern on the part of the 
Germans, and notably the Bundesbank, that Maastricht had not gone far 
enough to ensure lasting economic convergence amongst single currency 
members, and the related stability of any future single currency (interviews, 
British treasury and German finance ministry a; Stark, 2001).  
 Following the historical discussion, this chapter reviewed the 
implementation record of the original SGP, addressing some design flaws in 
the preventive and corrective arms of the pact which became glaringly 
obvious with the crisis of November 2003, when France and Germany 
avoided sanction despite repeatedly breaching the 3% deficit limit. A brief 
review was undertaken of the literature that sought to contribute to debate 
over SGP reform, which followed the crisis of November 2003, and it was 
noted that this literature analyzes the SGP through an economic lens, which 
is a point of contrast with the political approach taken in the study at hand. 
After covering briefly the implementation record of the reformed SGP from 
2005 to 2011, discussion turned to the debt crisis in the Eurozone, and while 
acknowledging that the debt crisis relates to failings in the SGP, to some 
extent, it was argued that certain faults in SGP design, such as a singular 
focus on public, rather than private budget developments, or ignorance of 
wider macro-economic imbalances beyond the budget deficit, were not 
considered particularly problematic prior to the onset of the debt crisis, and 
were thus not raised in the 2004-05 reform negotiations. A related point, 
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therefore, is that criticism of the SGP, as a cause of the debt crisis, is largely 
inaccurate, or excessively focused on the experiences of Greece and 
Portugal, whilst failing to consider the experiences of Spain and Ireland, for 
instance, which could not have been affected by a more consistently 
implemented SGP.  
 Finally, this chapter articulated the empirical contribution of the 
thesis, beginning with a review of the various bodies of literature that have 
analyzed the SGP thus far, ranging from approaches that treat the SGP as an 
example of rules-based fiscal policy, with economic implications, to 
literature that proposed reforms to the original SGP, in the run-up to 2004-05 
negotiations, and contributions that have assessed the overall architecture for 
the operation of EMU, of which the SGP is only one element. After 
discussing these analyses of the SGP, some literature was presented that has 
approached the SGP from a more explicitly political standpoint, aiming 
variously to explain member state positions in the debate over establishment 
and reform, and to test theoretical frameworks for understanding the outcome 
of SGP negotiations. Following this review, the discussion turned to the 
approach this thesis takes to analyzing the mechanisms for influence in the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, which adds value 
to existing literature in its focus on the impact of distinct negotiation 
contexts, as well as on member states selected for study because of variation 
in their bargaining resources, rather than factors directly related to population 
or economic size.  
 The following section of the thesis, including chapters 3 and 4, 
describes the theoretical framework that has guided the analysis herein. 
Chapter 3 builds on conceptualizations of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ in 
the Europeanization literature, to highlight important features of these 
negotiation contexts, including default condition, preference composition, 
interdependence and distributional conflict, all of which differ between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, with implications for the bargaining resources 
states can utilize to wield influence in each case. While there are examples of 
studies (Scharpf, 1988; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000) that have 
analyzed the effects of such changes in negotiation context, these tend to 
emphasize default condition alone, and aim to explain collective negotiation 
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outcomes rather than the influence of individual member states on 
distributional outcomes, the latter being the aim of this thesis. Thus, chapter 
3 explains how this thesis contributes to conceptualization of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, in identifying important differences between them, and the 
effects of these differences on member state negotiation performance, neither 
of which has yet received much attention in the literature.  
  Chapter 4 outlines the rational choice institutionalist approach this 
thesis takes to analyzing the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP, advancing the central argument that member states will privilege 
different bargaining resources in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in response 
to the distinct context in each, so as to achieve the fixed goal of negotiation 
success. A review is also presented of literature that assesses distributional 
outcomes of negotiations, or states’ negotiation performance, and of a variety 
of bargaining resources argued to be relevant for influencing the 
distributional outcome of negotiations, including preference intensity, 
information, content expertise and process expertise, the resources this study 
analyzes. The chapter than explains how this thesis conceptualizes 
preference intensity, information, content expertise and process expertise, 
which compose the independent variables in this study, as well as the 
conceptualization of negotiation performance, the dependent variable in this 
study. It goes on to advance the causal argument that possession of these 
resources to a greater extent will improve member state negotiation 
performance, subject to negotiation context, insofar as preference intensity 
will be relevant for negotiation success in ‘uploading’, though not in 
‘reuploading’, and information, content expertise and process expertise will 
be relevant for success in the latter, though not the former.  
 Chapter 4 then advances the specific hypotheses to be tested, and 
articulates the causal mechanisms through which each of the bargaining 
resources analyzed, is posited to impact on member state negotiation 
performance, both generally and subject to the intervening variable 
negotiation context. Finally, this chapter articulates the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis, which lies in clarifying the expectations of a 
rational choice institutionalist approach to analyzing intergovernmental 
negotiations, through a focus on specific bargaining resources and how the 
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mechanisms by which they operate, interact with changing context between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, as well as in synthesizing debate 
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Section 2 - Theoretical Framework 
 
Chapter 3 - Negotiation Contexts 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theoretical argument that negotiations will differ 
under the contexts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, due to four key features 
that vary between the former and latter, namely default condition, preference 
composition, interdependence between negotiating parties and the level of 
distributional conflict surrounding negotiations. It is essential to understand 
these characteristics of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in order to answer the 
main research question this study poses, which is whether differences 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations affect member state 
performance in each. Thus, this chapter draws on the Europeanization 
literature that introduced the concepts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, 
noting that, while a great deal of attention has been devoted to the 
‘uploading’ stage in the EU policy process, whereby member states negotiate 
the establishment of EU-level policy with the aim of shaping said policies in 
accordance with national preferences (Börzel, 2001), limited attention has 
been paid to the ‘reuploading’ stage, in which member states aim to negotiate 
the reform of EU-level policy to reflect national preferences (Kaarlejärvi, 
2007). The aim of this chapter is to build on existing conceptualizations of 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in order to highlight important differences 
between them that have not received sufficient consideration in existing 
literature, and that lie behind the theoretical argument this thesis advances, 
that differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ will impact on 
member state negotiation performance in each context.  
 While this chapter addresses three main studies that treat the concept 
of ‘reuploading’, or some variation on this conceptualization of member state 
participation in EU policy reform, it argues that these studies leave questions 
open, particularly regarding the impact of differences between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations on the performance of individual member 
states. Thus, this chapter not only highlights important differences between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ that have been underemphasized in existing 
literature, it advances the specific claim that these changes will affect the 
negotiation performance of individual member states, owing to the distinct 
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bargaining resources they possess, and the differential utility of particular 
bargaining resources under the contexts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. 
The logic behind this argument is elaborated in chapter 4, which completes 
the theoretical framework section of the thesis.  
 
 
3.1 ‘uploading’  
Europeanization approaches aim to explain the varying effects of EU 
regulations on different member states, as well as the ways in which member 
states participate in the EU policy process to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the costs of EU policies at domestic level (Bulmer and Lequesne, 
2005). Specifically, national actors attempt to shape EU policy through 
negotiations both across member states and between member states and 
Brussels, resulting in an EU policy ‘menu’ from which member states 
‘download’ policy for implementation at domestic level (Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003: 34; Borzel, 2001; Bulmer and Burch, 2001 in Featherstone 
and Radaelli, 2003: 34). The process whereby member states attempt to 
shape EU policy to reflect national policy preferences is called ‘uploading’. 
Tanja Borzel (2005: 63 in Bulmer and Lequesne) cites three main reasons 
why member states attempt to ‘upload’ policy preferences to EU-level:  
 
1.) In order to reduce the need for legal and administrative  
adaptation in ‘dowloading’ (incorporating European policies  
into national policy structures). 
2.) To prevent competitive disadvantages for domestic industry.  
3.) To enable national governments to address problems that  
preoccupy their constituencies but cannot be effectively dealt  
with at domestic level (for example immigration).  
 
 In the past, Europeanization literature has tended to deal especially 
with the first two of these motivations for ‘uploading’, particularly with 
regard to the ‘goodness-of-fit’ hypothesis (see for example Green Cowles et 
al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). The ‘goodness-of-fit’ hypothesis 
has been used to explain varying levels of adaptation across member states in 
response to Europeanization, as well as varying compliance records with EU 
policy. Along those lines, arguments in the Europeanization literature, 
regarding the link between ‘uploading’ and ‘goodness-of-fit’, held that 
member states attempt to ‘upload’ national preferences to European level, in 
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order to achieve a good fit between European and domestic institutions 
and/or policies, so reducing the adaptational pressure at domestic level 
(Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). However, as described by Ellen 
Mastenbroek (2005), the ‘goodness-of-fit’ hypothesis has proved to be of 
limited utility in explaining member state change in response to 
Europeanization pressures, and in particular, member state compliance with 
European policy. Further to that, Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006) argue that 
the ‘goodness-of-fit’ hypothesis assumes that policy-makers want to 
maintain the status quo at domestic level, while in reality they often seek to 
change the status quo. Thus, as demonstrated by previous empirical studies, 
the ‘goodness-of-fit’ hypothesis is of limited use in explaining member state 
responses to Europeanization, and member state compliance records, in the 
real-world setting of shifting circumstances and domestic policy preferences 
(Mastenbroek, 2005).   
There is, then, a need to consider the Europeanization process beyond 
‘uploading’, because it is crucial to understand what happens next – what 
happens when a head of government ‘uploads’ his or her preferences for 
policy change at domestic level, but the domestic opposition is able to block 
this change and so that member state does not comply with EU policy? What 
happens when a member state votes a left-wing majority into government, 
and their first initiative is to roll back the liberalizing reforms that have been 
induced by EU policy? It is possible that these compliance problems are 
isolated and can be addressed with the mechanisms provided for at 
supranational level, but it might also be the case that policy non-compliance 
becomes widespread, or some shift in external circumstances precipitates a 
general preference change amongst member states, and ultimately the EU 
policy in question must be reformed. Along those lines, Jan Kaarlejärvi 
(2007) argues that the traditional Europeanization literature is incomplete, as 
it focuses on the ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ stages, but fails to account 
for what happens in the instance of significant implementation problems at 
the national level. Thus, Kaarlejärvi (2007: 127) suggests a stage of 
‘reuploading’ in the EU policy process, wherein member states attempt to 
renegotiate and reform original policy, in order to better suit their current 
policy preferences, following a failed implementation stage.  
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Kaarlejärvi treats the process of ‘reuploading’ as largely similar to the 
process of ‘uploading’, noting only such differences between the two as 
timing and changes in member state preferences. He uses an in-depth case 
study of the German relationship with EU rules for fiscal policy 
coordination, to show the progression from ‘uploading’ to ‘downloading’ 
and failed implementation to ‘reuploading’. Kaarlejärvi does not attempt to 
explain how or why Germany succeeded in ‘uploading’ national policy 
preferences for inclusion in the EU-level rules on fiscal policy coordination, 
namely the SGP, but rather takes this success as a starting point to consider 
why Germany met with such difficulty in implementing these rules, as well 
as how Germany responded to the unanticipated problems caused by the 
SGP.  
Nor does Kaarlejärvi attempt to explain why Germany succeeded at 
‘reuploading’ changed policy preferences, beyond offering the statement that 
“[I]n this reuploading process, the economically and politically larger a 
Member State is, the easier it is for that Member State to promote its own 
national interests at the European level, and the case of Germany is an 
excellent example” (Kaarlejärvi, 2007: 232). Kaarlejärvi cites Germany’s 
economic and political power as the reason for success in both ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’, but offers no explanation as to how this power was 
effectively translated into securing the desired outcome in either case. This is 
unproblematic, given that the focus of his research is much more on the 
conditions that led to ‘reuploading’ than on the process itself, but it does 
represent a gap in the understanding of ‘reuploading’. In other words, as 
Kaarlejärvi’s work is the only extensive literature on this concept of 
‘reuploading’, there is a need for further analysis of this stage in the policy 
process, in order to determine how and why it differs from ‘uploading’, as 
well as whether it is in fact the domain of the most economically and 
politically powerful member states.  
A rare example of a contribution on the question of how EU negotiations 
differ when they take place in the presence of existing supranational policy, 
rather than in the absence of said policy, which is the key change between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, is a study by Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg (2000). In this study, the authors argue that the unique status 
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quo of each member state party to Council negotiations, which is 
characteristic of negotiations in the absence of existing supranational policy, 
rather than one status quo common to all, which is characteristic of 
negotiations in the presence of supranational policy, should be considered 
when modeling a range of acceptable outcomes, and hence the likelihood of 
reaching agreement on EU-level policy in each distinct circumstance. 
Similarly, an important contribution to theorizing the effects of default 
condition on agreement outcomes is in the form of Fritz Scharpf’s ‘joint 
decision trap’ (Scharpf, 1988; 2007). For Scharpf (1988), decision-making in 
the European Community and in Federal Germany shares the common 
affliction that, under conditions of unanimity, any actor benefitting 
comparatively from the status quo, relative to outcomes contained in the 
zone of agreement, will resist policy reform, with the result that sub-optimal 
policies prevail in these decision-making contexts, absent a shift from 
bargaining to problem-solving styles of negotiation. 
Both Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000) and Scharpf (1988; 2007) 
identify the pivotal role of default condition, in impacting on negotiation 
processes and outcomes, which is a key contribution to the gap in the 
literature from a dearth of studies on the relevance of changing context 
between what this thesis labels ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
However, the focus of these studies is much more on the effects of changing 
default condition for negotiation outcomes, than on the specific resources 
through which member states influence negotiations. Thus, while the change 
in default condition that these studies identify is an essential point of 
departure for the theoretical arguments advanced in this thesis, as illustrated 
in the following section of the chapter, the ultimate aim of this study departs 
from the former contributions, in seeking to explain how changing context, 
bound up with default condition, mediates the utility of bargaining resources 
with which member states can influence negotiations, and to understand the 
causal processes through which these resources operate under each context. 
By conducting a study of member states’ performance in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, this thesis highlight how 
differences between the context in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ make 
distinct bargaining resources relevant for negotiation success in each context, 
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which serves to qualify, and elaborate, the theorized effects of these 
bargaining resources on state’s negotiation performance more generally.  
 
 
3.2 ‘uploading’ vs. ‘reuploading’ 
There are four main, interrelated differences between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, which impact on the general process and 
outcome of negotiations in each context. The first relates to default 
condition, which changes substantially between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. Specifically, in ‘uploading’ negotiations, there 
exists no institutionalized cooperation at the EU-level, so the default 
condition in case of no agreement is the existing national policies on offer.  
 To take the example of financial regulation, there is at present no 
comprehensive policy for financial regulation at EU-level. Some measures 
have been agreed, but the transfer to international level of a comprehensive 
framework for regulating financial market activity across the EU has not 
occurred. This is a topical issue in response to the recent global financial 
crisis and the process is ongoing to institutionalize cooperation in this area, at 
EU-level. However, as is often the case in intergovernmental negotiations, 
different members want different things, and all are interested in 
safeguarding national interests. Crudely, this means that Germany wants a 
stricter set of regulations imposed on financial institutions than does the 
United Kingdom, the capital of which is host to big investment banks that 
favor the British market for its relatively loose regulations (Whyte, 2012).
8
 
The finance industry is an important source of income for London and so 
British national representatives negotiating at EU-level will tend to oppose 
introducing regulations that might lead banks to relocate. However, not only 
do some EU member states see the British approach to financial regulation as 
a potential threat to the stability of the global economy, they also, therefore, 
see British participation as essential for the effectiveness of any EU-level 
agreement on financial regulation (Whyte, 2012). Further, as long as the UK 
maintains a domestic policy that is comparatively friendly to international 
                                       
8
 A complete discussion of Britain’s position on reforming financial regulation would 
require detailed consideration of domestic-level interest constellation, with an emphasis on 
popular opinion toward bankers in response to the ongoing effects of the financial crisis. 
This deliberate simplification is in aid of presenting an illustrative example. 
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finance, other European markets are at a disadvantage in terms of attracting 
this sort of revenue (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010). At this stage of 
negotiations, then, the default condition, which is that all member states 
maintain existing national policies, is more attractive to the British than to 
their continental counterparts.  
To take this example further, assuming that competences were 
effectively transferred from national to EU-level, in the realm of financial 
market regulation, the default condition would change. In other words, once 
the decision has been made to institutionalize comprehensive financial 
regulation at EU-level, and the policy established, the default condition for 
all member states in any future negotiations is that policy framework. So, in 
the event that the policy states had agreed to establish should at some future 
point become suboptimal, and the decision were taken to negotiate reform of 
EU financial regulation, it would not matter that the UK used to have the 
most finance-friendly market, because the default condition at that point is 
not a return to national policies, but rather maintenance of the supranational 
policy states have set out to reform.  
It is crucial to note, though, that this change in default condition only 
comes into effect where there has been some meaningful transfer of 
competence to the supranational level. In other words, ‘uploading’ 
negotiations may be successful, insofar as they don’t break down and states 
reach some negotiated agreement (Keohane, 1984), but unless the agreement 
requires a shift in policy administration from the national to supranational 
level, there is the possibility to return to national arrangements, and hence 
the default condition does not truly change. An example of 
intergovernmental negotiations that result in an agreement, but no real 
change in the default condition, is the Kyoto Protocol regulating greenhouse 
gas emissions. While this agreement commits states to observe binding 
targets for the emission of greenhouse gases, it does not involve the transfer 
of policy administration to the supranational level, but rather requires states 
to report on emissions themselves. Thus, in any reform negotiations over 
Kyoto, it would be possible for states to return to domestic policies 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions, without incurring material costs such 
as reestablishing agencies whose responsibilities have been transferred 
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largely to international level. Of course there are other costs to consider, such 
as reputational costs that would be involved with departing from 
international cooperation, but the important point is that the default condition 
does not change significantly in this case, between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
In contrast to this, in a policy area such as monetary union, the 
default condition changes drastically between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, because in the former, states have distinct national currencies 
and central banks, while in the latter, they share a common currency and 
central bank. This is not to say that in the area of monetary union or in the 
aforementioned example of financial regulation, there is no possibility for 
states to return to national policy after agreeing a supranational policy, but 
rather that the costs of doing so are likely too great for this to be a real 
option, except in the most extreme cases. Thus, for the majority of 
negotiations over such policies, the shift in default condition from 
‘uploading’ to ‘reuploading’, is significant enough to change negotiations in 
the latter.  
The second, related difference between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
is that ‘uploading’ negotiations consist not only of debate over how 
supranational policy should look, but also over whether there should be a 
supranational policy at all. For this reason, member state preferences will be 
composed of both whether to institutionalize coordination at EU-level, and 
the form this coordination should take. Thus, a member state that is 
attempting to convince others to accept their preferred policy design, will be 
unlikely to win over another member that is unsure of the merits of 
establishing an EU-level policy in the first place, and if the latter state is to 
be won over, it will likely be on their terms (Moravcsik, 1998). In 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, on the other hand, preferences are composed only 
of the form coordination should take, because the issue of whether or not to 
coordinate has already been decided. Thus, more attention should be paid to 
identifying a policy design that is acceptable to all negotiating parties, rather 
than ‘buying off’ uncertain partners (Naurin, 2009).  
It is important to point out here that in fact member state preferences 
in ‘reuploading’ negotiations might also concern whether or not to reform 
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existing policy, though this is not a comparable situation to that in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, where states are deciding whether to 
institutionalize coordination at the supranational level at all. This is so for 
two main reasons, the first being that states are unlikely to enter into 
complex and often costly multilateral negotiations, to reform a policy they 
are content with. In ‘uploading’ negotiations, states that are happy with 
existing domestic policies might agree to an EU-level policy because there 
are material benefits in transferring policy responsibility to the supranational 
level, for example in terms of the EU providing oversight that is costly to 
arrange at national level (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005). Or, in a world 
characterized by increasing interdependence, it might be that a particular 
policy area is better addressed at the supranational than the national level, so 
even a state with relatively effective domestic policies can envision that 
supranational policy will be more effective (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010). 
These are only two examples, but it is relatively easy to envision why a state 
that is satisfied with the status quo might still be willing to transfer policy 
responsibility to the EU. In contrast to this, it is difficult to imagine reasons 
why states that are satisfied with existing EU policy, would set out to reform 
it. Rather, the incidence of ‘reuploading’ negotiations generally indicates 
significant, widespread dissatisfaction with existing supranational policy, 
either because of changed preferences or suboptimal effects of the policy in 
question, to name two possible sources (for example Kaarlejärvi, 2007; 
Scharpf, 1988). 
The second reason why the situation regarding preference 
composition is so different between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations has to do with compliance. Specifically, compliance is not a 
factor in ‘uploading’ negotiations, because there has been no EU-level policy 
present to comply or not comply with, prior to that point. However, in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, compliance is certainly a factor, not least because 
compliance problems are often the catalyst for policy reform (Kaarlejärvi, 
2007). In the case of widespread non-compliance, member states have a 
strong and common incentive to reach agreement in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, because the alternative is being saddled with a policy that has 
proven ineffective. Even in the case where one or a few states have failed to 
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comply with existing policy, and the mechanisms provided for within the EU 
have failed to address this non-compliance, all member states have an 
interest in policy reform, so as to avoid free-riding or negative externalities 
caused by non-compliers. 
This contrasts with Scharpf’s interpretation of the ‘joint-decision 
trap’, in that Scharpf considers it a likelihood that states would hold reform 
negotiations hostage, thereby prolonging a sub-optimal policy arrangement, 
if they are not satisfied with reform options on the table (Scharpf, 1988). 
While this may be the case in certain policy areas, where the potential costs 
from negative externalities caused by non-compliers are insignificant, or 
where non-compliers are the very states favoring the status quo, because of 
the possibility to free ride, this will not always be the case. Regarding the 
first point, there are certainly examples where the costs of complying with 
policy, while others fail to do so, are prohibitively high, thus precluding a 
bargaining strategy based on relative satisfaction with the default condition, 
in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. To return to the example of financial policy, if 
member states were to adopt a common policy for regulating finance at the 
supranational level, and compliance with said policy later became 
inconsistent, it seems highly unlikely that any states would be willing to 
maintain an arrangement where they implemented stringent regulations, in 
accordance with supranational policy, only to see other states shirk their 
commitments, thereby potentially attracting a disproportionate amount of 
financial business to their economy, whilst threatening the stability of the 
EU-wide financial system (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010; Whyte, 2012). Thus, 
even states that found it relatively straightforward to comply with existing 
EU-level policy would have a significant interest in policy reform, if 
compliance were inconsistent across member states.  
Turning to the other side of the argument, it may rather be the non-
compliers who hold ‘reuploading’ negotiations hostage, given that the costs 
to them of non-compliance with this hypothetical EU-level financial 
regulation, mainly in the form of reputational costs or sanction under EU 
law, have not materialized. However, this would require some confidence 
that such costs will not materialize in future, in addition to confidence that 
other costs from disparate regulatory approaches within the EU would not 
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eventually materialize, both of which seem prohibitively high and are thus 
likely to preclude a bargaining strategy based on professed satisfaction with 
the status quo, under the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Thus, while it 
is the case that preference composition in ‘reuploading’ negotiations might 
involve whether or not to reform existing policy, as well as how that 
reformed policy should look, this is a very different situation than when 
preferences involve whether or not to coordinate at EU-level in the first 
place. 
The third difference between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ lies in the 
leveling of the playing field that results from a distinct default condition in 
the former and latter. In ‘uploading’ negotiations, the default condition is 
maintenance of domestic policies, which, in almost any policy area, leaves 
some states with better options than others. Specifically, British policy on 
financial regulation means that Britain is more able to attract and maintain 
big finance within its borders, which arguably confers benefits on the British 
economy, in terms of jobs, tax revenue, etc. At the same time, the 
interdependence of European economies means that other states are 
vulnerable to the risks involved with loose financial regulation, as witnessed 
through the recent global financial crisis and related economic crisis that is 
still ongoing in the Eurozone (Whyte, 2012). Thus, as long as there is no 
coordination of financial regulation at EU-level, there exists an asymmetrical 
interdependence between the UK and other EU member states. Once states 
institutionalize coordination at the EU-level, though, this asymmetrical 
interdependence becomes more symmetrical. It might be very difficult, in 
some cases, to negotiate an agreement where states with more competitive 
regulations standardize in accordance with EU regulations, but in the event 
that such agreements are concluded, the interdependence between 
participating states is more symmetrical from that point on.  
This leveling of the playing field, or increasingly symmetrical 
interdependence between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, leads 
to decreased distributional conflict in ‘reuploading’, which is the fourth 
feature of distinction. In ‘uploading’ negotiations, some states typically have 
much more to gain than others from institutionalizing coordination at EU-
level, and those latter states will expect concessions in return for reaching 
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agreement (Moravcsik, 1998). In ‘reuploading’ negotiations, though, it is in 
the interest of all states to reach an agreement, precisely because the 
alternative is to maintain the existing policy they have set out to reform.  
The following table summarizes the four points discussed above: 
 
 
Table I. Comparing ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
 ‘uploading’ ‘reuploading’ 
Default Condition No EU-level policy Same EU-level policy as 
that agreed in ‘uploading’ 
Preference 
Composition 
1.) Whether to establish an 
EU-level policy 
2.) How EU-level policy 
should look 
1.) Whether to reform 
existing EU-level policy 
2.) How reformed policy 
should look 
Interdependence Asymmetrical – states are 
affected by others’ national 
arrangements, but have no 
control over them 
Symmetrical – national 
arrangements replaced by 
EU-level arrangements, or 




High – some member states 
have much more to gain than 
others from agreeing an EU-
level policy 
Low – all member states 
have an interest in reforming 
sub-optimal EU-level policy 
 
 
Taking into consideration these distinctions between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, it is essential to question Kaarlejärvi’s 
assumption that negotiations only differ between them to the extent that time 
has elapsed and member state preferences have changed (Kaarlejärvi, 2007). 
Rather, there is reason to believe that these distinct features of ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ stand to impact on the general process and outcome of 
negotiations, as argued by Scharpf (1988) and Dimitrova and Steunenberg 
(2000), as well as on the negotiation performance of individual member 
states. Specifically, these contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations can be expected to mediate the utility of particular 
bargaining resources in each, with implications for the states that are likely to 
negotiate successfully under the context of ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’, 
as a result of the distinct resources possessed by different member states. The 
expectation that changing context will impact on the utility of bargaining 
resources, is articulated further in the following chapter, on analyzing 
intergovernmental negotiations.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to clarify the concepts of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, and to articulate important differences between these 
negotiation contexts, which are not examined at length in existing literature, 
and are integral to the main research question this thesis seeks to answer, 
namely whether differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations impact on member state performance in each. Thus, this chapter 
introduced the Europeanization literature, which has treated thoroughly the 
concept of ‘uploading’, in analyzing the ways in which EU member states 
seek to participate in the EU policy process to mediate the effects of 
membership (for example, Green Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003). It also discussed a gap in the Europeanization literature, 
insofar as analyses of the EU policy-making process through a 
Europeanization framework tend to cover only ‘uploading’, a stage in which 
states compete to shape EU-level policies, and ‘downloading’, a stage in 
which states implement EU policy at domestic level. This is a gap identified 
by Kaarlejärvi (2007), who aims to complete the Europeanization approach 
to EU policy-making by incorporating a stage of ‘reuploading’, in which 
member states negotiate to shape policy reform, following a failed 
‘downloading’ stage. However, this concept of ‘reuploading’ does not 
receive sufficient treatment in existing literature, exemplified by 
Kaarlejärvi’s assumption that there are no major differences between the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ stages of the EU policy process, aside from 
the obvious time lag, and changes in member state preferences between them 
(Kaarlejärvi, 2007).  
 While related contributions discussed in this chapter have seized on a 
key change between these negotiation contexts, specifically the default 
condition, these contributions have not considered the effects of this change 
on member state influence in each, nor do they go beyond a focus on default 
condition, despite additional features of great import differing between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ (Scharpf, 1988; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2000). Thus, this chapter highlighted these additional differences between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, including preference composition, 
interdependence and distributional conflict, as well as default condition, and 
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the following chapter of the thesis is tasked with illustrating the link between 
such contextual features, and the negotiation performance of individual 
member states.  
 The following chapter introduces the rational choice institutionalist 
approach through which this thesis analyzes member state performance in 
the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. After 
explaining the utility of this approach, insofar as it highlights how rational 
actors can be expected to shift their strategies in line with changing context 
in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, so as to achieve the fixed goal of 
negotiation success in each, the chapter also explains the need to combine 
this approach with a focus on bargaining resources, to generate specific 
predictions regarding the outcome of member state negotiation performance. 
Along those lines, the dependent variable, negotiation performance, and the 
independent variables, preference intensity, information, content expertise 
and process expertise, are introduced, including a review of existing 
literature on these concepts, and description of the conceptualization adopted 
for the study at hand.  
 The chapter then articulates the hypothesized relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables, generally expected to be positive, 
with an increase in possession of these four bargaining resources, the 
independent variables, improving member state negotiation performance, the 
dependent variable. However, it is essential to incorporate the role of context 
as an intervening variable, which leads to the expectation that the positive 
relationship between bargaining resources and negotiation performance will 
be subject to context, specifically preference intensity will impact on 
negotiation performance mainly in the context of ‘uploading’, while 
information, content expertise and process expertise will mainly affect 
negotiation performance in the context of ‘reuploading’. Beyond articulating 
the hypothesized relationship between bargaining resources, negotiation 
performance and negotiation context, chapter 4 describes the specific causal 
mechanisms through which these bargaining resources are posited to impact 
on member state negotiation performance, subject to the intervening role of 
context. Finally, chapter 4 discusses the theoretical contribution this study 
makes to various literatures, before concluding 
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Chapter 4 - Analyzing Intergovernmental Negotiations 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the rational choice institutionalist approach taken to 
analyze the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. In line 
with a rational choice institutionalist approach, the delegations to 
intergovernmental negotiations can be expected to adjust their bargaining 
strategies in line with context, to privilege those resources most relevant for 
wielding influence in a given context (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; 
Thomson et al., 2006), which leads to the expectation that states will rely on 
distinct bargaining resources to negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’. This provides for some clear predictions that can be assessed 
against empirical evidence of states’ bargaining in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. For example, this approach leads to 
the prediction that states will not rely on the same bargaining resources to 
achieve negotiation success in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. However, 
there are also elements of the approach that remain underspecified, such as 
predicting how a particular bargaining resource will operate, and interact 
with negotiation context, to impact on a state’s negotiation performance. 
Thus, an essential complement to this rational choice institutionalist 
approach, is consideration of specific bargaining resources, the mechanisms 
through which they operate and their differential relevance in distinct 
negotiation contexts. 
 This chapter explains how combining a rational choice institutionalist 
approach that calls attention to the context of negotiations, with a focus on 
the effects of bargaining resources for states’ negotiation performance, 
provides for assessment of the overarching effects of changing negotiations 
context, as well as how these changes mediate the utility of specific 
bargaining resources. The expected effects of these dynamics are that, while 
the goal remains the same in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, the changing context means that a strategy based on one 
bargaining resource is unlikely to be adopted for both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, and in the event that it is, this will lead to negotiation success 
in one or the other context, but not both. The concomitant assumption is that 
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some delegations will be more able to influence negotiations in the context 
of ‘uploading’ than ‘reuploading’, or vice versa, depending on the specific 
bargaining resources they possess. It is worth noting that some states may 
possess such a variety and abundance of bargaining resources that they can 
negotiate successfully in any context, though they would nonetheless be 
expected to pursue a distinct strategy as dictated by changing context in 
‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’, which also represents an interesting 
potential finding from this analysis.  
 Central to this study is the concept of member state negotiation 
performance, as this is what the thesis ultimately seeks to explain. Therefore, 
following a review of approaches to analyzing international negotiations, 
discussion is presented of negotiation performance, including various 
understandings of this concept, and the conceptualization adopted for the 
study at hand, namely negotiation performance as the extent to which a 
member state influences negotiations to affect the outcome agreement. From 
there, the focus turns to bargaining resources, with a general review of the 
resources that have received attention in the negotiation literature, and 
explanation for why this thesis focuses on preference intensity, information, 
content expertise and process expertise, which relates mainly to their 
particular relevance in the setting of the EU, as well as the value in 
undertaking a process-tracing analysis to enhance understanding of how 
these resources operate in practice.  
 After reviewing the literature on each of these bargaining resources, 
including general negotiation literature, literature on intergovernmental 
negotiations and literature on EU negotiations specifically, this chapter 
advances hypotheses regarding the role of each bargaining resource in 
facilitating states’ success in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. As 
a key aim of this thesis is to clarify the relationship between bargaining 
resources, negotiation context and member state negotiation performance, 
the analysis seeks to uncover detailed causal processes through which the 
bargaining resources under examination facilitate negotiation success, and 
how context mediates this relationship. Thus, following presentation of 
hypotheses, the chapter also presents posited causal processes, through which 
each bargaining resource is expected to affect negotiation performance, and 
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the way in which changing context between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, is 
expected to mediate this relationship. Finally, chapter 4 articulates the 
contribution this thesis makes to theorizing the effects of context, and of 
specific bargaining resources, on the performance of individual states in 
intergovernmental negotiations, with emphasis on the value added in 
combining these approaches, as well as in synthesizing various literatures to 




4.1 Beyond the Success/Failure Dichotomy: A Rational Choice 
Institutionalist Approach 
There is a wide body of literature that seeks to explain instances of 
international cooperation or coordination, and the circumstances under which 
states agree to enter into cooperative agreements, or coordinate their policies 
with other states (for example Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1985; Young, 1989). A 
common approach in this literature is to specify the type of collective action 
problem with which states are faced, and identify the corresponding 
circumstances under which states are likely to reach negotiated agreements 
to address this type of problem, as well as determining the general 
institutional form the agreement is likely to take (Garrett, 1992). It is 
possible, using this approach, to demonstrate whether states have achieved 
negotiation success, in terms of whether or not an agreement has been 
reached. In other words, if the negotiating parties have made the decision to 
coordinate, rather than not coordinate, the negotiations have been successful. 
However, in order to demonstrate the relative success of one state or another, 
it is necessary to consider negotiation success beyond this dichotomy of 
coordination/non-coordination, and focus on the specific form of negotiated 
agreements. Thus, James Sebenius (1992) argues that an approach which 
seeks to explain negotiated outcomes in terms of a dichotomy between 
cooperation and defection is incomplete, and that it is necessary not only to 
consider whether agreement was reached, but also the distributive 
implications of an agreement.  
 For the purpose of this project, it is useful to take both points into 
account, and combine an approach that analyzes cooperative agreements in 
terms of the type of problem they attempt to solve, highlighting the 
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circumstances of a negotiation process and the way these shape the general 
outcome of negotiations, with an approach that focuses on bargaining 
dynamics and resource capabilities, to understand the more specific features 
of an agreement (Garrett, 1992). In other words, there is considerable 
analytical leverage to be gained in considering the broad contours of a 
negotiation process, along the lines of a collective action approach, though 
there is value in going beyond the success/failure dichotomy that this 
approach has emphasized, in order to understand not only the likelihood of 
cooperative outcomes emerging under different circumstances, but also the 
likelihood of individual negotiating parties wielding influence under 
particular circumstances, and the strategies they rely on to do so. This thesis 
takes that step, in analyzing member state performance in the ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
Analyzing international cooperation in terms of the type of problem 
negotiators try to solve and the corresponding strategies they use to achieve a 
set of possible payoffs, is broadly the game-theoretic approach to explaining 
international cooperation (Sebenius, 1992). Authors have used this approach 
to draw inferences about state behavior in international negotiations, the 
design of international institutions and other questions central to the study of 
international relations (IR) (see for example Snidal, 1985; Martin, 1992; 
Koremenos et al., 2001).  Koremenos et al. argue that game-theoretic logic 
allows researchers to draw a connection between independent variables of 
circumstance and dependent variables of institutional design (Koremenos et 
al., 2001: 774-775), and as Sebenius puts it, game theory is of the ‘structure 
determines outcome’ school of thought (Sebenius, 1992: 347).  
The game-theoretic approach is useful in drawing a distinction between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, because it highlights such factors 
as the type of problem, the choices and strategies available to players, and 
the potential payoffs from cooperation. However, two weaknesses of a game-
theoretic approach, with regard to this study, are a focus on general outcomes 
rather than specific distributive consequences, and a set of assumptions 
involved with formal game-theoretic analysis that do not often hold in real-
world situations, including the EU negotiations this thesis analyzes (see 
Young, 1989: 358-359). In his critique of game theory, Sebenius (1992) 
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argues that these assumptions represent a crucial weakness in the literature 
that employs a game-theoretic analysis, and Garrett (1992) emphasizes the 
need to focus on the dynamics of bargaining in a real-world situation, in 
order to understand international agreements.  
Along the same lines, rational choice theorists have examined 
institutional design with the aid of game-theoretic concepts, though without 
adopting wholly a game-theoretic approach, and the concomitant 
assumptions (Aspinwall and Scheider, 2001). As the purpose of this study is 
to consider the relative influence of different states on the specific outcomes 
of negotiations, mediated by negotiation context, there is a great deal of 
relevance in the rational choice insitutionalist literature, as well as in 
literature on bargaining dynamics and resource capabilities (Garrett, 1992). 
A rational choice institutionalist approach highlights how member states 
seeking to achieve the fixed goal of negotiation success, must adapt their 
strategies to accommodate the changing institution, or context, between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. That is, where the institution, or 
context, in ‘reuploading’ is different from that in ‘uploading’, the choices 
and strategies available to players, as well as the potential payoffs, will differ 
accordingly. It is necessary to consider the impact of this changing context 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in terms of which bargaining 
resources are essential to influence outcomes in each.  
Drawing on the previous chapter’s discussion of key differences between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, it is logical to expect the process and outcome 
of negotiations to be distinct in ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’, as a result 
of these differences. For example, the default condition, an important feature 
of distinction between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, has been 
identified as a causal factor in explaining negotiation process and outcomes 
(for example Ostrom, 1986; Scharpf, 1988; Pollack, 1997). As a response to 
public-choice arguments that decision-making under unanimity would tend 
to produce pareto-optimal outcomes, because agreement would not emerge 
in the absence of this condition (see Scharpf, 1988), Elinor Ostrom (1986) 
questioned this assumption, highlighting the role of default condition, and 
the need to consider the default condition as a mediating factor in predicting 
the effects of unanimity on decision outcomes.  
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Pollack (1997: 113) applied this logic to analyze the influence of 
supranational institutions in the EU, arguing that where the default condition 
means maintenance of a status quo, this benefits agents in the principal-agent 
relationship, when principals seek to sanction agent shirking. On the other 
hand, where the default condition is return to pre-original policy, member 
states, the principals in this case, have an advantage in seeking to roll back 
the influence of supranational institutions, the agent. Pollack’s contribution 
drew on the application of the default condition argument by Scharpf (1988), 
to an analysis of decision-making in Federal Germany and the EC, in which 
he argues that, contrary to producing policy improvements, unanimity can in 
fact lead to the preservation of sub-optimal policy, unless the default 
condition is abandonment of cooperation, rather than maintenance of existing 
policy. In other words, under conditions of unanimity, once policy is agreed 
in a first instance, so long as any actor prefers this policy to the reform 
options on the table, that actor will block reform.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Scharpf’s argument appears to 
contrast with the predicted effects outlined in this thesis, of a change in 
default condition from non-cooperation to maintenance of cooperation in the 
existing format, which occurs between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. Rather 
than reiterating that discussion here, it is useful to elaborate on Scharpf’s 
argument, insofar as it relates to the way in which actors approach 
negotiations. Scharpf (1988) argues that the possibility to move on from sub-
optimal policy arrangements, under conditions of unanimity, depends on the 
style of bargaining by which negotiations are characterized. Specifically, 
where there is a problem-solving approach to negotiations, policy 
improvements can be made under conditions of unanimity. It is important to 
note, though, that Scharpf considers the presence or absence of distinct 
styles, such as bargaining versus problem-solving, to be exogenous to the 
negotiations he analyzes, rather than determined by the default condition. In 
other words, while Scharpf highlights the relevance of these different 
negotiation styles, he does not seek to explain their incidence as a result of 
default condition.  
On the other hand, another feature of distinction between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, level of distributional conflict, has been 
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identified as a cause of, for example, bargaining versus problem-solving 
approaches to negotiations. There is a body of literature that aims to link the 
level of distributional conflict in negotiations with the perceived costs of 
making concessions, and the type of bargaining actors will employ (see for 
example Koremenos et al., 2001; Heritier, 2007; Naurin, 2009). The general 
argument is that where the distributional implications of a choice are small, 
and there is thus less at stake, bargaining will be less competitive, while 
bargaining will be more competitive when the distributional implications of a 
choice are large, and there is thus more at stake in the negotiation process 
(Koremenos et. al, 2001; Naurin, 2009).  
Naurin (2009) distinguishes between these two types of bargaining as 
follows: “integrative bargaining involves efforts at reaching agreements by 
comparing and matching fixed preferences, searching for solutions that will 
satisfy all participants given their existing preferences”; “distributive 
bargaining, by contrast, denotes a competitive bargaining game, where actors 
try to solve the conflict by pressuring the other participants to make 
concessions” (Naurin, 2009: 37). In other words, integrative bargaining 
involves attempts by actors to shift the positions of others through the 
process of negotiations, which is made possible by the flexibility of 
negotiators to change their positions in the absence of clearly defined win-
sets, high stakes and resultant political pressure, the presence of which 
factors lead to distributive bargaining.
9
  
While this classification of bargaining types is a useful approach to 
analyzing negotiations, it is unlikely that any bargaining situation will be 
characterized entirely by one or the other of these styles. Thus, Dür and 
Mateo (2010) argue that, as any negotiation can be composed of elements of 
both integrative and distributive bargaining, it is more useful to consider the 
                                       
9
 It is important, here, to distinguish between positions and preferences, in that cooperative 
forms of bargaining, such as integrative bargaining, are centered on the goal of making 
actors compromise on their positions, not their preferences. In any bargaining context, 
preferences tend to be fixed, while positions may be more or less flexible. An actor’s 
preferences are composed of their normative ranking of different courses of action, that is, 
what they want and what they believe to be right, while their position indicates which 
compromise solution they are willing to accept (Naurin, 2009: 40). Thus, the process of 
integrative bargaining entails clarifying preferences and preference orderings, to facilitate 
compromises and move actors from their original positions to a common position. In 
contrast to this, when the negotiation process involves attempts by actors to change the 
preferences of other actors, arguing, rather than bargaining, takes place (Naurin, 2009). 
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strategies of each party to a negotiation, and the extent to which they employ 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’ bargaining tactics. Applying their framework to 
intergovernmental negotiations over the EU’s financial perspective for 2007-
13, Dür and Mateo argue that states with more bargaining power, which they 
consider to derive from country size, alternative to agreement and domestic 
constraints, are more likely to rely on hard bargaining tactics, for example 
threats, because the power they bring to negotiations lends credibility to such 
an approach. In contrast to this, a state lacking bargaining power would not 
threaten to exit negotiations, for instance, because this would not be taken 
seriously and would thus be ineffective (Dür and Mateo, 2010).  
The key distinction between these two approaches, then, is that the 
former characterizes the whole of the negotiation process, largely on the 
basis of the motivations of negotiating parties, which are thus considered to 
be common amongst them. In contrast to this, the latter approach does not 
seek to classify the process of negotiations as a whole, but rather the 
strategies of individual parties to a negotiation, independent of the general 
shape of the process. The rational choice institutionalist approach this thesis 
applies to the SGP negotiations, is something of a middle way between these. 
Specifically, the approach highlights the institution, or context, as a factor 
that impacts on the bargaining behavior of all states, though not because it 
serves to change their motivations from, for instance, value creation to value 
claiming (Odell, 2000), or bargaining to problem-solving (Elgström and 
Jönsson, 2000). Rather, context matters because it mediates the utility of 
specific bargaining resources, and thus the strategies that an actor can be 
expected pursue.   
To offer an illustrative example, Dür and Mateo (2010) contend that 
having a good alternative to agreement, as one of three aspects of bargaining 
power, is a factor that lends credibility to a member state in adopting hard 
bargaining tactics. While I accept this to an extent, I would argue that a good 
alternative to agreement is not necessarily constitutive of bargaining power, 
and might, in some bargaining situations, be largely irrelevant. Similarly, I 
would argue that information is a resource that can lend bargaining power, 
assuming bargaining power is equivalent to a state’s potential to influence 
the agreement outcome in their favor, yet this is not a resource that Dür and 
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Mateo consider likely to lead a state to pursue hard bargaining. There seems 
to be no reason to assume, however, that a state possessed of asymmetrical 
information about the preference ordering of another, for example, wouldn’t 
threaten to exploit this to move the former actor’s position, which is a hard 
bargaining tactic. Thus, rather than considering that certain resources 
constitute power while others do not, I would highlight the negotiation 
context as determining the relevance of a given resource for wielding 
influence, and hence the extent to which it will feature in a state’s pursuit of 
negotiation success.  
This emphasis on context might appear similar to the approach first 
mentioned, that classifies negotiations according to the level of distributional 
conflict involved. While the level of distributional conflict is a crucial feature 
of the negotiation context, which changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, the relevance of this change lies in mediating the influence a 
state can achieve with recourse to particular bargaining resources, rather than 
affecting the motivations of negotiators. Specifically, if some parties stand to 
gain or lose significantly depending on the outcome, compared to the status 
quo, as is typically the case in ‘uploading’ negotiations, then relative 
preference intensities for reaching agreement should be more relevant than 
under conditions where the breakdown of negotiations would leave all 
parties in comparable circumstances, as they would be whether negotiations 
concluded in agreement or not. This is so for two main reasons, one true of 
international negotiations in general, the other arguably more specific to the 
case of the EU. The first lies in the need for preference intensity to be linked 
with a credible threat to exit in order that it can be useful, which raises the 
question of whether the threat to exit would be taken seriously in the context 
of a low level of distributional conflict. The second relates to the reputational 
costs of exiting intergovernmental negotiations, which would be particularly 
high in the densely institutionalized setting of the EU, and thus make this 
likely only in the event that there is a great deal to be won or lost.  
Thus, the negotiation context does not impact on bargaining in a uniform 
way, as it would in a bargaining versus problem-solving argment, for 
instance (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000). Rather, the negotiation context 
mediates the relevance of specific bargaining resources, with the ultimate 
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effect, in terms of distributional outcome, depending on the resources a state 
can bring to bear in influencing negotiations under various contexts. In other 
words, it is essential to consider both negotiation context and states’ 
bargaining resources, in order to explain the distributional outcomes of a 
negotiated agreement, or, to put it differently, the negotiation performance of 
a given state.  
 
 
4.2 Conceptualizing Negotiation Performance 
Given that this study takes as its starting point two sets of negotiations that 
resulted in agreement, and aims to measure the relative influence of different 
member states in producing the agreement in each case, a dichotomous 
approach to negotiation performance would be insufficient. Thus, negotiation 
performance refers to the success or failure of individual parties to the 
negotiations, rather than any measure of the outcome agreement overall. 
There are a variety of ways to conceptualize the distributive outcome of 
negotiations. Zartman and Rubin (1982) discuss the relative gains and losses 
each party has secured, rather than referring explicitly to success or failure. 
Similarly, Andrew Moravcsik tends to refer to relative benefits and 
concessions for member states, in considering the outcomes of treaty 
negotiations in the EU (see for example Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis, 1999).  
Also on the subject of EU-specific studies, Jonas Tallberg (2008) 
focuses on power, and seeks to explain bargaining power such that it 
becomes equivalent to negotiation success, rather than something that might 
lead to negotiation success. Stefanie Bailer also emphasizes power, though 
she treats this distinctly from the outcome of negotiation success, which she 
considers to be reflected in securing agreement closest to one’s own original 
positions (Bailer, 2004: 100). This focus on the distance between favored 
positions and outcome is also central to Derek Beach’s approach, though he 
refers to influence rather than success (Beach, 2005: 12). That is, securing an 
outcome agreement in line with starting positions indicates influence for 
Beach, whereas this indicates bargaining success for Bailer (Beach, 2005; 
Bailer, 2004).  
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This latter treatment is similar to the approach taken in the DEU 
project, which is one of the most ambitious attempts thus far to measure 
decision-making influence in the EU, with the aim of testing competing 
models of decision-making (Thomson et al., 2006). The approach taken in 
this volume is to consider capabilities, conceptualized as actors’ potential to 
influence other parties to a decision-making process, and to influence the 
decision outcome (Thomson et al., 2006: 45). Further to that, Thomson et al. 
(2006) mention that actors’ capabilities can be based on a variety of different 
resources, which is very much in line with the approach this thesis takes to 
analyzing member state negotiation performance, with reference to 
bargaining resources as the explanatory factor for influence, or success. This 
is distinct from other conceptualizations described above, such as that by 
Tallberg (2008), which considers power to be equivalent to negotiation 
success, rather than an explanatory factor for negotiation success.  
 Thus, the conceptualization of negotiation performance that this 
thesis adopts is along the lines of Bailer (2004) and Thomson et al. (2006). 
Specifically, I distinguish between negotiation performance, which is 
understood to be a neutral term, reflective of the attempt to influence the 
outcome agreement, and negotiation success, which is a positive description 
of negotiation performance. These concepts are defined for the purposes of 
this study as follows: negotiation performance is the extent to which a 
member state influences negotiations to affect the outcome agreement; 
negotiation success refers to influencing negotiations to achieve an outcome 
that is close to, or similar to, own policy positions over the issues negotiated.  
One problem with conceptualizing negotiation success in this way is 
that it risks counting good fortune as success (Bailer, 2004). In other words, 
a member state may enjoy an outcome that is close to their original position, 
though this may be for a number of reasons quite apart from their influence 
in the negotiations. I expand on the methodological challenges this poses, 
and the steps I take to overcome these challenges, in the following chapter. 
For now, I simply present the conceptual distinction between negotiation 
success, which, as indicated by the above definition, implicates deliberate 
influence to achieve a favorable outcome, and accidental success, which is 
defined as a result of negotiations with an outcome agreement close to own 
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positions, though not due to own deliberate influence. It is crucial to 
distinguish between deliberate and accidental success in this analysis, in 
order to produce valid conclusions. 
 Another point to consider is the distinction advanced by Panke 
(2012), between negotiation success and negotiation effectiveness, in 
analyzing the influence of EU member states in intergovernmental 
negotiations. Panke (2012) argues that considering negotiation success in 
terms of the totality of issues over which member states secure an outcome 
close to their original position, tends to skew results in favor of big states that 
take positions over a greater number of issues than do small states. Thus, 
negotiation effectiveness, a concept that refers to how effectively member 
states influence the outcome of issues over which they take a position, 
provides control for the differential number of issues over which big versus 
small states tend to take positions, which can correct for overestimations of 
the success of big member states in EU negotiations (Panke, 2012: 112).  
Panke further distinguishes her analysis of negotiation effectiveness 
from existing studies of negotiation success by noting that the latter, in 
contrast to the former, do not often inquire into how states achieve the 
success they do, which exposes such studies to the risk of counting 
accidental success as success achieved through influence. This is an issue I 
address in distinguishing between negotiation success achieved through 
deliberate influence, and accidental success, which is discussed above and 
revisited in chapter 5, on research design. The question of whether one state 
can be considered more successful than another if both have secured 
favorable outcomes over all of the issues on which they took positions, 
though the former has taken positions over more issues than the latter, is 
pertinent and a point I discuss in chapter 10, on the subject of Belgian 
negotiation success with recourse to process expertise in ‘reuploading’, and 
again in the concluding chapter of the thesis. For now, it is useful to 
acknowledge the contributions made by Panke, to enhancing the accuracy of 
measures of influence in intergovernmental negotiations, as well as 
highlighting the need to consider intervening processes, rather than only start 
and end points of negotiations, both of which contributions this thesis aims to 
build on.  




4.3 Bargaining Resources in Intergovernmental Negotiations: How, When 
and Why they Matter 
The wide and varied body of negotiation literature identifies an equally 
diverse range of resources that can be relied upon to influence the outcome 
of negotiations. To an extent, the resources highlighted vary on the basis of 
the particular type of negotiations under consideration, such that analyses of 
one-off negotiations between sovereign states tend to highlight aggregate 
structural power as the deciding factor in who prevails (Tallberg, 2008), 
while analyses of negotiations that take place in the context of majority 
decision-making institutions will focus on votes, and vote distribution to 
explain outcomes (Bailer, 2004). However, there are some bargaining 
resources, such as a good alternative to agreement, that authors emphasize in 
analyzing such distinct situations as contract negotiations between employer 
and employee (Lax and Sebenius, 1985), and intergovernmental negotiations 
between EU member states (Moravcsik, 1998).  
 In an attempt to understand the sources of member state influence in 
international organizations (IOs), Cox et al. (1975) undertake an in-depth 
study of several organizations with differing areas of focus, size, 
membership and mandates, among other variables, to identify the resources 
that facilitated influence in each case. While finding that certain resources, 
such as expert knowledge on the part of individual representatives, were an 
important element of influence in almost all organizations, the authors also 
discover that some sources of influence were specific to a certain 
organization, some were relevant in formal negotiation settings and others in 
the day-to-day operation, and some mattered in a particular policy area but 
not others, to provide a few examples of the variation observed (Cox et al., 
1975). Thus, there is an argument to be made for selecting resources on the 
basis of their prevalence in literature on IOs, or international negotiations, or 
even negotiations more generally, though there is also evidence of the need 
to consider the specific case under study, when selecting the resources to be 
analyzed. 
 In the IR literature in particular, state-level resources, such as size 
and military capabilities, have been highlighted especially by realists, while 
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the liberal field of IR emphasizes economic size as well (for example 
Keohane, 1984; Bailer, 2004; 2010). Institutional resources, such as the right 
to initiate proposals or restrict participation in negotiations from the outset, 
the decision rules and vote distribution are also considered widely (for 
example Krasner, 1991; Bailer, 2010; Tallberg, 2008, Thomson et al., 2006). 
As previously mentioned, the unilateral alternative, alternative to agreement 
or BATNA is another resource that many authors have focused on in 
explaining negotiation outcomes (for example Lax and Sebenius, 1985; 
Moravcsik, 1998, Sebenius, 1992). Andrew Moravcsik considers states’ 
alternatives to agreement as shaping relative preference intensities, and 
places a great deal of weight on the preference intensities of negotiating 
parties, in explaining the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations 
(Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999). Along similar lines, the 
presence of a small win-set, which is understood to derive from domestic 
constraints, is also a resource for influence in international negotiations that 
has received widespread attention (for example Putnam, 1988; Dür and 
Mateo, 2010). The salience of the issues under negotiation, or lack thereof, 
for a given party, is considered to impact on influence, though findings are 
mixed with regard to whether a high level of salience enhances or diminishes 
performance (Bailer, 2004). Other bargaining resources that relate more to 
individual members of a delegation, which have received a great deal of 
attention in existing literature, include skill, information, process expertise 
and content expertise (for example Winham, 1977; Zartman and Berman, 
1982; Mastenbroek, 1989; Tallberg, 2006; 2008; Bailer, 2004; Beach, 2005).  
 The in-depth, qualitative approach this thesis takes to analyzing the 
SGP negotiations, precluded consideration of all or even most of these 
resources, and it was thus necessary to identify those most relevant for the 
study at hand. Immediately, this led to the decision to exclude some 
resources, such as military capabilities, which are not relevant to 
intergovernmental negotiations in the EU. On the subject of economic and 
population size, both of which are potentially more relevant to EU 
negotiations, Bailer (2010: 745) cites the argument that these matter insofar 
as larger states will always hold the latent potential to block trade, though it 
is unclear how easily even the largest EU member state could block trade in 
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the face of the single market. Further to that, given the wide domain of trade 
amongst EU member states, it is arguable that even the smallest state has an 
important market share in some product, and hence the latent power of 
blocking trade, which neutralizes the size element of the argument. Finally, 
the reputational costs involved in using such a resource for influence in EU 
negotiations, would be so significant as to make this highly unlikely. 
Nonetheless, I aim to control for the independent effects of economic and 
population size, by considering these in case selection, which the following 
chapter expands on. 
 Selecting the SGP for study served to neutralize all resources related 
to voting, because the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP operated under conditions of unanimity. Along the same lines, the SGP 
provided the opportunity to control for salience, which is also discussed in 
the case selection section of the following chapter. The idea of win-set size, 
and, related, domestic constraints, is arguably highly relevant in EU 
negotiations, though I consider this to be linked with preference intensity, 
which is one of the bargaining resources examined in this study. Specifically, 
the utility for a state negotiating in the EU, of domestic constraints and the 
concomitant limited win-set, lies in signaling credible refusal to compromise, 
which is also the essence of preference intensity as a bargaining resource. 
Further to this, and in line with Moravcsik (1998), I consider domestic 
constraints, or lack thereof, as an indicator of a member state’s preference 
intensity, in that the more favorable domestic opinion is toward maintaining 
the status quo, the less intense is a member state’s preference for securing 
agreement at EU-level. The research design chapter expands on this, in 
detailing the indicators used to capture states’ preference intensities, for this 
study.  
 In addition to preference intensity, the bargaining resources this study 
analyzes are information, content expertise and process expertise. There are 
examples in the literature of these latter resources being considered together, 
as a subset of expertise or of information, which includes process expertise, 
content expertise and preference information (for example Beach, 2005; 
Tallberg, 2008). However, I consider that a negotiating party can possess a 
great deal of preference information and little content expertise, so these are 
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treated as separate bargaining resources, rather than under the banner of 
‘expertise’ or ‘information’.  
 Two reasons for selecting these resources as a focus of the analysis 
lie in their predominance in the literature on international negotiations, and 
EU negotiations in particular, and in the utility of uncovering the effects of 
such subtle resources on states’ potential to influence intergovernmental 
negotiations, which is facilitated by the process-tracing approach in this 
study. A third reason for analyzing these specific bargaining resources is that 
this study aims to test the argument that big member states do better than 
their smaller counterparts in EU negotiations (for example Moravcsik, 1991; 
Thomson et al. eds., 2006), and there is no automatic reason to assume that 
big member states are more likely than small states to possess these 
resources. Of the four bargaining resources examined in this study, only 
preference intensity might be expected to correlate closely with size, in that 
unilateral alternatives are often more viable for large than small states. Thus, 
an exploration into how each of these resources operates to impact on states’ 
negotiation performance, as well as how the context of negotiations can 
mediate that process, might either disprove the tenet that large member states 
prevail in EU negotiations, or, crucially, might indicate that small states can 
enhance their influence by cultivating such individual-level resources as 
information, process expertise and content expertise, in their delegates to EU 
negotiations.  
 
4.3a  Preference Intensity 
The intensity of a state’s preference for reaching a negotiated agreement, 
compared with the alternatives to agreement, is widely believed to impact on 
the state’s potential to influence the distributive outcome of negotiations (see 
for example Lax and Sebenius, 1985; Sebenius, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999). More specifically, when a state has a low 
preference intensity for reaching agreement, compared with their alternatives 
to agreement, that state is considered more likely to succeed at influencing 
any agreement that is concluded, than is a state with a high preference 
intensity for reaching agreement, compared to their alternatives. Andrew 
Moravcsik argues that a state’s overall bargaining power derives from their 
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preference intensity, insofar as those states with the most intense preference 
for agreement are those that will make the greatest concessions to reach 
agreement. He draws on Nash bargaining theory, which emphasizes the 
relative value for states in concluding agreement, as compared with their best 
unilateral or coalitional alternatives (Moravcsik, 1998), to predict the 
distributional outcomes of any agreement that is reached.  
 Similarly, Lax and Sebenius (1985) highlight the role of alternatives 
to agreement in determining negotiation outcomes, and advocate a 
consideration of how alternatives can change over the course of negotiations, 
so that the favored party in a negotiation might, in turn, shift. Of course, it is 
not always feasible that alternatives to agreement can be changed over the 
course of negotiations, and in that case a state’s preference intensity, 
understood to derive from alternatives to agreement, would be fixed 
throughout. As an example of the former case, where alternatives to 
agreement, and hence preference intensities, are likely to change, 
negotiations between two states over the supply of a resource that is held in 
one state, might be affected if a third state expressed interest in purchasing 
the resource, thereby changing the alternative to agreement for the owner of 
the resource, from sitting on surplus production, to selling it elsewhere. On 
the other hand, in multilateral intergovernmental negotiations over the 
question of establishing common regulatory standards, for instance, it is less 
likely that preference intensities could change so easily, excepting the 
possibility that a small group of states among the negotiating parties saw the 
possibility to establish their own regulatory standards, in the absence of 
overall agreement. Nonetheless, this fails to address certain aims that are 
often behind the drive to establish common regulatory standards, such as 
minimizing regulatory arbitrage (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010).  
 One important feature of intergovernmental negotiations that can 
decisively change preference intensities, if not alternatives to agreement, is 
domestic politics. If domestic opinion in one state is opposed to the 
establishment of common regulatory standards, then the preference intensity 
of that state’s negotiators, for reaching agreement on common regulatory 
standards, will be lower, all else equal, than that of a state with domestic 
opinion that favors the establishment of international standards. However, 
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domestic opinion can change, and if, over the course of negotiations, 
domestic opinion shifts in favor of, or against, whatever the subject of 
negotiations, this stands to change the state’s preference intensity for 
reaching agreement.  
This observation relates to Putnam’s argument about two-level 
games, and the effect on a state’s bargaining power in international 
negotiations, of domestic constraints (Putnam, 1988). Specifically, Putnam 
argues that the size of a state’s win-set, which is the set of agreements they 
can sell at domestic level, can serve as a source of influence in international 
negotiations, if a state can point to a small win-set resulting from domestic 
opposition, in demanding certain concessions. While preference intensity is 
broader than this, because it is not only about domestic opinion, or domestic 
constraints, there is clearly a relationship between domestic support for 
international agreement, and the intensity of a state’s preference for reaching 
agreement, in that the costs of failing to reach agreement will be greater for a 
government with a domestic public that favors agreement, then if the 
domestic public is opposed. Thus, in arguing for the effects of a state’s win-
set size on their influence in negotiations, Putnam is also addressing the role 
of preference intensity in determining the outcomes of international 
negotiations, given that a small win-set can be assumed to indicate lower 
preference intensity.  
 This is so for two reasons, the first relating to the point outlined 
above, in terms of the costs for a government in failing to reach an 
international agreement that the domestic public supports, and the second 
relating to the quality of a state’s unilateral alternative to agreement. 
Specifically, if the domestic public opposes international agreement, except 
under specific conditions, which a small win-set implicates (Putnam, 1988), 
then there is reason to assume that the status quo, and hence unilateral 
alternative to agreement, is at least somewhat workable. This is not to say 
that the quality of policy arrangements should be judged entirely on the basis 
of public opinion, but there is reason to assume that domestic publics will 
favor changes to a policy that isn’t working, whether those be changes 
resulting from international agreement, or elsewhere. Thus, if the intensity of 
a state’s preference for reaching international agreement derives, at least in 
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part, from the workability of the state’s unilateral alternative to agreement, 
then a domestic public in favor of maintaining the status quo, the unilateral 
alternative, relative to most potential international agreements, should 
indicate a certain standard of quality or workability in the status quo. This 
has no bearing on whether the government wishes to reach agreement for 
other reasons, which is why international agreements are concluded in the 
face of domestic constraints, but the point remains that these arguments 
about alternatives to agreement, domestic constraints, win-set size and 
preference intensity are interrelated.  
 This is taken into consideration in operationalizing the variable 
preference intensity, which the following chapter discusses. For now, the 
definition of preference intensity, adapted from Moravcsik (1998: 62), is 
presented as “the relative value [a state] places on an agreement compared to 
the status quo alternative.” It is worth noting that coalitional alternatives to 
agreement are not considered here, because this was not relevant in either of 
the SGP negotiations. While it was possible, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
that not all states involved would qualify for the single currency, or that the 
lack of a strict SGP agreement would make it harder for certain states to gain 
acceptance into the single currency (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), there was 
no formal possibility that a group of states within the EU would decide to 
forge a smaller currency union that did not go through the legal channels for 
determining membership in the euro, as laid out in Maastricht. It goes 
without saying that, in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, there was also no 
coalitional alternative to agreement over SGP reforms.  
 In line with Moravcsik’s argument, the expectation is that the lower 
the preference intensity of a member state for reaching agreement, the more 
successful that state will be in negotiations, though it is also expected that the 
utility of preference intensity for influencing negotiations, will be diminished 
significantly in the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, as compared with 
‘uploading’. Having a low preference intensity for reaching agreement 
means that a party can credibly threaten to exit negotiations, in which case 
that party can expect to win concessions on issues over which they threaten 
exit (Lax and Sebenius, 1985). In the case of the SGP, a state’s unilateral 
alternative to agreement in ‘uploading’ negotiations was to maintain their 
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national currency, either alongside the euro or in the absence of any single 
currency. As is expanded on in subsequent chapters, some states could have 
exited negotiations without derailing the entire project, only their own 
participation in the first round of membership, while other states were 
deemed essential for the success of the single currency, and so their decision 
to quit SGP negotiations would have meant termination of the project, at 
least temporarily (Buchanan et al. 1996; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). This 
fact, along with the differential stability of member states’ national 
currencies, among other things, means that the unilateral alternative to 
agreement would have been far more acceptable for some states than others, 
with the concomitant impact on their preference intensities for reaching 
agreement in the ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
 In contrast to this, in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the default 
condition would have been maintenance of the SGP as it was, rather than 
maintenance of national arrangements, so there is some question as to 
whether one can even refer to a unilateral alternative to agreement short of 
exiting the single currency, and the status quo alternative, namely the SGP as 
it was, had already proved ineffective (see chapter 2). Thus, while some 
states may have favored reform more than others, it can be assumed that all 
states had a high preference intensity for reaching some reform agreement, 
compared to the default condition of maintaining the original, unworkable 
SGP. In such a situation, it is unlikely that a state would be willing to 
threaten exit, and even less likely that this threat would be deemed credible 
by other parties, which points to the irrelevance of preference intensities in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, as compared to ‘uploading’ negotiations. 
Therefore, I set out the following hypotheses regarding preference intensity: 
  
 H1: The lower the preference intensity of a member state,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
 H1A: A low preference intensity is more important for  
negotiation success in the absence of established EU-level  
policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in‘reuploading’. 
 
 To reiterate the argument, not only will preference intensities for 
reaching agreement be generally high in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, they will 
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not be shaped by the differential quality of national arrangements, as in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, but by the extent to which a state could cope with 
existing EU policy. The argument regarding the irrelevance of preference 
intensity as a bargaining resource in ‘reuploading’ negotiations is not related 
to any general change of bargaining style between negotiations, but to a 
changing context that diminishes the utility of a low preference intensity for 
securing the goal of negotiation success. Thus, negotiating parties with other 
resources can be expected to privilege those in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
rather than a low preference intensity, which they would certainly be 
expected to rely on in ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
The causal process through which I expect a low preference intensity to lead 
to negotiation success, in line with H1, is as follows: 
 
 A low preference intensity!state will use the threat of `
 exit(1)!threat of exit is taken seriously by other states(2)! 
other states respond to demands of the state that utilizes this 
bargaining tactic(3)!the positions of that state are  
accommodated in the negotiated agreement(4)!state has  
negotiated successfully(5). 
 
 On the other hand, as outlined above, the causal role of preference 
intensity is minimized in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where the status quo 
alternative leaves all negotiation participants with the common policy they 
have set out to reform. Thus, the effects of negotiation context in mediating 
the utility of preference intensity as a bargaining resource, in line with H1A, 
are posited to operate as follows:  
 
In the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, a low preference 
intensity!state will not use the threat of exit(1)!threat to  
walk away from negotiations would not be taken seriously by  
other states(2)!the threat of exit is not a feasible bargaining 
tactic(3)!this tactic will be absent in ‘reuploading’  
negotiations(4). 
 
In addition to testing whether the hypothesized relationship between 
preference intensity and negotiation performance is present in the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, I trace the 
processes through which states rely on preference intensity to achieve 
negotiation success, as well as the extent to which this is mediated by 
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negotiation context, so as to determine whether the posited causal processes 
outlined above are supported by empirical evidence.  
 
4.3b  Information 
The role of information has received a great deal of attention in the literature 
on international negotiations, and EU negotiations more specifically. In an 
analysis of the changing process of international negotiations as a result of 
increasing interdependence and complexity in the global arena, Winham 
(1977: 97) argues that negotiations should be modeled as the search for 
information, rather than strategy, and that parties focus on the process of 
clarifying positions and possible outcomes, rather than on securing a 
particular known outcome. Winham views this changed process of 
negotiations along the lines of a shift from distributive to integrative 
bargaining as conceived by Walton and McKersie (1965) (Winham, 1977: 
97). Similarly, Daniel Naurin highlights the role of information in 
cooperative bargaining in particular, as opposed to in more competitive 
forms of bargaining, thus emphasizing the role of information in 
international negotiations, though contingently (Naurin, 2009).  
 In contrast to these more contingent views of the role of information 
in international negotiations, Mastenbroek (1989), for example, refers to 
exploration, or the process of gathering information, as one of four principal 
factors in international negotiations that go toward constituting the ideal 
negotiator (in Meerts, 1997: 474). Stefanie Bailer (2006; 2010) also argues 
for the utility of information as a bargaining resource, in that the possession 
of information about the preferences of other negotiating parties, can aid in 
influencing negotiations. Bailer acknowledges, in her application of this 
argument to EU negotiations, that these are generally characterized by a high 
level of information, owing to the frequency of meetings between member 
state representatives. Nonetheless, she considers the level of shared 
knowledge about formal positions to be distinct from related information 
about the actual resolve of negotiating parties, or other aspects of a position 
that may not come across in formal negotiation rounds, yet are relevant to 
reaching a compromise agreement (Bailer, 2006: 362). Applying a similar 
logic to analyses of the influence of supranational institutions in EU 
negotiations, Derek Beach argues that the potential for a supranational actor 
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to provide leadership in aid of skewing the final agreement toward its 
favored outcome, increases where this actor possesses a comparative 
informational advantage (Beach, 2005: 3). Further to this, Tallberg (2006: 
33, 114) explains that access to exclusive information facilitates 
identification of the zone of agreement within which compromise can be 
achieved, thereby allowing for the promotion of an outcome nearest one’s 
own position, within the acceptable range.  
 With these points in mind, I define information as knowledge about 
participants’ policy positions, the reasons behind those positions, and the 
level of salience attached to them (Naurin, 2009). The expectation is that the 
more information a negotiating party has, the more able that party is to locate 
common ground and, within it, propose a compromise that is nearest to their 
own position (Tallberg, 2008). In the context of the SGP negotiations, where 
a multitude of issues were under consideration, and there was a need to 
balance domestic and international constraints in establishing and reforming 
the main architecture for fiscal policy in EMU, it can be assumed that 
member states required additional information, beyond the formal positions 
stated by their counterparts, in order to locate common ground. The more 
information a member state had about the positions of others, the more 
influence that state could be expected to wield in determining the outcome 
agreement. Thus, the level of information a member state had in the SGP 
negotiations should be a crucial determinant of negotiation performance, and 
a higher level of information should improve performance.  
 However, it is important to consider the negotiation context, and the 
extent to which the context in ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ would have 
mediated the utility of information as a bargaining resource. Specifically, the 
context in ‘uploading’ is such that the default condition, maintaining national 
arrangements, would be far more acceptable to some states than to others. 
Thus, states that were relatively satisfied with their existing national 
arrangement, or unilateral alternative to agreement, could credibly threaten to 
exit negotiations rather than compromise. In this context, then, a state with a 
low preference intensity can fix the zone of agreement, and information 
might be useful for maneuvering within that zone, but the outcome 
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agreement is nonetheless likely to reflect more nearly the positions of the 
state with a credible threat to exit, than any other state.  
 In ‘reuploading’ negotiations, on the other hand, the default condition 
is maintenance of the existing EU-level arrangement, which, in the case of 
the 2004-05 SGP reform negotiations, would have meant the original SGP. 
Given the unworkability of this situation, the default condition would be 
similarly unfavorable for all negotiation participants, which decreases the 
likelihood of any state exiting negotiations, and frees the state with a high 
level of information to move the outcome closest to their own position, 
within a wider zone of agreement. In other words, the causal role of 
information is facilitated as one moves from negotiations with a high level of 
distributional conflict, to negotiations with a low level of distributional 
conflict. The former situation will be dominated by the state or states with 
the lowest preference intensity, leaving a state with a high level of 
information to influence negotiations only within the set zone of agreement 
of the state that will take the unilateral alternative, rather than compromise. It 
is possible, then, that a state with a high level of information will be 
influential in either context, but it is unlikely that a state with a high level of 
information will negotiate more successfully than a state with a low 
preference intensity, in ‘uploading’ negotiations, unless the state’s 
bargaining strategy combines a high level of information with low preference 
intensity, for example. Thus, I set out the following hypotheses regarding 
information: 
 
 H2: The more information a member state has, the more  
successful that state will be in negotiations.  
 
 H2A: Information is more important for negotiation success  
in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case  
in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-level  
policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’.  
 
 Thus, the changing context between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
can be expected to impact on the utility of information as a bargaining 
resource, such that a negotiating party striving toward the fixed goal of 
negotiation success will privilege information as a bargaining resource in the 
latter negotiations, though not in the former. This is because information is 
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less useful in the context of ‘uploading’ than in ‘reuploading’, but it is not 
because of any change in the goal of negotiators, from claiming value to 
creating value (Odell, 200), or from bargaining to problem-solving (Elgström 
and Jönsson, 2000). In other words, if preference intensity appeared useful in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, then delegations possessed of this resource would 
be expected to deploy it. What is significant about the changing context 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ is that unilateral alternatives to 
agreement are less feasible in the latter context, which opens up those 
negotiations to success by states with a high level of information, among 
other resources.  
 The causal process through which a high level of information is 
expected to lead to negotiation success, in line with H2, and the effects of 
negotiation context in mediating this relationship, as predicted by H2A, are 
as follows: 
 A high level of information!know more about others’  
positions than what is stated at formal negotiating sessions(1) 
!locate common ground(2)!propose compromises that  
encompass this common ground, whilst reflecting own  
positions as much as possible(3)!proposals are acceptable as  
they address others’ positions over crucial issues(4)! 
proposals incorporated into final agreement(5)!state has  
negotiated successfully(6). 
 
In the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, a high level of 
information!know more about others’ positions than what is  
stated at formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate common 
ground(2)!situation remains the same unless others’  
positions are nearer to the state(s) with the lowest preference  
intensity than was previously known(3) 
 
 It is the aim of this thesis to test not only the hypothesized 
relationship between information and negotiation performance, but also the 
extent to which the posited causal processes outlined above reflect the actual 
processes through which member states influenced outcomes in the 
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4.3c  Content Expertise 
While there is some treatment of content expertise in the negotiation 
literature (see Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008), there is more extensive 
engagement with the concept of content expertise in the wider literature on 
IOs, where, for example, studies have examined the role of content expertise 
in explaining the general influence of actors in an IO (Cox et al., 1973), 
rather than specifically in formal negotiation situations, or the influence of a 
given organization in the international arena (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
In a study of sources of influence across a wide range of IOs, Cox et al. 
(1973) find that expert knowledge is one of the few sources of influence 
relevant to most organizations, regardless of differences between them in 
terms of institutional design, policy area and size, among other features.  
 Derek Beach draws on these more general findings regarding 
expertise as a source of influence in IOs, to theorize the role of content 
expertise in grand bargains over European integration. He argues that two 
distinct aspects of content expertise, including technical and legal expertise, 
are relevant, in that the former affords knowledge of how treaty provisions 
function under the status quo, as well as the impact of concessions given to 
new members, while the latter relates to knowledge of EU law, which is 
essential in drafting treaty texts or judging the impact of potential changes 
under negotiation (Beach, 2005: 27). Thus, while Beach defines content 
expertise as “levels of substantive technical and legal knowledge of the 
issues under discussion” (2005: 27), Jonas Tallberg conceives of content 
expertise as “technical knowledge of the issues under negotiation”, 
exemplified by the enhanced influence that former Luxembourgish Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker could bring to bear in European Council 
negotiations over economic policy, owing to his expert knowledge acquired 
as finance minister of Luxembourg (2008: 701-702).  
In his study of content expertise in European Council negotiations, 
Tallberg (2008) finds that such an advantage in technical knowledge allows 
the negotiator to form a broader picture of the negotiations and to consider a 
wider range of issue outcomes, which facilitates identification of satisfactory, 
technical acceptable compromises. Given the relevance of Tallberg’s 
approach for the analysis at hand, his definition of content expertise as 
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“technical knowledge of the issues under negotiation” (Tallberg, 2008: 701) 
is adopted for this study. The expectation is that possessing superior content 
expertise enables a state to consider a broader range of possible outcomes 
over issues than can other states, and the more outcomes a state can consider, 
the more likely that state is to identify one that addresses the positions of 
others, as well as their own.  
 With regard to the case at hand, negotiations over the SGP involved a 
host of complex technical issues, a thorough understanding of which would 
have been difficult to accomplish across all levels of the delegation. While 
one can assume a basic level of technical knowledge among all negotiation 
participants, with the possible exception of Heads of State and Government 
negotiating in the European Council, there were significant differences 
among member states in terms of familiarity with Maastricht and the original 
SGP, approach to fiscal policy, and the balance between fiscal and monetary 
policy, which were all relevant issues in the design and reform of the SGP. 
Although some of these differences would have diminished with the 
experience of membership in the common currency, the five years that 
elapsed between the launch of the euro and the start of ‘reuploading’ are 
unlikely to have erased all of the preceding years when ministers and civil 
servants had been making fiscal policy in the presence of their own national 
standards and institutional designs, and this time lapse would not have 
affected differences in content expertise that owed to some states having 
first-hand experience with the design of Maastricht and/or the original SGP. 
Thus, content expertise can be expected to serve as an important determinant 
of performance in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP.  
 However, it is, again, important to consider the context in which 
negotiations take place, and how this affects the utility of bargaining 
resources. Specifically, the causal role of content expertise in affecting 
member state negotiation performance is diminished in the presence of a 
high level of distributional conflict, where the default condition is far more 
acceptable to some parties than others, and the potential gains from securing 
agreement, relative to the status quo arrangement, stand to benefit some 
parties considerably more than others. Under such a context, when the range 
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of agreements is fixed by a state that will exit negotiations rather than shift 
position, no amount of technical knowledge is likely to change that. 
 Under these circumstances, content expertise could be a source of 
influence, for example combined with a low preference intensity, to secure 
negotiation success. Content expertise could also be a source of influence 
independent of a low preference intensity, though only within the confines of 
the position(s) of a state or states with low preference intensity. Specifically, 
a state with a high level of content expertise could shift the outcome 
agreement nearer to their own position, so long as this did not interfere with 
the stance of a state that, in the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, could 
credibly threaten exit. It is unlikely, though, that deploying content expertise 
alone could lead a state to negotiate more successfully than a counterpart 
with a low preference intensity, in the context of  ‘uploading’ negotiations. 
Yet this constraint is absent in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where the status 
quo arrangement is common amongst negotiating parties, and hence, all else 
equal, content expertise can be expected to lead to negotiation success for a 
state that deploys this bargaining resource. Therefore, I set out the following 
hypotheses regarding content expertise: 
 
 H3: The more content expertise a member state has, the  
more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
H3A: Content expertise is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
 The posited causal process through which a high level of content 
expertise is expected to lead to negotiation success, in line with H3, is as 
follows:  
 
A high level of content expertise!know the technical  
boundaries for possible issue outcomes(1)!quicker to  
narrow down the range of agreement and propose 
compromises(2)!proposals reflect own positions within a 
technically acceptable range of agreement(3)!proposals 
incorporated into negotiated agreement(4)!state has  
negotiated successfully(5)  
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The posited effects of negotiation context in mediating this relationship 
between content expertise and negotiation performance, as predicted by 
H3A, are as follows: 
 
In the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, a high level  
of content expertise! know the technical boundaries for  
possible issue outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the  
range of agreement and propose compromises(2)! 
proposals reflect own positions within a technically  
acceptable range of agreement(3)!proposals rejected  
unless they reflectthe positions of the state(s) with the  
lowest preference intensity(4).  
 
 These posited causal processes, as well as the more general prediction 
regarding content expertise and negotiation performance, will be examined 
in light of the empirical evidence of member state performance in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
 
 
4.3d  Process Expertise 
There is some ambiguity in the literature surrounding the concept of process 
expertise. For example, while Tallberg (2008: 701) defines process expertise 
as “knowledge of the institutional framework of negotiations, including legal 
provisions and procedures”, Beach (2005: 27) defines it as “analytical 
skills”. Thus, to an extent, Tallberg’s definition of process expertise is more 
similar to Beach’s definition of content expertise than to Beach’s own 
definition of the former (see Beach, 2005: 27; Tallberg, 2008: 701). In fact, 
Beach’s conceptualization of process expertise is more in line with some 
conceptualizations of skill. For example, Bailer (2004: 106) describes skill as 
capturing how well a party uses information in the bargaining process, and 
Zartman and Berman (1982: 207) view skill as the ability to aggregate a 
collection of positions into a coherent stance for the delegation as a whole, 
which can then be communicated to opponents in the bargaining process. 
With regard to the former approach, by Bailer, there is a clear relationship 
between skill and information, which accords with Beach’s treatment of 
process expertise as one of three components of information (Beach, 2005). 
On the other hand, though Zartman and Berman’s understanding of skill 
implicates analytical prowess, it also locates the importance of skill as prior 
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to the exchange between negotiating parties. That is, for Zartman and 
Berman (1982), skill is about preparing a coherent position to present to 
negotiation counterparts, while for Bailer (2004: 106), skill is about the 
virtuosity of bargainers in the exchange itself. In general, then, there is a 
clear distinction in how each of these authors treat the concept of skill, as 
well as the distinction between skill and process expertise, though there is 
arguably more similarity between process expertise, as understood by Beach, 
and skill, as understood by Bailer in particular, then between the concepts of 
process expertise for Beach and Tallberg.  
 Interestingly, when Beach expands on his understanding of process 
expertise, he explains that this deals with both analytical skills and the 
experience necessary to comprehend proposals, as well as procedural skills 
to effectively steer a negotiation (Beach, 2005: 27). This continues to 
resonate with Bailer’s understanding, and moves closer to Tallberg’s 
emphasis on procedural knowledge as the key to influencing negotiations 
through process expertise (Tallberg, 2008). Thus, on closer inspection, there 
is no great distance between Beach and Tallberg, in terms of understanding 
process expertise, but more so in the clarity of definition each author offers. 
Given this, and the relevance of Tallberg’s application of process expertise in 
a study of bargaining power in the European Council, to the study at hand, I 
adapt slightly Tallberg’s definition of process expertise, which is 
conceptualized here as “knowledge of the institutional framework of 
negotiations” (Tallberg, 2008: 701). In line with Tallberg and Beach, the 
expectation is that possessing an advantage in process expertise enables a 
delegation to effectively steer negotiations.   
 In the case of the SGP negotiations, then, experience with the 
procedural aspects of EMU and the EU more broadly, as well as the 
workings of the specific institutions in which negotiations took place, could 
indicate to negotiators the best time or forum in which to table a proposal, or 
whether to respond to a proposal immediately, rather than waiting to gauge 
the responses of others, for instance. Given the complexity of both 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, and the variety of 
questions that had to be solved in order for agreement to be reached, it would 
have been crucial for negotiators to tackle proposals strategically, knowing 
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where to devote their greatest efforts and at what point a compromise that 
reflected their interests would be most likely accepted.  
However, this advantage afforded by process expertise would only be 
useful when states are prepared to compromise. Under the context of 
‘uploading’ negotiations, where a state might prefer the default condition to 
shifting position beyond a fixed point, no amount of process expertise is 
likely to make viable a compromise proposal that does not reflect this former 
state’s position. Thus, the utility of process expertise as a bargaining resource 
is mediated by negotiation context, where the context in ‘uploading’ serves 
to diminish the effectiveness of process expertise, independent of other 
bargaining resources, such as a low preference intensity. This limit on the 
effectiveness of process expertise is absent in the context of ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, where the default condition is common to all negotiating 
parties, and thus no state is likely to exit negotiations rather than 
compromise. With these points in mind, I advance the following hypotheses 
regarding process expertise: 
 
 H4: The more process expertise a member state has,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
 H4A: Process expertise is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
 The causal process through which I expect a high level of process 
expertise to lead to negotiation success, in line with H4, is as follows: 
 
 A high level of process expertise!aware of institutional  
nuance surrounding negotiations(1)!identify effective routes  
for influence(2)!exploit this route to propose compromises  
that reflect own positions(3)!proposals incorporated into  
 negotiated agreement(4)!state has negotiated successfully(5) 
 
On the other hand, the effects of negotiation context in mediating the utility 
of process expertise as a bargaining resource, in line with H4A, can be seen 
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In the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, a high level  
of process expertise!aware of institutional nuance  
surrounding negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for 
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose compromises  
that reflect own positions(3)!proposals rejected unless they  
reflect the positions of the state(s) with the lowest preference  
intensity(4) 
 
 As with the other variables described above, both the hypothesized 
relationship between process expertise and negotiation performance, and the 
posited causal processes, will be tested against empirical evidence from the 




4.4 The Dynamic Effects of Bargaining Resources and Negotiation Context: 
Enhancing Understanding of Intergovernmental Negotiations 
The rational choice institutionalist approach this thesis takes to analyzing the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, is useful insofar as 
it predicts that different resources will be relevant for achieving the fixed 
goal of negotiation success in the distinct contexts of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’. However, this approach does not offer predictions regarding 
the differential importance of information, content expertise and process 
expertise in the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Neither does this 
approach point to a specific causal process between certain values of the 
independent and dependent variables, for instance a high level of information 
and negotiation success. The approach leads to the expectation that a high 
level of information, facilitated by the negotiation context in ‘reuploading’, 
will provide for negotiation success. However, the intervening causal 
processes outlined above have been derived from consulting a vast and 
varied body of negotiation literature, rather than from the rational choice 
institutionalist approach. Thus, while this thesis joins a wide body of 
literature that takes as its starting point a rational choice institutionalist 
approach, and an equally wide body of negotiation literature, it stands to 
make an important contribution to each.  
 In testing the predictions of a rational choice institutionalist approach, 
regarding the effects of context in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
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negotiations over the SGP, this study provides for confirmation of the 
expectation that rational actors pursuing a fixed goal will adapt their 
strategies in line with institutional constraints, to achieve the fixed goal of 
negotiation success. If the results of the analysis herein do not confirm this, 
then the in-depth approach that has been taken, tracing the causal process 
between possessing a bargaining resource and deploying it to achieve 
negotiation success, will shed light on where the rational choice 
institutionalist predictions diverged from the empirics. From there, it would 
be possible to refine the hypotheses that emerge from this approach, so that 
they might be retested in similar negotiation situations. Alternatively, if the 
results are confirmatory of predictions advanced in line with a rational choice 
institutionalist approach, the process-tracing analysis provides for enhanced 
understanding of how exactly the causal process operates.  
 The contribution this thesis makes to various bodies of negotiation 
literature, lies as much in synthesizing these as it does in confirming and 
refining the findings therein. By analyzing the differential importance of a 
variable such as preference intensity, which features in IR-based studies of 
one-off negotiations (for example Keohane and Nye, 1977), and one such as 
content expertise, which is deemed relevant for influence in densely 
institutionalized IOs (see Cox et al., 1973), this thesis can say a great deal 
about, for instance, the extent to which negotiation situations differ on the 
basis of intra-organizational contextual factors, and hence each of these 
variables are potentially relevant for negotiation success at different times 
within the same organization, rather than being differentially useful on the 
basis of inter-institutional variation. Within a given body of negotiation 
literature, such as that focused on the EU, this thesis can contribute valuable 
insight as to the differential importance of such widely analyzed resources as 
information, content expertise and process expertise, both in any one context, 
and, potentially, in distinct negotiation contexts, though the latter is not a 
predicted finding.  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this thesis speaks to the ever 
present question of whether aggregate structural resources, such as 
population and economic size, are the best indicators of negotiation success 
(Keohane, 1984; Zartman and Rubin eds., 2002; Bailer, 2004; 2010; 
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Tallberg, 2008), regardless the negotiation context, or whether small states 
can negotiate as successfully as big ones, given the right context in which to 
deploy their resources. Alternatively, this thesis might reveal that economic 
size matters only insofar as it leads to higher information and content 
expertise, for example, with the wider implication that these individual-level 
resources do matter, though possessing an advantage in them remains the 
preserve of the mighty. The overarching point is that the in-depth, qualitative 
approach this thesis takes to analyzing the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, provides for the advancement of knowledge in 





Drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter, of differences between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, this chapter explained how a 
rational choice institutionalist approach offers considerable analytical 
leverage, in highlighting negotiation context, and the changing context 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, as well as how that impacts on the 
potential for member states to wield influence in each. Combining the broad 
predictions that can be derived from a rational choice institutionalist 
approach with more specific predictions that emerge from analyses of 
particular bargaining resources in negotiation situations, this chapter 
presented clearly articulated hypotheses and related causal processes to 
operationalize the theoretical arguments that result from synthesizing various 
negotiation literatures. Assessing these predictions in light of empirical 
evidence from ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, has 
utility for confirming and clarifying the rational choice institutionalist 
understanding of how states cooperate, and the extent to which the 
circumstances of cooperation matter, and incorporating the focus on 
bargaining resources leads to a clear expectation that the effects of context 
will impact on states’ negotiation performance, depending on the resources 
they possess. Thus, rather than concluding that certain bargaining resources 
will always implicate power on the part of states that possess them (for 
example Dür and Mateo, 2010), or that certain contexts will facilitate 
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cooperative, or pareto-optimal outcomes (for example Keohane, 1984; 
Scharpf, 1988), the rational choice institutionalist approach this thesis takes 
to analyzing the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
allows for examination of how these dynamics interact, to explain the 
specific distributive outcomes of a given negotiation situation.  
 Along those lines, the conceptualization of negotiation performance is 
essential to the utility of such an approach. Specifically, it is in the 
distinction between deliberate and accidental negotiation success, that 
influence is effectively captured. Absent this, it is not possible to enhance the 
rational choice institutionalist argument that context matters, with an 
appraisal of how context matters. Nor is it possible, absent this focus on 
deliberate versus accidental negotiation success, to clarify the processes 
through which influence is wielded in the EU, and the extent to which this 
varies with intra-institutional contextual changes.  
 The following chapter of the thesis, on research design, details how 
the theoretical constructs outlined over the course of this and the previous 
chapter, are operationalized for data collection and analysis, with emphasis 
on the multiple indicators and data sources used to enhance validity. There is 
also in-depth discussion of the process-tracing analysis undertaken in this 
study, and the complementarity of a case study approach, for such an 
analysis (Gerring, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Vennesson, 2008). 
Along those lines, chapter 5 discusses case selection, including the SGP and 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, as nested cases selected for 
study within the overarching case of the SGP, all of which is justified on the 
basis of research design criteria, and the need to maintain comparability of 
cases so as to facilitate the process-tracing analysis that is an essential 
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Section 3 - Research Design 
 
Chapter 5 - Research Design 
 
Introduction 
As the aim of this thesis is to go beyond observing correlations between 
cause and effect variables, to understand causal mechanisms, the study has 
been designed to facilitate detailed analysis of the intervening processes that 
link the independent and dependent variables (Gerring, 2004). Thus, the 
main method of analysis is process tracing, which refers, broadly, to the 
identification of causal mechanisms connecting independent and dependent 
variables (Vennesson, 2008: 232). A variety of uses have been identified for 
process-tracing techniques, with Vennesson (2008) explaining a key 
distinction between positivist and interpretivist approaches to process 
tracing. This thesis adopts a positivist approach, whereby the main aim of the 
process-tracing analysis is to assess, and clarify, the causal link, or lack 
thereof, between different levels of bargaining resources and the outcome of 
negotiation performance, as mediated by context in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP (Vennesson, 2008: 232). Thus, the 
accuracy of theoretical arguments regarding the explanatory role of 
bargaining resources for negotiation performance, and the expected effects of 
context derived from the rational choice institutionalist approach, are 
evaluated in light of the processes observed through empirical evidence 
(Vennesson, 2008).  
 Case study approaches have often been identified as useful 
complements to process-tracing analyses (for example Gerring, 2004; 
George and Bennett, 2005; Vennesson, 2008). One reason for this is that 
process tracing requires significant quantities of data, combined with 
considerable attention to detail, and clearly specified theoretical claims, all of 
which is facilitated by a small-n design (Vennesson, 2008). As explained by 
Gerring (2004) in an analysis of the trade-offs involved with different case 
study formats, increasing the number of units
10
 under study tends to decrease 
comparability, with the result that a posited process linking cause and effect 
                                       
10
 Gerring refers to units where many authors refer to cases. While some would identify the 
SGP in this study as a case, Gerring (2004) would refer to the SGP as a unit, with 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations as two cases within that unit.  
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variables may not apply to all units, if they are not sufficiently comparable. 
Thus, for the purposes of carrying out a process-tracing analysis, it was 
useful to identify one case that could provide for internal variation, and for 
reasons justified further in the case selection section of this chapter, it was 
desirable to select the SGP specifically. The ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP provide for within case variation that enables 
testing of causal arguments regarding the role of context in mediating the 
relationship between bargaining resources and negotiation performance. 
Further to that, it was necessary to analyze the performance of multiple 
member states in both the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, to 
enable the testing of causal arguments regarding relationships between 
different values of the independent variables, and the outcome of negotiation 
performance. Thus, the case study approach adopted in this thesis 
incorporates synchronic and diachronic variation (Gerring, 2004), which is 
essential to test the full range of hypotheses derived from the applied 
theoretical frameworks.  
 While it was necessary to introduce synchronic variation, by 
analyzing the performance of multiple member states, it was not possible to 
apply the detailed process-tracing approach to all member states involved in 
the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. The reasons for 
this, namely the need to control for certain factors, and the considerable data 
requirements involved with the approach to operationalizing the dependent 
variable, as well as the process-tracing analysis, are elaborated in the case 
selection section of this chapter. The case selection section also explains how 
introducing necessary variation on the independent variables, whilst ensuring 
an appropriate degree of comparability (Gerring, 2004; George and Bennett, 
2005), led to the selection of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
for analysis.  
 Subsequent sections of the chapter outline the operationalization and 
measurement for the dependent variable - negotiation performance, and each 
of the independent variables - preference intensity, information, content 
expertise and process expertise. As described in the previous chapter and 
expanded on here, negotiation performance is operationalized with 
considerable sensitivity to the need to distinguish between accidental and 
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deliberate success, so as to arrive at valid conclusions. Similarly, each of the 
independent variables is captured through multiple indicators, with the aim 
of enhancing validity of the measurement of such abstract concepts as those 
analyzed in this study. Further to that, detailed justification is provided for all 
of the indicators of each independent variable, with explicit reference to 
existing literature and previous attempts to measure these bargaining 
resources, wherever possible.  
 After describing and justifying the approach taken to measuring each 
variable, this chapter elaborates the process-tracing analysis. Drawing on the 
previous chapter’s presentation of posited causal processes linking each 
independent variable with the dependent variable, and the mediating role of 
negotiation context in these causal relationships, the data requirements are 
described, for generating empirical evidence against which these posited 
causal processes were checked. The final section of the chapter returns to the 
discussion of case selection, including justification for selecting the SGP, as 
well as Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, as nested cases. 
 
 
5.1 Presenting the Model 
 
5.1a Measuring Negotiation Performance 
Negotiation performance is defined as the extent to which a member state 
influences negotiations to affect the outcome agreement. Following Hosli 
(2000), Bailer (2004), and Beach (2005), negotiation performance is 
operationalized as the distance between actors’ policy positions and the 
negotiated agreement. This distance is considered qualitatively, in terms of 
the similarities and/or differences between policy positions and issue 
outcomes in the final agreement. The more similarity between the former and 
the latter, the better the member state has performed or, in other words, the 
more successfully the member state has negotiated.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, researchers that have used this 
measurement in the past point out the risk of counting accidental successes 
as real influence (see Bailer, 2004; 2008; 2010). For example, a member 
state’s policy position might match exactly with a particular issue outcome in 
the negotiated agreement, but this could be due to luck, rather than deliberate 
influence (Barry, 1980). A further issue is that a member state with a 
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moderate policy position going into negotiations, has less to do to move the 
outcome agreement toward their position, than does a state with an extreme 
position, with the result that the latter state might appear less successful than 
the former, despite exerting greater influence on the outcome agreement 
(Bailer, 2008). With regard to the first issue, the qualitative methodology 
adopted for this thesis provides for distinction between luck and genuine 
influence, as the whole process of negotiations is investigated, with attention 
to the specific resources used by states to wield influence throughout, rather 
than simply focusing on the start and end points. The second issue is also 
addressed through detailed analysis of the whole process of negotiations, and 
case selection, as a later section of the chapter describes.  
In order to measure member state negotiation performance, it was 
necessary to collect data on the policy positions of member states, to provide 
for a comparison between those positions and the negotiated outcome. Each 
issue within the SGP dossier is treated separately, as this accords with the 
common perception, as well as reports by participants, that a proposal is 
debated in the Council point by point, rather than being considered as a 
whole (Thomson and Stokman, 2006: 51). It was thus necessary to specify 
each of the issues under consideration and to collect data on member states’ 
positions regarding each of these issues. The criterion for an issue to be 
considered in the analysis is that at least some of the actors involved in 
decision-making took different positions on it. This is the most basic 
criterion applied in the DEU dataset (Thomson and Stokman, 2006: 35).  
Some of the issues covered in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP proved more contentious politically than others, 
and only a small number had to be referred to Ecofin and the European 
Council for final agreement. These issues are well documented, with 
widespread consistency, in secondary accounts and media reports of both 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ (for example Brunila et al., 2001; Heipertz 
and Verdun, 2010; Agence Europe, 1996b; 2005a). Rather than collecting 
new data to establish which key issues had to be decided beyond the 
MC/EFC, at the level of Ecofin or the European Council, I rely on existing 
data from the above sources.  
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Issues that were resolved in the MC/EFC are less widely reported 
than issues that required debate at the highest levels of decision-making. In 
order to identify those former issues, I consulted a selection of primary and 
media sources. Specifically, I relied on the documents referred to as ‘key 
issue papers’, composed by the MC/EFC at the start of both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the pact, which outline all points under 
negotiation, and thus provide a useful starting point to identify issues.
11
 From 
there, I consulted minutes from MC meetings for the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations,
12
 Agence Europe reports on the progress of negotiations for 
both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, and Financial Times reports for both 
negotiations. I limited searches in Agence Europe and the Financial Times to 
reports from the dates of major negotiating sessions, as well as three days 
prior to and following those sessions, for both negotiations.
13
 Finally, I 
conducted interviews with negotiation participants representing both member 
states and the Commission, during ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, as a check on data from documentary evidence.
14
 
Having established the full set of issues to be considered, it was 
necessary to identify member state policy positions over the outcome for 
each of these issues. Member state policy positions were measured 
immediately following the introduction of the Commission proposal
15
 in both 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations (following Thomson et al., 2006), 
and these positions were compared with the actual issue outcomes in the 
original and reformed SGP. In order to carry out this comparison, I adapt the 
approach taken in the DEU dataset (see Thomson et al., 2006), asking expert 
interviewees to describe the position of each member state, and locating 
                                       
11
 See Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996a) ‘Further work on fiscal 
discipline in Stage 3 following the Monetary Committee meeting on 17 January 1996’, 29 
January, MC/II/041/96-EN, regarding ‘uploading’; Economic and Financial Committee 
(2004) ‘Non-paper: Strengthening, Clarifying and better Implementing the Stability and 
Growth Pact’, 12 November, ECFIN/CEFCPE(2004)REP/50538, regarding ‘reuploading’. 
12
 References for these unpublished minutes, accessed via a FOI request to DG-Ecfin, are 
provided in the Appendix. 
13
 Dates for ‘uploading’: 21-22/6/1996; 20-22/9/1996; 2/12/1996; 12-13/12/1996; 
17/3/1997; 4-5/4/1997; 16-17/6/1997. Dates for ‘reuploading’: 7-8/3/2005; 20/3/2005; 22-
23/3/2005. These dates exclude all meetings that took place within 3 months of the 
Commission proposal, the timeframe within which member states are considered to form 
their positions, prior to political debate over said positions. 
14
 Details of all interviews conducted, are provided in the Appendix. 
15
 The Commission proposal for ‘uploading’ was presented 10 January, 1996; the first 
Commission proposal for ‘reuploading’ was presented 16 September, 2004.   
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these on a continuum from strict to weak, as most issues within the dossier 
could be classified accordingly. Depicting issues on this continuum is 
intended for illustrative purposes only, as the outcome of negotiation 
performance depends on the qualitative similarity between the content of 
states’ positions and the issue outcome, rather than any quantitative measure 
of distance. Thus, for those issues in the dossier that could not be arranged 
on a continuum from strict to weak, for example questions for which there 
were only negative or positive responses, I measure success in the same way, 
comparing the content of each state’s position with the content of the final 
agreement, yet provide no illustrative depiction.  
It was also essential to consider the importance of individual issues, 
as it is significant to achieve negotiation success over issues that a state 
deems particularly important within the dossier. For this reason, member 
state representatives were asked to note the most important issues to their 
delegation, and EU representatives were asked to note the most important 
issues overall. This is taken into consideration in measuring the overall 
performance of each member state.  
As well as interviewing negotiation participants to establish the 
content of states’ positions, I relied on a variety of primary sources and 
media, as additional confirmation of the data gained from interviews. Again, 
the ‘key issue papers’ detailing issues for negotiation, from the MC/EFC
16
, 
were useful sources for both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, as were Agence 
Europe and Financial Times reports. In addition to these sources, I consulted 
minutes from Parliamentary sessions, for relevant committees in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. These included Economics and 
Finance committees, as well as European Affairs committees, depending on 
national parliamentary orientation.
17
 I also consulted minutes from meetings 
                                       
16
 See Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996a) ‘Further work on fiscal 
discipline in Stage 3 following the Monetary Committee meeting on 17 January 1996’, 29 
January, MC/II/041/96-EN, regarding ‘uploading’; Economic and Financial Committee 
(2004) ‘Non-paper: Strengthening, Clarifying and better Implementing the Stability and 
Growth Pact’, 12 November, ECFIN/CEFCPE(2004)REP/50538, regarding ‘reuploading’. 
17
 Belgian committees: Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs; Federal Advisory 
Committee on European Affairs; French committees: The Committee of Finance, Economy 
and Budget Control; The Foreign Affairs Committee; German committees: Finance 
(Bundestag); Affairs of the European Union (Bundestag); Economic Committee 
(Bundesrat); Dutch committees: Finance; European Affairs. With the exception of Germany, 
all of these committee minutes were available online, via the following sites: 
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of the Ecofin Council, and DG Ecfin.
18
 Finally, I performed several 
Lexis/Nexis searches, including one to generate ‘all European news in 
English’, with the terms ‘stability pact’ and ‘stability and growth pact’, as 
well as one to generate ‘all Dutch language news’, ‘all French language 
news’ and ‘all German language news’, which included the respective 
translations of ‘stability pact’ and ‘stability and growth pact’.
19
 In order to 
ensure that member state positions were captured immediately following the 
Commission proposal, I limited all documentary evidence for this variable to 
that published within three months following the proposal, which includes 
January to April, 1996 (‘uploading’) and September to December, 2004 
(‘reuploading’).  
 Given that it was not possible to cover all member states in this 
detailed analysis, only those positions of the four states under consideration 
are located, as well as the outcome and, for the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
the status quo. It is necessary, then, to consider whether states not located on 
the continuum are actually moving the issue outcome, with the result that 
those member states appearing successful in my analysis, were in fact 
fortunate to have a position between that of another state and the issue 
outcome, thereby benefitting from the influence of the more extremely 
positioned state, which we do not see in my measurement. All aspects of the 
analysis have been designed with considerable sensitivity to the more general 
risk of attributing influence where fortune is at work, and deliberate 
                                       
http://www.senaat.be/www/?MIval=/index_senate&LANG=nl (Belgium); 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/ (France); http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/ 
(Netherlands). I accessed the German minutes via consultation requests to the German 
Bundestag, and a personal visit to the archives of the Bundesrat Library in Berlin. All 
minutes were available solely in the native language(s) of the publishing state, and I hired 
native speakers of French, Dutch and German to translate text, where necessary. For all 
minutes available online in pdf format, I limited the search to those documents containing 
the terms ‘stability pact’ or ‘stability and growth pact’, as translated into the respective 
language. For the German minutes that were not available online, I consulted minutes from 
every session of the relevant committees, within the specified time period of three months 
following the Commission proposal in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. 
18
 These minutes, accessed via FOI requests to the European Commission and Council of the 
European Union, were so lacking in detail as to be useless for gaining reliable information 
about member state positions. This is an issue that I continue to pursue with the aid of 
specialists in applying FOI law, as the lack of transparency implicated by the content of 
these documents is a serious problem.  
19
 A list of the specific publications returned from these searches and consulted for data 
collection, is provided in the Appendix. 
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negotiation success is only attributed to a state where multiple sources of 
data support this conclusion.  
Further to that, as the aim of this thesis is to go beyond establishing a 
correlation between independent and dependent variables, to explain the 
outcome of negotiation performance with a focus on the role of each 
bargaining resource, and the specific mechanisms through which these 
operate to lend influence to states, the process-tracing analysis is an essential 
step. This analysis provides for greater confidence in conclusions regarding 
state negotiation success, insofar as these conclusions are not only based on 
the number of issues over which states appear to secure an outcome closest 
to their position, but on observing the processes through which a state 
deploys specific bargaining resources to influence those outcomes. Thus, a 
state benefitting from the influence of another state, in seeing an outcome 
agreement close to their position, though one which the former state did 
nothing to effect, would not be considered successful for the purposes of this 
study. 
It is worth noting that states’ negotiation performance is considered 
in light of the content of political agreement reached over the original and 
reformed pact in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
respectively. While there is a process of translating political agreement into 
legal text, this process is not considered in the analysis, because it is mainly a 
legal, technical process handled by low level member state representatives, 
which enshrines political agreement into legislation. In the case that changes 
to a text, which would affect the content of the political agreement, are 
requested during this process, it is necessary to return to political negotiation 
at higher levels of the member state delegations. Thus, while this process 
may lead to a final legal text that is not identical to the political statement 
emerging from the relevant European Council summit, this is due to the need 
for basic language to be translated into legal language, rather than any 
change of substance in the latter text (interview, Council secretariat b).  
 
 
5.1b Measuring States’ Preference Intensities for Reaching Agreement 
Given the distinct default condition in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, there is a need to consider different indicators of 
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a state’s preference intensity for reaching agreement in each case. I adapt the 
approaches by Moravcsik (1998) and Heipertz and Verdun (2010) to 
measuring states’ bargaining power in the Maastricht and SGP negotiations, 
respectively, in order to identify relevant indicators of states’ preference 
intensities for reaching agreement, in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. Specifically, I consider the following indicators 
in measuring a state’s preference intensity during ‘uploading’ negotiations: 
currency stability, domestic opinion toward EMU membership, the 
likelihood of key trading partners joining EMU and whether the state was 
pivotal to the project going ahead.  
 Regarding the first indicator, it can be assumed that the more stable a 
member state’s currency, the less urgent the need for enhanced credibility 
from the common currency, which indicates a lower preference intensity. I 
measure currency stability with respect to states’ experience in the ERM, the 
precursor to EMU that lasted from 1989 until the launch of the single 
currency. This provides for a look at currency stability prior to completion of 
the Maastricht Treaty that enshrined a commitment to full EMU, as well as 
in the period just after the signing of the Treaty, and throughout negotiations 
over the SGP. The role of domestic opinion toward EMU membership 
impacts on a state’s preference intensity in that the more favorable domestic 
opinion was toward EMU membership, the more costly for the government if 
the project did not go forward or the state in question failed to qualify, while 
the more opposed domestic opinion was, the more legitimate it would have 
been for the state to withdraw from SGP negotiations, and hence the running 
to join the single currency. This indicator is based on results from 
Eurobarometer surveys for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997.
20
 
 With regard to the likelihood of key trading partners gaining 
membership, it would have been potentially more costly, both politically and 
economically, for a state to turn away from EMU if their key trading partners 
adopted the common currency, thus conferring a lower preference intensity 
                                       
20
 See European Commission (1995) ‘Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European 
Union’, Number 43, Fieldwork: April-May 1995; European Commission (1996) 
‘Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union’, Number 45, Fieldwork: February-
March and April-May 1996; European Commission (1997) ‘Eurobarometer: Public Opinion 
in the European Union’, Number 47, Fieldwork: February-June 1997. 
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on a state with key trading partners unlikely to join EMU in the first round.  
It is worth noting that nearly all EU member states have a considerable 
volume of trade with others, though there are trading relationships that are 
particularly intense, as well as those small, open economies in the EU that 
depend on trade more heavily than others. Finally, if a state’s exit from 
negotiations meant the termination of the project, than any concern about the 
opportunity costs of taking the unilateral alternative are moot, giving such a 
state an extremely low preference intensity relative to other states, which 
were not pivotal to the project’s completion. These last two indicators are 
apparent from multiple secondary sources (for example Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010), which describe which states were expected to join, and 
highlight those deemed pivotal to the project’s completion.   
In the case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the alternative to agreement 
for all member states would have been to continue with the SGP as it stood. 
Thus, the indicators I consider in measuring a state’s preference intensity for 
reform are whether the state had been subject to initiation of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), whether the state had a deficit close to the 
reference value of 3% of GDP in the lead up to and during the time of 
negotiations and whether the state had a debt close to the reference value of 
60% of GDP prior to and during negotiations.  
With regard to the first indicator, for a state that had already reduced 
deficit levels in line with the existing EDP, the need to secure a weakening of 
the rules would be less urgent than for a state that was unsure of how their 
government and public would cope with initiation of the EDP in the first 
place. Furthermore, a state that had already been subject to the EDP would 
be less willing to see other member states escape that process through 
securing reforms to weaken the pact. The deficit level in the lead up to and at 
the time of negotiations has significant implications for a state’s preference 
intensity, because a state that was likely to breach the ceiling provided for 
under the original SGP, would have a stronger preference for securing 
reforms than a state that did not face the impending threat of sanctions under 
the existing arrangement. Finally, a state with a high debt level may have 
preferred an overall weakening of the pact, but would have found the 
alternative to agreement more attractive than a reform deal that shifted the 
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focus of the EDP from deficit to debt levels, which was a possibility in this 
case. I rely on the DG Ecfin display of ongoing and closed EDP procedures, 
available on the Commission website
21
, for the first indicator, and on 
Eurostat’s ‘general government debt and deficit’ online statistics for 
individual states, to capture the second and third indicators. 
Because there was no theoretical argument in the literature to indicate 
that one of these aspects of preference intensity should be more relevant than 
others, equal weight is attributed to each indicator, in assigning a total value 
for preference intensity to each member state. However, in assigning scores 
to states within each indicator, there is an effort to reflect the heightened 
importance in ‘uploading’ negotiations of the fourth indicator - whether a 
state is pivotal to the project going ahead - and the diminished importance of 
the third indicator - whether key trade partners are likely to qualify and join. 
Regarding the first point, for a state that is pivotal to the project’s 
completion, such that their exiting negotiations would effectively derail said 
project, that state’s preference intensity for reaching agreement should be 
partiularly low. This is so because the state’s decision to exit negotiations 
would not incur the risk of opportunity costs from non-participation in the 
project being negotiated, given that it would cease to progress toward 
completion once the state exited negotiations.  
In terms of the second point, regarding trading partners, as mentioned 
in the preceding justification for each indicator, the level of trade between all 
states concerned was sufficiently high as to implicate considerable benefits 
from abolishing exchange rate costs, though the subtle difference between 
the trade situation for France as compared with the Netherlands, for example, 
warrants some attention to this indicator. With these points in mind, overall 
values for preference intensity in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations are assigned as follows: 
 ‘uploading’ 
 Currency stability - state with de facto anchor currency under  
 ERM receives a 4; state that could operate within narrowest  




m, regarding indicator 1; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/data/main_
tables, regarding indicators 2 and 3. 
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 bands against the de facto anchor currency receives a 3;  
 other states receive a 2 
  
 Domestic opinion toward EMU membership - states ranked  
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing domestic opinion that is  
most favorable, based on average value of support less  
opposition over 1995-1997, and 4 representing domestic  
opinion that is least favorable, based on average value of  
support less opposition over 1995-97 
  
Whether key trade partners are likely to qualify and join –  
this indicator is treated dichotomously, with states that have  
key trade partners likely to qualify and join receiving a 1, and  
those with key trade partners less likely to qualify and join  
receiving a 2; based on geographical division of states into 
Mediterranean and Northern European trading blocs 
  
 Whether state is pivotal to the project going ahead –  
 this indicator is treated dichotomously, with states that  
 are not pivotal receiving a 1, and those that are pivotal  
 receiving a 4 
 
 ‘reuploading’ 
 Initiation of EDP - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
 with those that had been subject to and complied with the  
 EDP receiving a 4, those that had not receiving a 1 
  
 Deficit Level - this indicator can be treated one of two  
 ways, depending on the empirics; if there is a clustering of  
 states near and far from the deficit ceiling, the indicator may  
 be treated dichotomously, with those near the ceiling  
receiving a 1 and those far from it receiving a 4; if there is an  
even spread between states, they will be scored from 1 to 4,  
with 1 representing the lowest deficit, and 4 the highest 
  
Debt Level - this indicator can be treated one of two ways,  
depending on the empirics; if there is a clustering of states  
near and far from the debt ceiling, the indicator may be  
treated dichotomously, with those near the ceiling receiving a  
4 and those far from it receiving a 1; if there is an even spread 
between states, they will be scored from 1 to 4, with 1  
representing the lowest debt, and 4 the highest 
 
 
5.1c Measuring States’ Information 
I consider the following indicators of member state information levels in the 
SGP negotiations: frequency of participation in restricted informal meetings 
outside the direct negotiating sphere, frequency of bilateral meetings with 
other member state representatives and frequency of contact with 
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representatives from the European Commission. With regard to the third 
indicator, it is argued widely in the literature on EU negotiations, that the 
Commission has an informational advantage compared to member states in 
the Council, both because of institutional resources and the Commission’s 
role as relative neutral (see for example Meerts and Cede, 2004; Beach, 
2005). Thus, frequent contact with representatives from this institution, 
should be an important source of information for member state 
representatives in the SGP negotiations.  
 The first and second indicators are derived from a study by Paul 
Meerts (1997) of the perceptions of small member states negotiating in the 
EU, in which all participants (numbering 50) indicated in a survey that 
informal contacts outside of official meetings are an important source of 
information for negotiators.
22
 Along the same lines, Jonas Tallberg (2006; 
2008) cites bilateral meetings and informal communications with 
government representatives, as crucial to increasing preference information 
for the Council Presidency. Also on the subject of the Council Presidency, 
Alain Guggenbühl (2004) highlights the need for national representatives of 
the Presidency state to approach other delegations or participate with them in 
restricted informal meetings to increase information.  
While it is possible that these tactics apply only to the state holding 
the Council Presidency, neither author indicates this. One point to consider, 
in this regard, is whether the member state holding the Presidency would be 
able to gain information through the aforementioned strategies, because the 
holder is seen as a neutral mediator, while a state that was not holding the 
Presidency would be unable to do so, failing to inspire the same trust. 
Considering Tallberg’s own argument that member states are aware of the 
tendency for the Presidency state to use this role to further important national 
aims or construct compromises closer to their preferred position (Tallberg, 
2006: 2, 11), it seems that any other member state would be able to gain 
information through the same channels as those pursued by the state holding 
the Presidency.  
                                       
22
 This study focused on small member states because the response rate from large member 
states was deemed too low to be representative. There is nothing in the study to suggest that 
this source of information is particular to small states. 
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In order to capture these indicators, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with one or more member state representatives for the ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Where possible, multiple representatives 
were interviewed, though this was not possible except in select cases. 
However, this does not present a problem to the analysis, given that member 
state representatives who were interviewed, all confirmed that the pattern of 
participation in restricted informals and meetings between state 
representatives and their counterparts, as well as with the Commission, was 
similar at all levels of the delegation. In other words, the German MC 
member was not holding significantly more meetings with his colleagues, 
than was the German Ecofin member, but rather these meetings followed a 
similar pattern at all levels of the delegation, for instance.  
Further to this, the Commission representatives interviewed as a 
check on the data obtained from member state representatives, reported 
confirmatory information. Nonetheless, as an additional check on the 
member state information levels captured through these indicators, the scores 
received by each of the states under analysis in an index compiled by 
Stefanie Bailer (2006), which ranks all EU member states on information 
levels in EU negotiations in general, were included in arriving at values for 
state information, in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. Although I consider that 
information level may be specific to a given set of negotiations, or at least a 
policy area, Bailer’s index is highly reliable and reports scores similar to 
those found in my own research.  
Following data collection, the decision was taken to exclude the third 
indicator - frequency of contact with Commission representatives - in 
measuring state information levels for the ‘uploading’ negotiations. This is 
because no member state representatives interviewed, reported holding such 
meetings as a source of information about the ‘uploading’ negotiations. With 
regard to measuring member state information levels in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, the decision was taken to exclude indicator one - participation 
in restricted informal meetings outside the direct negotiating sphere - 
because none of the representatives interviewed, mentioned such sessions as 
being relevant, nor did documentary evidence indicate that these were a 
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feature in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, whereas they were very apparent, 
and reportedly relevant to the ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
As there was no theoretical argument in the literature to indicate that 
one of these aspects of information should be more relevant than others, 
equal weight is attributed to each, in combining the indicators to assign states 
an overall value for information. Thus, values are arrived at as follows: 
 
 ‘uploading’ 
 Frequency of participation in restricted informal meetings  
 outside the direct negotiating sphere - states ranked from  
1 to 4, with 1 representing least frequent participation, and 4 
representing most frequent participation 
  
Frequency of bilateral meetings with other member state 
representatives - states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing  
least bilateral meetings with other state representatives, and 4 
representing most  
  
Bailer Index - states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing  
the lowest score for information in the Bailer index, and 4 
representing the highest score 
 
 ‘reuploading’ 
Frequency of bilateral meetings with other member state 
representatives - states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing  
least bilateral meetings with other state representatives, and 4 
representing most  
  
Frequency of contact with representatives from the European 
Commission - states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing  
least frequent contact with Commission representatives, and 4  
representing most 
  
Bailer Index - states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing  
the lowest score for information in the Bailer index, and 4  
representing the highest score 
 
 
5.1d Measuring States’ Content Expertise 
I consider the following indicators of content expertise: similarity between 
pre-EMU monetary policy and monetary policy of the ECB, whether any of 
the state’s delegation during ‘uploading’ negotiations had been present 
during the Maastricht negotiations over EMU, whether any of the state’s 
delegation during ‘reuploading’ negotiations had been present during the 
‘uploading’ negotiations and/or Maastricht negotiations, and whether the 
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Head of State or Government (HoS/G) had served as finance minister or in 
the finance ministry. Given that any indicator of content expertise must be 
fairly context-specific, I adopt only one of the four indicators of content 
expertise used in this study, from the wider literature on intergovernmental 
negotiations, namely whether the HoS/G had served as Finance Minister or 
in the Finance Ministry. In his research into the role of expertise in European 
Council negotiations, Tallberg (2008: 701-702) finds that differences 
between HoS/G, in terms of content expertise, are especially pronounced in 
the European Council, due to the deliberate separation of the former from 
national civil servants in that forum. Tallberg suggests that where HoS/G 
have served previously as portfolio ministers for the policy area under 
negotiation, they bring an advantage in content expertise to European 
Council negotiations. Experience in the finance ministry, or national 
equivalent, should afford HoS/G the advantage in content expertise that 
Tallberg refers to here, in the SGP negotiations that this thesis analyzes. This 
indicator is readily apparent from media and official biographies of the 
HoS/G, from each member state under consideration.  
 A state’s pre-EMU monetary policy is a useful indicator of content 
expertise in that a member state with a history of stability-oriented monetary 
policy similar to the policy mandated for the ECB under the Maastricht 
Treaty, would be able to call upon a wider body of technical knowledge 
regarding complimentary fiscal policy than would a state with less 
experience implementing stability-oriented monetary policies. This indicator 
is apparent from a wide variety of secondary sources that discuss the 
monetary policies of member states in the years prior to EMU, including, for 
example, Moravcsik (1998), Dyson and Featherstone (1999) and Frieden 
(2002).  
With regard to the second indicator, much of the original SGP 
negotiations were dominated by the issue of keeping the SGP within the 
remit of the Maastricht Treaty, so that treaty amendments would not be 
necessary for its passage. Thus, a negotiator that had participated in the 
Maastricht negotiations would afford their delegation a higher level of first-
hand knowledge of the issues under negotiation, than if no such negotiator 
were present in the delegation. Along the same lines, in the ‘reuploading’ 
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negotiations, where a negotiator had been present also during the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations and/or Maastricht, their delegation can be expected to have the 
same advantage in knowledge of the issues under negotiation, as compared 
to a delegation with no such negotiator. In order to capture these indicators, I 
have consulted the list of attendants at the Intergovernmental Conference on 
Economic and Monetary Union, provided by the Secretariat General of the 
European Commission
23
, and have compared this against the list of 
delegation members provided by the finance ministry of each state analyzed, 
for the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP.
24
 
As with the other variables discussed thus far, there was no 
theoretical argument for attributing different weight to some indicators than 
others, so they are considered equally in arriving at overall values for content 
expertise, as follows: 
 
 ‘uploading’ 
 Fit between pre-EMU monetary policy and stability-oriented  
 policy of the ECB - this indicator is treated dichotomously, with  
 a 1 for states that did not have a good fit, and a 2 for states that  
 did 
  
 Whether any of the delegation had been present during Maastricht  
negotiations over EMU - this indicator can be treated one of two 
ways, depending on the empirics; if there is a clustering of states  
that had or did not have any representatives at Maastricht, the 
indicator may be treated dichotomously, with those that did have 
representatives at Maastricht receiving a 2 and those that did not, 
receiving a 1; if there is an even spread between states, whereby  
one had multiple representatives present at Maastricht, one had a 
single representative, one had none, etc. then states will be ranked 
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lack of repeat representatives  
or least number of repeat representatives, and 4 representing the  
most 
  
Whether HoS/G had served as Finance Minister or in the Finance 
Ministry – this indicator is treated dichotomously, with a 1 for  
those HoS/G that did not have a relevant background, and 2 for  
those HoS/G that did 
                                       
23
 See European Commission (unpublished) ‘Liste Des Delegations De La Reunion Des 
Representants Personnels Du 15 Janvier 1991’, Conference Des Representants Des 
Gouvernements Des Etats Membres, Union Economique Et Monetaire, provided to the 
author by the Secretariat General of the European Commission, 28 July, 2011.  
24
 I contacted the Belgian, French, German and Dutch finance ministries by email, and asked 
for the name(s) of their representatives to the MC/EFC and Ecofin/Eurogroup, over the 
course of these negotiations. I also checked this information with negotiation participants. 
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 ‘reuploading’ 
Fit between pre-EMU monetary policy and stability-oriented  
policy of the ECB - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
with a 1 for states that did not have a good fit, and a 2 for  
states that did 
  
Whether any of the delegation had been present during  
 ‘uploading’ negotiations and/or Maastricht - this indicator can 
be treated one of two ways, depending on the empirics; if there  
is a clustering of states that had or did not have any repeat 
representatives, the indicator may be treated dichotomously,  
with those that did have repeat representatives receiving a 2  
and those that did not, receiving a 1; if there is an even spread 
between states, whereby one had multiple repeat representatives,  
one had a single representative, one had none, etc. then states  
will be ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lack of repeat 
representatives or least number of repeat representatives, and 4 
representing the most 
  
Whether HoS/G had served as Finance Minister or in the  
Finance Ministry - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
with a 1 for those HoS/G that did not have a relevant  
background, and 2 for those HoS/G that did 
 
 
5.1e Measuring States’ Process Expertise 
The following indicators of process expertise are considered: tenure of the 
Head of State/Government, tenure of the Finance Minister or equivalent and 
tenure of the MC/EFC representative. These indicators are based on Tallberg 
(2008), who explains that experience and continuity in office provide process 
expertise to EU negotiators, as well as Beach (2005), who highlights 
procedural skills gained from institutional memory as a source of process 
expertise. While the latter refers to the institutional memory of the Council 
secretariat, rather than any one official within the institution, it is possible to 
adapt this understanding of process expertise applied to an institution, such 
that it captures the process expertise of an individual actor, by considering 
the procedural skills built up by that actor over the course of his/her time in a 
given role. Thus, the tenure of key delegation members in the ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP should indicate the level of 
process expertise for member states. These indicators are readily apparent 
from official biographies of states’ delegation members, and interviewees 
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have been asked about their own tenure and that of other representatives, as a 
check on evidence from the former sources.  
 As with all other independent variables, equal weight is attributed to 
each indicator, in arriving at overall values for process expertise, as follows: 
 
 ‘uploading’ 
 Tenure of the HoS/G - states ranked from 1 to 4, from  
 shortest to longest tenure 
  
 Tenure of the Finance Minister - states ranked from 1 to 4,  
 from shortest to longest tenure 
  
 Tenure of the MC representative - states ranked from 1 to 4,  




 Tenure of the HoS/G - states ranked from 1 to 4, from  
 shortest to longest tenure 
  
 Tenure of the Finance Minister - states ranked from 1 to 4,  
 from shortest to longest tenure 
  
 Tenure of the EFC representative - states ranked from 1 to 4,  





This section outlines the data requirements and sources for analyzing the 
posited causal processes linking independent variables - bargaining resources 
- with the dependent variable - negotiation performance, as well as those that 
account for the intervening effects of negotiation context. Below is a table 
summarizing the hypothesized relationships between these variables, as well 
as potential confirmatory evidence. It is important to note, though, that these 
hypotheses speak only to correlations between the variables; the process-
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H1: The lower the preference intensity of 
a member state, the more successful that 
state will be in negotiations. 
Confirmed if the state with the lowest 
preference intensity negotiates most 
successfully 
H1A: A low preference intensity is more 
important for negotiation success in the 
absence of established EU-level policy, as 
is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, 
as is the case in ‘reuploading’.  
Confirmed if the state with the lowest 
preference intensity negotiates most 
successfully in ‘uploading’, yet the state 
with the lowest preference intensity does 
not negotiate most successfully in 
‘reuploading’, or relies on a different 
resource to negotiate successfully in 
‘reuploading’ 
H2: The more information a member state 
has, the more successful that state will be 
in negotiations.  
Confirmed if the state with the most 
information negotiates most successfully 
H2A: Information is more important for 
negotiation success in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘uploading’.  
Confirmed if the state with the most 
information negotiates most successfully in 
‘reuploading’, yet the state with the most 
information does not negotiate most 
successfully in ‘uploading’, or relies on a 
different resource to negotiate successfully 
in ‘uploading’ 
H3: The more content expertise a member 
state has, the more successful that state 
will be in negotiations. 
Confirmed if the state with the most 
content expertise negotiates most 
successfully 
H3A: Content expertise is more important 
for negotiation success in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘uploading’. 
Confirmed if the state with the most 
content expertise negotiates most 
successfully in ‘reuploading’, yet the state 
with the most content expertise does not 
negotiate most successfully in ‘uploading’, 
or relies on a different resource to 
negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’ 
H4: The more process expertise a member 
state has, the more successful that state 
will be in negotiations. 
Confirmed if the state with the most 
process expertise negotiates most 
successfully 
H4A: Process expertise is more important 
for negotiation success in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘uploading’ 
Confirmed if the state with the most 
process expertise negotiates most 
successfully in ‘reuploading’, yet the state 
with the most process expertise does not 
negotiate most successfully in ‘uploading’, 
or relies on a different resource to 
negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’ 
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5.2a Hypothesizing the Role of Preference Intensity and Tracing the Causal 
Process 
  
 H1: The lower the preference intensity of a member state,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
Causal Process: A low preference intensity!state will use  
the threat of exit(1)!threat of exit is taken seriously by other 
states(2)!other states respond to demands of the state that  
utilizes this bargaining tactic(3)!the positions of that state  
are accommodated in the negotiated agreement(4)!state has  
negotiated successfully(5). 
 
 Where a state with a low preference intensity threatens exit over a 
particular issue, I would expect to find conciliatory responses from other 
states, with the end result that the issue(s) over which this state has 
threatened exit are similar to that state’s policy position in the final 
negotiated agreement. I would not expect to find that a state with a high 
preference intensity threatened exit from negotiations, but if this were 
observed, it would be crucial to track the responses of other states, as this has 
the potential to disprove the posited causal process.     
 In order to trace this process, I consulted media reports and secondary 
sources, as well as carrying out interviews with representatives of member 
states and EU institutions, party to the negotiations. The interviews were 
essential to check steps two and three in the process, in particular, as 
documentary evidence does not typically report on such subtle aspects of a 
negotiation process. Regarding media and secondary sources, I consulted 
Agence Europe and the Financial Times, as well as carrying out a 
Lexis/Nexis search of ‘all European news in English’, for the terms ‘stability 
pact’ and ‘stability and growth pact’,
25
 for the dates of major negotiation 
sessions, as well as for the three days preceding and following these 
sessions.
26
 The following secondary sources were also consulted - Ruling 
Europe and The Stability and Growth Pact: The Architecture of Fiscal Policy 
in EMU, as these sources discuss in detail the process and outcome of 
                                       
25
 A list of the specific publications returned from these searches and consulted for data 
collection, is provided in the Appendix. 
26
 Dates for ‘uploading’: 21-22/6/1996; 20-22/9/1996; 2/12/1996; 12-13/12/1996; 
17/3/1997; 4-5/4/1997; 16-17/6/1997. Dates for ‘reuploading’: 7-8/3/2005; 20/3/2005; 22-
23/3/2005. 
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negotiations for the 12-13/12/1996 and 16-17/6/1997 meetings, with regard 
to the ‘uploading’ negotiations, and Ruling Europe covers the 
Ecofin/Eurogroup meetings of 7-8/3/2005 and 20/3/2005.  
 
 H1A: A low preference intensity is more important for  
negotiation success in the absence of established EU-level  
policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’.  
 
Causal Process: The causal role of preference intensity is  
facilitated by negotiations with a high level of distributional  
conflict, and minimized in negotiations with a low level of 
distributional conflict, in particular where the status quo  
alternative leaves all negotiation participants with the  
common policy they have set out to reform. In this latter  
case, the threat of exit is not an effective tactic, because even  
if some states are more satisfied than others with the status  
quo, the former states risk negative externalities or future  
crises by forcing others to maintain a policy that has proven 
ineffective.  
Under such circumstances:  
 
a low preference intensity!state will not use the threat of 
exit(1)!threat to walk away from negotiations would not be  
taken seriously by other states(2)!the threat of exit is not a  
feasible bargaining tactic(3)!this tactic will be absent in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations(4). 
 
 In the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, I would not expect to find that 
states used the tactic of threatening to exit negotiations, regardless their 
preference intensity for reform, and thus the threat of exit should be absent 
from ‘reuploading’ negotiations. However, if evidence were found that states 
utilized this bargaining tactic in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, it would be 
crucial to track the responses of other states, as the effective use of this tactic 
in ‘reuploading’ would weaken or disprove the causal argument. I consulted 




5.2b Hypothesizing the Role of Information and Tracing the Causal Process 
  
 H2: The more information a member state has, the more  
successful that state will be in negotiations.  
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Causal Process: A high level of information!know more  
about others’ positions than what is stated at formal negotiating 
sessions(1)!locate common ground(2)!propose compromises  
that encompass this common ground, whilst reflecting own  
positions as much as possible(3)!proposals are acceptable as  
they address others’ positions over crucial issues(4)!proposals 
incorporated into final agreement(5)!state has negotiated 
successfully(6).  
 
 Interviews were essential to establish the extent to which member 
state representatives knew about others’ positions, and Commission 
representatives to the MC/Ecofin (‘uploading’) and EFC/Ecofin and 
Eurogroup (‘reuploading’) were interviewed for this purpose. Commission 
representatives should be better placed to comment on the apparent 
understanding by state representatives of others’ positions than would state 
representatives themselves, as responses from the latter are more likely to be 
biased. In addition to interviewing Commission representatives, 
representatives from states other than those analyzed in this study were 
interviewed, including the Chairman of the MC in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations and the representative to the EFC of the Council Presidency 
state in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations.   
Moving through the causal process, it was necessary to determine the 
extent to which states were able to locate common ground and propose 
compromises that reflected this, as well as gauging others’ responses to these 
proposals. Initially, attempts were made to access written proposals by 
member states, in order to check this stage in the causal process, though 
neither the institutional archives in Brussels, nor member state capitals held 
such documents. I followed this up in interviews with negotiation 
participants, at which point I discovered that individual member states had 
not submitted official written proposals, but had mostly reported their 
proposals verbally, to be included in drafts by the Commission and Council 
Presidency. Thus, I relied on interviews and media documents to piece 
together the content of member state compromise proposals, as well as the 
extent to which these incorporated the positions of others. The specific media 
sources include Financial Times and Agence Europe, as well as a wide 
selection of publications generated from a Lexis/Nexis search of ‘all 
European news in English’, for the terms ‘stability pact’ and ‘stability and 
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growth pact’,
27
 all over the period April 1996 to June 1997 (‘uploading’) and 
December 2004 to March 2005 (‘reuploading’).  
The final step in this causal process, then, would be for the content of 
proposals made by well-informed states to be incorporated, in large part, into 
the final negotiated agreement. Again, interviews with negotiation 
participants, as well as media reports, were relied on for this purpose, as 
detailed above. In order to overcome the obstacle posed by a lack of written 
proposals, additional interviews were arranged with representatives of the 
Council secretariat, as a neutral institution with detailed records of the 
negotiation process, in order to check the reliability of data utilized for other 
steps in this process, as well as this final step.  
 
 H2A: Information is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’.  
 
 Causal Process: The causal role of information is facilitated as  
one moves from negotiations with a high level of distributional 
conflict to negotiations with a low level of distributional conflict.  
The former situation will be dominated by the state or states with  
the lowest preference intensity, leaving a state with a high level  
of information to influence negotiations only within the set zone  
of agreement of a state that will take the unilateral alternative  
rather than compromise. Under such circumstances:  
  
a high level of information !know more about others’ positions  
than what is stated at formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate  
common ground(2)!situation remains the same unless others’ 
positions are nearer to the state(s) with the lowest preference  
intensity than was previously known(3).  
 
  
 For an explanation of the data to check steps one and two, see the 
previous section regarding H2. Moving through the causal process, it was 
necessary to determine whether the states that ranked highly on information 
in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, used information in the 
same way in each context. For the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, I would expect 
to find a state with a high level of information putting forward proposals at 
                                       
27
 A list of the specific publications returned from these searches and consulted for data 
collection, is provided in the Appendix. 
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step 3, while in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, I would not expect to find a 
state with a high level of information actively shaping the debate.  
If states with a high level of information were putting forward 
proposals in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, it would be necessary to consider a 
number of issues: first, whether that state also has a low preference intensity; 
second, how the proposal is received – where a state with a high level of 
information attempts to follow the process posited for the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, the expectation is that their proposal(s) would be rejected in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, unless the positions of this state happen to coincide 
with those of the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity; third, whether 
the content of the proposal reflects the position of the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity, in which case I would assume that the state with a high 
level of information discovered that others’ positions were nearer those of 
the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity than they had appeared to be 
at formal negotiating sessions, and incorporated this into a proposal.  
Again, the main data source for this was participant interviews with 
member state and Commission representatives, as well as additional 
interviews with officials from the Council secretariat, in lieu of written 
proposals. To the extent that states with a high level of information in both 
negotiations used this bargaining resource differently in each, i.e. 
compromises were proposed by high information states in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, but not in the ‘uploading’ negotiations (accepting under the 
circumstances highlighted above), I could be reasonably confident in 
accepting the posited causal process in line with H2A. Alternatively, if states 
with a high level of information follow the same causal process toward 
influencing negotiations in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
then it would be necessary to reject the posited causal process and, 
potentially, the hypothesis as well.  
 
5.2c Hypothesizing the Role of Content Expertise and Tracing Causal 
Processes 
  
 H3: The more content expertise a member state has,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
Causal Process: A high level of content expertise!know  
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the technical boundaries for possible issue outcomes(1)! 
quicker to narrow down the range of agreement and propose 
compromises(2)!proposals reflect own positions within a 
technically acceptable range of agreement(3)!proposals 
incorporated into negotiated agreement(4)!state has  
negotiated successfully(5). 
 
 In order to establish the extent to which different state representatives 
knew the technical boundaries for possible issue outcomes, interviews were 
essential. Commission representatives to the MC (‘uploading’ negotiations) 
and EFC (‘reuploading’ negotiations) were interviewed for this purpose. 
Commission representatives should be better placed to comment on the 
apparent extent of knowledge of state representatives than would state 
representatives themselves, as responses from the latter are more likely to be 
biased. In addition to interviewing Commission representatives, 
representatives from states other than those analyzed in this thesis were 
interviewed, including the Chairman of the MC in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations and the representative to the EFC of the Council Presidency 
state in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  In general, at least one of the 
Commission representatives interviewed for the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations had attended both the MC/EFC and 
Ecofin/Eurogroup sessions, which provided for assessment of the extent to 
which member state representatives at both levels, knew the technical issues 
under negotiation.  
 In terms of differential expertise among the Heads of 
State/Government, I did not expect this be relevant for the majority of 
negotiations, as only the most politically sensitive issues reached that highest 
level of decision-making, and then agreements tended to be of a political, 
rather than technical nature. However, theory predicts that there would have 
existed a larger discrepancy in expertise between different Heads of 
State/Government than between different MC/EFC members, for example, 
and so it was desirable to trace the effects of this discrepancy at the highest 
level of decision-making. While it was not possible to arrange an interview 
with anyone who participated regularly in European Council negotiations, it 
was possible to interview finance ministers who had sat in occasionally, and 
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this was used to observe the effects of any discrepancies in content expertise 
at that level of member state delegations.  
Moving through the causal process, it was necessary to determine 
which states tabled proposals and when. As in the case of attempts detailed 
above, to check written proposals for the purpose of tracing the posited 
causal process relating to information, I discovered that written proposals by 
member states did not exist. Thus, again, I relied on interviews and media 
documents, as detailed above for the independent variable information, to 
discover how quickly member states proposed compromises, and whether 
these were technically acceptable.  
To the extent that a state with a high level of expertise appears to 
have known more than others about the technical boundaries for possible 
agreements, and proposed compromises more quickly than other states, the 
expectation is that these proposals would be technically acceptable, but of 
course this would need to be demonstrated as the next step in the causal 
process. Given the absence of written proposals, again, interviews with 
negotiation participants were relied on, and particularly the additional 
interviews with representatives of the Council secretariat, which were 
arranged as a check on data reported by other negotiation participants. Where 
proposals that are deemed technically acceptable were incorporated into the 
final negotiated agreement, the posited causal process could be accepted. 
Where proposals that are deemed technically acceptable were not 
incorporated into the final agreement, it would be necessary to consider the 
political sensitivity of the issues concerned and, based on this, either 
conclude that the hypothesized link between content expertise and 
negotiation success only holds in cases of low politicization, or potentially 
reject the posited causal process altogether.  
 
 H3A: Content expertise is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
 Causal Process: The causal role of content expertise is  
facilitated as one moves from negotiations with a high  
level of distributional conflict to negotiations with a low  
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level of distributional conflict. The former situation will be 
dominated by the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity, 
leaving a state with a high level of content expertise to  
influence negotiations only within the set zone of agreement of  
a state that will take the unilateral alternative, rather than 
compromise. Under such circumstances:  
  
a high level of content expertise!know the technical boundaries  
for possible issue  outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the  
range of agreement and propose compromises(2)!proposals  
reflect own positions within a technically acceptable range of 
agreement(3)!proposals rejected unless they reflect the  
positions of the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity(4).  
 
 
 An explanation of the data utilized to check steps one through three is 
provided in the previous section, regarding H3. Moving through the causal 
process to step four, for the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where proposals that 
are deemed technically acceptable were incorporated into the final negotiated 
agreement, it would be possible to accept the posited causal process. 
However, for the ‘uploading’ negotiations, proposals that are deemed 
technically acceptable and incorporated into the final negotiated agreement 
would also need to reflect the positions of the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity. If the proposal reflected only the positions of the 
proposing state, and departed from those of the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity, then it would be necessary to reject the posited causal 
process. Alternatively, where proposals deemed technically acceptable did 
not reflect the positions of the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity, 
and were rejected, this would support the posited causal process. 
 
 
5.2d Hypothesizing the Role of Process Expertise and Tracing Causal 
Processes 
 
 H4: The more process expertise a member state has,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
Causal Process:  A high level of process expertise!aware  
of institutional nuance surrounding negotiations(1)!identify 
effective routes for influence(2)!exploit this route to  
propose compromises that reflect own positions(3)! 
proposals incorporated into negotiated agreement(4)!state  
has negotiated successfully(5) 
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 In order to establish whether member state representatives were more 
or less aware of the institutional nuance surrounding negotiations, it was 
necessary to conduct interviews with negotiation participants. Commission 
representatives to the MC (‘uploading’ negotiations) and EFC (‘reuploading’ 
negotiations) were interviewed for this purpose, as Commission 
representatives can be assumed to be less biased than state representatives 
themselves, in reporting on this subject. Along those lines, representatives 
from member states other than the cases analyzed in this thesis, were 
interviewed, in order to compare their responses with data from Commission 
interviews.  
Moving through the causal process, participant interviews, again, and 
media sources, as detailed in section 5.2b, were the crucial data to check 
whether those states with intricate knowledge of the institutional nuance of 
the situation, used this advantage to identify effective routes for influence 
and, coming to the third step, pursued this route to push their positions in a 
way that others, less expert in the process of negotiations did not. For this 
latter step, I judged interviews to be the only acceptable source of data, as 
documentary evidence would be unlikely to convey such a subtle point with 
any accuracy or reliability. Given the aforementioned absence of written 
proposals, it was, again, necessary to rely on participant interviews in order 
to test the fourth step in the causal process, as well as arranging for 
interviews with Council secretariat officials, as an impartial source to check 
the reliability of other interview data.  
To the extent that proposals advanced by a state with a high level of 
process expertise, in a manner reflective of their unique institutional 
knowledge of the negotiation situation, were incorporated into the final 
negotiated agreement, it would be possible to accept the posited causal 
process. However, if such proposals were not incorporated into the final 
agreement, or were deemed by participants to have been incorporated for 
other reasons, such as a coincidental change of position by one or more 
states, then I would be forced to reject the posited causal process in this case.  
 
 H4A: Process expertise is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
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the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
 Causal Process: The causal role of process expertise is  
facilitated as one moves from negotiations with a high level  
of distributional conflict to negotiations with a low level of  
distributional conflict. The former situation will be dominated  
by the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity, leaving  
a state with a high level of process expertise to influence  
negotiations only within the set zone of agreement of a state  
that will take the unilateral alternative, rather than compromise.  
Under such circumstances: 
 
 a high level of process expertise!aware of institutional nuance 
surrounding negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for  
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose compromises that  
reflect own positions(3)!proposals rejected unless they reflect  
positions of the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity(4).  
 
 An explanation of the data used to check steps one to three is 
provided in the previous section, regarding H4. Moving through the causal 
process to step four, for the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where proposals 
advanced by a state with a high level of process expertise, in a manner 
reflective of their unique institutional knowledge of the negotiation situation, 
were incorporated into the final negotiated agreement, it would be possible to 
accept the posited causal process. However, for the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
proposals that were advanced by a state with a high level of process expertise 
would, according to the posited causal process, need in their manner to 
reflect a unique knowledge of the negotiation situation, and in their content, 
to reflect the positions of the state(s) with lowest preference intensity, if they 
were to be incorporated into the final negotiated agreement. Absent this latter 
criteria, that is, if a proposal by a state with a high level of process expertise, 
and a high preference intensity, reflected their position, and not that of the 
state(s) with the lowest preference intensity, yet was included in the final 
negotiated agreement, I would be forced to reject the posited causal process. 
On the other hand, if a state with a high level of process expertise proposed a 
compromise that did not reflect the positions of the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity, and saw that proposal rejected, this would support the 
posited causal process for the case of ‘uploading’ negotiations.   
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The following table summarizes the posited causal processes 
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Table III. Summary of Posited Causal Processes 
Variable Posited Causal Process 
Preference 
Intensity 
(‘uploading’) low preference intensity!state will use the threat of 
exit(1)!threat of exit is taken seriously by other states(2)!other states 
respond to demands of the state that utilizes this bargaining 
tactic(3)!the positions of that state are accommodated in the negotiated 
agreement(4)!state has negotiated successfully(5) 
Preference 
Intensity 
(‘reuploading’) low preference intensity!state will not use the threat 
of exit(1)!threat to walk away from negotiations would not be taken 
seriously by other states(2)!the threat of exit is not a feasible 
bargaining tactic(3)!this tactic will be absent in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations(4) 
Information (‘uploading’) high level of information !know more about others’ 
positions than what is stated at formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate 
common ground(2)!situation remains the same unless others’ positions 
are nearer to the state(s) with the lowest preference intensity than was 
previously known(3) 
Information (‘reuploading’) high level of information!know more about others’ 
positions than what is stated at formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate 
common ground(2)!propose compromises that encompass this 
common ground, whilst reflecting own positions as much as 
possible(3)!proposals are acceptable as they address others’ positions 
over crucial issues(4)!proposals incorporated into final 
agreement(5)!state has negotiated successfully(6) 
Content 
Expertise 
(‘uploading’) high level of content expertise!know the technical 
boundaries for possible issue outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the 
range of agreement and propose compromises(2)!proposals reflect 
own positions within a technically acceptable range of 
agreement(3)!proposals rejected unless they reflect the positions of the 
state(s) with the lowest preference intensity(4)  
Content 
Expertise 
(‘reuploading’) high level of content expertise!know the technical 
boundaries for possible issue outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the 
range of agreement and propose compromises(2)!proposals reflect 
own positions within a technically acceptable range of 
agreement(3)!proposals incorporated into negotiated 




(‘uploading’) high level of process expertise!aware of institutional 
nuance surrounding negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for 
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose compromises that reflect 
own positions(3)!proposals rejected unless they reflect positions of the 
state(s) with low preference intensity(4) 
Process 
Expertise 
(‘reuploading’) high level of process expertise!aware of institutional 
nuance surrounding negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for 
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose compromises that reflect 
own positions(3)!proposals incorporated into negotiated 
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5.3 Case Selection  
 
5.3a Selecting The Stability and Growth Pact 
The SGP was selected for analysis because it meets important research 
design criteria. The first and most basic is that the SGP, originally agreed in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, has been through both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, providing for the necessary diachronic variation. 
Second, in measuring the influence that a member state has on negotiations 
in the EU, researchers have tended to highlight salience as an explanatory 
factor (for example, Bailer, 2004; Thomson and Stokman, 2006; Naurin and 
Wallace, 2008; Tallberg, 2008), though findings differ over whether a high 
level of salience increases or decreases bargaining success. This thesis does 
not aim to uncover the effects of salience, and the SGP largely provides for 
the control of salience, as the regulation of fiscal policy by an authority other 
than the sovereign state would be in almost any circumstances, and was in 
the case of the EU, a highly salient topic for all states concerned. While there 
was a difference between states’ perceptions of how they stood to benefit 
from EMU membership, and the sovereignty they were willing to relinquish 
to gain those benefits, the design and reform of fiscal policy regulation at 
EU-level were no less salient for even the most enthusiastic of EMU’s 
supporters, nor its best-behaved members (Moravcsik, 1998; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010).  
 Two concerns mentioned in chapter 4, regarding the 
operationalization of negotiation performance, lie in the risk of counting 
accidental success as deliberate influence, and of attributing success to a 
state that has secured an outcome agreement closest to own positions, though 
only because this state had a moderate original position, and thus less to do 
than some other states, to secure a favorable outcome (see Bailer, 2010). The 
SGP addresses these problems in that both the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations involved a multitude of issues that had to be agreed for the 
policy to come into effect, and it is thus possible to measure states’ 
negotiation performance in light of each individual issue within the dossier. 
Rather than considering negotiation performance only in terms of the whole 
negotiated agreement, member states’ negotiation performance is considered 
for each individual issue, so minimizing the effects of accidental success or 
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apparent success based on a median position. In other words, the likelihood 
of a state being lucky, rather than influential, and/or of a state choosing the 
median position over the whole range of issues under consideration, is 
extremely low. Taking these points into consideration, the SGP provides for 
variation that allows for the testing of hypotheses derived from the the 
theoretical framework, whilst minimizing design and measurement 
challenges.  
 
5.3b Synchronic Variation: Selecting Member State Cases within the SGP 
In order to trace the process through which member states influenced the 
SGP negotiations to achieve an outcome that reflected their position, it was 
necessary to carry out a detailed study of negotiations, drawing on 
documentary evidence and participant interviews, to reach valid conclusions. 
With this in mind, it was not feasible to analyze the performance of all 
member states involved in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
and it was thus necessary to select a limited number of states for detailed 
examination. Because the hypotheses to be tested in this study highlight 
specific bargaining resources as an explanatory factor for negotiation 
success, member states have been selected on the basis of variation in their 
possession of these bargaining resources, so providing for variation on the 
independent variables.  
 In order to draw a comparison not only between the performances of 
different member states in one context, but also the performance of a single 
member state in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, selections are kept 
constant for the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. It was necessary, 
therefore, to eliminate from consideration any state that was a EU member at 
the time of SGP reform in 2005, but not at its initial agreement in 1997. A 
further criterion for selection was that the member state had not negotiated 
an opt-out from EMU prior to the SGP negotiations in 1997, as this would 
affect the capacity of a state to influence the negotiations, independent of the 
variables of interest. Along the same lines, any state that had not adopted the 
single currency prior to 2005 is excluded as well. Although any SGP reform 
deal had to be agreed by all member states, it is well documented that the 
bulk of negotiations took place within the Eurogroup (for example Parker, 
2005; Agence Europe, 2005a), to which only finance ministers from states 
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that use the euro belong. This indicates a differential capacity for Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone states to influence the ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
Given these criteria, the member states from amongst which it was 
necessary to select are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Cases 
have been selected, again, on the basis of variation in the bargaining 
resources under study, among other factors, which are detailed below. 
During the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the preference intensities 
for reaching agreement differed widely among the states in question. In 
contrast to this, information, content expertise and process expertise differed 
more subtly, both in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
Nonetheless, among the states under consideration, there is an apparent 
difference between levels of information, content expertise and process 
expertise, as well as preference intensity. In presenting the justification for 
case selection, it is first explained why five of the possible twelve states are 
discarded. From there, an explanation is presented for the selection of four 
states – Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands – from the 
remaining seven. 
 
Austria and Finland 
Given that Austria and Finland joined the EU in 1995, the same year that 
negotiations over the SGP began, selecting these states would not allow for 
the hypotheses to be tested as effectively as they could through consideration 
of other states. Specifically, it is commonly argued that states display 
different bargaining styles on immediately joining the EU than they do after 
years of membership (for example Tallberg, 2008; Dür and Mateo, 2010). 
Thus, any observable differences between the negotiation strategy 
undertaken by Austria or Finland, or their level of success, in the ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, could be due to the length of their 
membership in the EU at the time of the latter, compared to the former 
negotiations. While this represents an interesting area of study, it does not 
address the question of general differences between these two negotiation 
contexts, which this project seeks to answer.  
 
 
  133 
Greece 
As a state very much on the periphery of the original SGP negotiations, 
given that it was widely understood, and in fact came to be true, that Greece 
would not qualify for the first round of EMU membership (for example 
interview with British Treasury official; Barber, 1995; Heipertz and Verdun, 
2010), Greece is not a good case for analysis.  
 
Portugal and Spain 
The situation regarding Portugal and Spain, in terms of membership length, 
is similar to that of Austria and Finland. Portugal and Spain both joined the 
EC in 1986, and had only been members for nine years at the start of the 
SGP negotiations. While it would be possible to argue that, after nine years, 
Portugal and Spain would have become just as accustomed as older members 
to negotiating in the EU, it would be equally possible to argue that 
comparing the negotiation performance of states that had been EC/EU 
members for nearly three decades (as in the cases of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), with that of states that 
had less than one decade of membership, is a more useful exercise in 
uncovering the effects of membership length than bargaining resources, on 
negotiation performance. Similarly, any difference between the performance 
of Portugal and/or Spain between the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, could be explained by membership length, rather than 
possessing the relevant bargaining resources for success in one context or the 
other.  
 The qualitative method employed for this study would minimize the 
possibility of misidentifying causal processes in such a way, but even if 
empirical evidence revealed that Spain, for example, used the relevant 
resources identified to negotiate successfully in ‘reuploading’, and used 
distinct resources to succeed in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, it would be 
more difficult to conclude that this was the result of contextual differences 
between the two negotiations, than if the state in question were an original 
member. Further to that, Dür and Mateo (2010: 567) hypothesize that states 
change their bargaining tactics over time, with newer members more likely 
than old members to use ‘hard’ bargaining tactics. Whether or not this 
hypothesis seems convincing, it would be difficult to distinguish between 
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this effect, and the effect of contextual differences between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, in explaining a change in the resources relied on 
by Portugal and Spain between the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. 
 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands 
Based on variation in the bargaining resources of interest, and the need to 
establish some element of comparability across cases, Belgium, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands have been selected for study. With regard to 
Ireland and Luxembourg, while there is no expectation that population or 
economic size will have a direct effect on negotiation performance, it is 
likely that any findings about the superior performance of Germany relative 
to Ireland, would be perceived as confirmation that large states have more 
say in EU policy-making, regardless of how strong the causal argument is for 
Germany’s higher information level, for example. In other words, as GDP is 
a standard control variable in cross-national research (Cole, 2005), a 
comparison between Germany and Luxembourg or Germany and Ireland, is 
less appropriate for the purposes of this study than one between Germany 
and France.  
Italy is excluded on the basis of a lack of variation in the bargaining 
resources under analysis. Specifically, Italy did not have a low preference 
intensity in either ‘uploading’ or ‘reuploading’ negotiations, nor does Italy 
rank highly with regard to the indicators for information, content expertise or 
process expertise. In addition to this, as one aim of the thesis is to consider 
the role of smaller member states, in contrast to the typical focus on large 
member states in analyses of the SGP negotiations (see for example Heipertz 
and Verdun, 2004; 2005; 2010), there is a need to introduce two small or 
medium states, so as to control for the effects of size. The selection of Italy 
would not provide for this, nor is it logical to select Italy in place of either 
France or Germany, two large states that are essential to a comprehensive 
analysis of the SGP negotiations. 
By comparing France and Germany, and Belgium and the 
Netherlands as pairs, it is possible to control for population and economic 
size. It is also possible to control for the independent effect of pre-EMU 
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monetary policy on negotiation performance, by considering Germany and 
the Netherlands, and France and Belgium, as pairs. Unfortunately, these 
states do not provide the opportunity to control for the independent effect of 
government change during negotiations, as only France underwent this in 
either ‘uploading’ or ‘reuploading’. However, I am confident that any effects 
of a mid-negotiation change of government on negotiation performance 
would be captured by the process expertise variable, which encompasses 
tenure of delegation members.  
Another factor that it was not possible to control for entirely is the 
effect of holding the Council Presidency. Specifically, the Dutch held the 
Council Presidency for part of both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, in the second half of 1997 and the second half of 2004, which 
provides only for within-case control, between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’. However, this is unproblematic for various reasons. Regarding 
‘reuploading’, given that I do not consider the political negotiations to begin 
until three months following the Commission proposal, as explained earlier 
in this chapter, this sees the start of negotiations in January 2005, by which 
point the Dutch presidency had already concluded. Thus, the Dutch held the 
presidency during the stage of position formation, from September to 
December 2004, which is a process focused more on the national than 
supranational level, and is unlikely to be effected by holding this 
supranational role. Nonetheless, I sought to confirm this with negotiation 
participants, all of who reported that the Dutch presidency in the second half 
of 2004, had no impact on their role in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, which did 
not begin in earnest until after the Luxembourgish presidency had begun in 
the first half of 2005.  
In terms of ‘uploading’, the bulk of political negotiations took place 
prior to the start of the Dutch presidency in June 1997, with the climax of 
negotiations occurring at the Dublin European Council in December 1996. 
Only two issues included in the analysis, the question of whether a maximum 
fine amount of .5% GDP should be an annual limit or a total limit, and of 
whether to add a resolution on growth and employment, were negotiated 
during the Dutch presidency; I exclude these issues from my assessment of 
Dutch negotiation performance, given that the presidency state is expected to 
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act as a neutral mediator, rather than simply defending own positions, and if 
the state chose to shirk this responsibility, the delegation could be seen to 
have an advantage in securing an outcome closest to their position. 
Excluding these issue does not have any major impact on general 
conclusions regarding Dutch success in ‘uploading’, and is thus a simple 
solution. 
 With regard to examining those variables that this thesis does aim to 
analyze, comparing the differential importance of bargaining resources in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ is facilitated in the case of the Netherlands, 
possessed of a high level of content expertise in both negotiations, so that 
evidence of the Dutch utilizing these resources to different extents in 
‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’, and their resultant negotiation 
performance, goes some way toward confirming or disconfirming multiple 
hypotheses. Regarding preference intensity, Belgium, France and Germany 
all experienced decisive shifts in preference intensity between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’, with the French and German intensity increasing, and the 
Belgian intensity decreasing, between the former and latter negotiations. This 
provides for useful within-case, as well as cross-case variation. In addition to 
within-case and cross-case variation in preference intensity, there is variation 
in information, content expertise and process expertise, across these states, 
which is essential to testing the hypotheses regarding the explanatory role of 
bargaining resources, and variation in bargaining resources, for member state 
negotiation performance.  
The main role of these nested case studies is to demonstrate the 
effects of variation in the independent variables, and the cases have thus been 
selected with the explicit aim of introducing observations with different 
values of the independent variables, to demonstrate how this variation affects 
the value of the dependent variable for each of these states, in ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. The analysis of multiple member states in 
any one negotiation context provides for synchronic variation, while analysis 
of the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations provides for diachronic 
variation. Introducing these two forms of variation within one overarching 
case provides for the testing of numerous causal claims, though without 
  137 
diminishing comparability, or precluding analysis of causal mechanisms 
(Gerring, 2004).  
While considerable efforts have been devoted to selecting states that 
are comparable, it is not feasible in this study to select cases that display the 
same values for every variable but one, nor to select cases that differ on 
every variable but one. Thus, the process-tracing analysis described earlier in 
the chapter is carried out in part to address this imperfect comparability of 
cases. In other words, to the extent that it is possible to support the 
hypothesized relationship between high information and negotiation success, 
for instance, the steps carried out to trace the intervening process provide 
further explanation of the causal mechanisms at work that connect 
information to negotiation performance, so strengthening results, despite the 
imperfect comparability of cases under analysis (George and Bennett, 2005).  
In addition to providing for the testing of hypotheses regarding 
resource levels and negotiation performance, and the differential importance 
of resources in distinct negotiation contexts, these cases also serve to 
generate additional hypotheses. Specifically, while the rational choice 
institutionalist framework applied to this study has led to hypotheses 
regarding the differential importance of preference intensity versus 
information, content expertise and process expertise in distinct contexts, the 
approach does not offer any predictions as to which of the latter three 
resources will be more or less important for negotiation success, in any one 
context. Through careful tracing of the causal mechanisms at work, linking 
resource levels to negotiation performance for each of these member states, it 
is possible to shed light on this important question. In so refining the 
theoretical approach undertaken here, it would be possible to formulate a 
new set of hypotheses regarding the differential roles of information, content 
expertise and process expertise, in explaining member state negotiation 





This chapter articulated the research design of the thesis, including detailed 
description of the operationalization of variables and concomitant data 
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sources, as well as the process undertaken to analyze this data. It also 
explained how the SGP and the four member states analyzed as embedded 
cases - Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands - were selected for 
study. The case study approach adopted for this thesis is an appropriate 
complement to the process-tracing method of analyzing data, which is 
undertaken for the purposes of examining causal mechanisms that link the 
independent and dependent variables (Gerring, 2004; George and Bennett, 
2005; Vennesson, 2008). As can be seen through description of the indicators 
used to measure the independent variables, these are not easily captured, and 
the contextual sensitivity that was essential for identifying appropriate 
indicators, necessitated a small-n design. Further to that, there was a need to 
ensure comparability of the instances under study, so that the indicators for 
each variable, as well as the posited process linking independent and 
dependent variables, could be applied without adjustment (Gerring, 2004). 
Hence the utility in selecting a single case that provides for internal variation.  
 The SGP provides for diachronic variation in the intervening variable 
of context, as well as synchronic variation in the independent variables, 
given that different member states participating in the SGP negotiations were 
possessed of different levels of the bargaining resources analyzed. Further to 
that, as detailed in the preceding section, the SGP offers additional 
advantages, such as the possibility to control for the effects of salience. In 
addition to that, the SGP facilitates measurement of the dependent variable - 
negotiation performance - which has been designed with the explicit aim of 
distinguishing between accidental and deliberate success, an essential step in 
generating valid conclusions.  
 The decision to focus on a select group of member states that 
participated in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
is also bound up with the overarching aim of designing a study that could 
capture causal mechanisms and abstract concepts that are notoriously 
difficult to measure (Bailer, 2004; 2008; 2010; Thomson and Stokman, 
2006). The data requirements involved in such an endeavor, which have been 
described in detail over the course of this chapter, precluded an analysis of 
all member states party to the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
and the need to enhance comparability (Gerring, 2004) in fact made it 
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desirable to limit the study to a select group of negotiation participants. 
Further to that, the selection of Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, in particular, facilitates the control of certain factors, outlined in 
the previous section, and provides for the necessary variation on the 
independent variables of interest. Thus, the main elements of research 
design, including a case study approach, measurement of abstract concepts 
using multiple indicators and data sources, and a process-tracing technique to 
analyze this data, are complementary and essential components in the 
valuable contribution this thesis makes to a variety of theoretical and 
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Section 4 - Empirics 
 
Chapter 6 - Overview of Findings 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of findings regarding the dependent 
variable, and reports values for the four independent variables, for Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. The remaining chapters in this empirical section 
of the thesis refer back to findings presented here, when analyzing the role of 
each bargaining resource with regard to predicting and explaining member 
state negotiation performance. Main findings from this chapter are that 
Germany and the Netherlands achieved the most notable, deliberate success 
in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, respectively. While this 
chapter provides only an overview of these results, subsequent chapters 
present more detailed analysis, including discussion of specific issues over 
which each state negotiated successfully, and, crucially, the resources they 
relied on to do so.  
 These findings regarding German and Dutch negotiation success are 
supportive of the hypothesized role of bargaining resources in affecting 
negotiation performance, in that Germany had the lowest preference intensity 
in ‘uploading’, and the Netherlands had the most content expertise in 
‘reuploading’. However, these findings are not conclusive regarding which 
resources the states relied on to negotiate successfully in each case, given 
that Germany also possessed a high level of information and process 
expertise in ‘uploading’, while the Netherlands also had a low preference 
intensity for reaching agreement in ‘reuploading’, to name two examples. 
Nor does this chapter present a conclusive answer to the main research 
question of whether differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations affect member state performance in each, given that findings 
discussed herein do not provide for identification of the specific bargaining 
resources states relied on to wield the influence they did in each negotiations, 
and thus whether those changed in line with changing context between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. Chapters 7 through 10 address this question 
head on, focusing on the role of each independent variable in explaining 
member state negotiation performance, and revealing the specific causal 
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processes through which these variables affected states’ performance, as well 




6.1 Dependent Variable - Negotiation Performance 
As stated in the research design chapter, each issue under negotiation within 
the SGP dossier is treated individually, and every issue over which there 
were at least two contrasting positions is included in the analysis of member 
state negotiation performance (Thomson and Stokman, 2006). Each issue is 
presented, followed by a description of the positions held by Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the final issue outcome in 
the negotiated agreement. Those issues that were of utmost importance to the 
negotiations as a whole are marked with an asterisk, and those issues 
identified as most important to individual delegations are marked with a 
double asterisk. Where possible, a continuum ranging from the weakest to 
strictest position is also depicted, with each state’s position located along the 
continuum, and a (+) denoting the location of the agreement outcome. For 
those issues that could not be arranged along a weak to strict continuum, this 
is noted following the description of states’ positions. Finally, a brief 
summary is provided, to clarify states’ positions and the negotiation 
performance of individual states, where applicable. 
 
6.1a Issues and Outcomes - ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
 
 Should the medium-term objective (MTO) of a general  
government balance be formalized with a 1% limit?  
 
 Belgium – no position 
  
 France – opposed to specific deficit target 
  
 Germany – in favor of 1% limit 
  
 Netherlands – in favor of 1% limit 
 
 Outcome: states should strive toward close to balance or  
surplus in the medium-term 
  
 (This issue cannot be arranged along a strict-weak continuum) 
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 This issue was ultimately more about whether or not to formalize the 
MTO, than about what the formal target would be. While the original 
German proposal envisioned a 1% target, the emphasis of the German 
delegation throughout negotiations was on aiming for a balanced budget in 
normal times, with “the idea [being] that there would be a balanced budget in 
normal times and 3% would allow for cyclical movements” (interview, 
German finance ministry a; Extel Examiner, 1996). Thus, the eventual issue 
outcome reflected the position of the French more than the Dutch and 
Germans, in that the target was not specific, and states were asked only to 
‘strive toward’ the target. This left room for interpretation, which the 
Germans in particular were opposed to, though this outcome did not 
implicate any significant compromise on the part of the Germans or Dutch, 
and the French were in a majority of states preferring this flexible outcome 
(van der Vaart, 1996). In general, this was not a central question for any 
delegations, because the emphasis throughout ‘uploading’ negotiations was 
much more on how the corrective arm of the pact would work, than on how 
the preventive arm would work, and thus it was not difficult to reach 
consensus among delegations (Agence Europe, 1996b).  
 
Whether there should be a debt target in addition to a ‘stricter’ 
deficit target; how would that be defined?*; whether there  
should be penalties for breaching the debt ceiling as well as  
deficit ceiling? 
 
 Belgium – emphasis on downward trend, rather than  
quantitative target; strongly opposed to penalties** 
  
 France – no position 
  
 Germany – no position; emphasis was on deficit 
  
 Netherlands – although emphasis was on the deficit, did  
favor a credible commitment for high debt states to lower  
debt levels toward 60% 
 
 Outcome: debt target defined quantitatively as 60% of GDP;  
no penalties for breaching debt target 
  
 (This issue cannot be arranged along a strict-weak continuum)  
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 Belgium was partly successful here, in that there are no penalties for 
breaching the debt target, which was the most important issue for the 
delegation (interview, Belgian finance ministry). However, this success is 
not very deliberate, given that the Belgians were essentially unopposed on 
that point (Agence Europe, 1996c). The Belgians were unsuccessful in that 
the debt target is defined quantitatively, though the absence of penalties 
minimizes the potential negative effects of this outcome.  
 The Dutch saw the “development of the debt as crucially linked to 
budget surplus or deficit” (interview, Dutch finance ministry b), while the 
prevailing view was that a focus on limiting deficits was sufficient 
(interviews, German finance ministry a and Commission b). Thus, absent a 
way to compel high debt states to address their debt burdens through 
differentiated requirements for budget surpluses, the Dutch favored some 
credible commitment toward reduction from high debt states. However, lack 
of concern from others, and political motivation to allow room for maneuver 
in the membership decision, ultimately led to a quantitative, yet non-
operational debt target (interviews, British treasury and Dutch finance 
ministry b).  
 
 How to calculate sanctions 
 
 Belgium – no position 
  
 France – in favor of a graduated approach to sanctions,  
rather than large initial fine 
  
Germany – initial fine of .25% and a variable amount  
linked to level of the deficit 
  
 Netherlands – no position on specific amount; favored  
prior determination of size 
 
 Outcome: fixed amount of .2% with variable amount linked  
to level of the deficit 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 This was a clear success for Germany, rather than France, given 
French opposition to such a large initial fine as that proposed by Germany, 
which the French representative to the MC referred to as “the ‘atomic bomb’ 
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approach” (Monetary Committee of the European Community, 1996a). 
Nonetheless, this issue was not subject to lengthy debate, as illustrated by the 
statement that “this was not really something discussed in detail on a 
political level; this was sort of pre-cooked, with the balance found at an early 
stage” (interview, Council secretariat a), and that balance was in Germany’s 
favor.  
 
 Whether max. of .5% GDP sanctions, should be an annual  
cap or total cap 
 
 Belgium – total cap 
  
 France – total cap 
  
 Germany – annual cap 
  
 Netherlands – not considered; held the Council  
Presidency at this point 
  
 Outcome: annual cap; maximum potential fines decreases  
for subsequent years 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 This outcome was a compromise between two opposing sides, though 
one that reflected the German position more so than that of the French, 
Belgians and majority of other states involved in negotiations, who favored a 
total cap on sanctions (European Report, 1997a). However, it was also the 
case that the Commission favored the German position, viewing a total cap 
as inappropriate. This is illustrated by a Commission participant’s statement 
that, “an excessive deficit doesn’t cease being a risk to monetary union after 
one year and one fine” (interview, Commission b). That the Commission 
shared the German position can be considered to minimize the deliberate 
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Timetable for implementation of sanctions 
 
 Belgium – 12 months from identification of excessive  
deficit 
  
 France – 12 months from identification of excessive  
deficit  
  
 Germany – 6 months from identification of excessive  
deficit 
  
 Netherlands – 12 months from identification of excessive  
deficit 
 
 Outcome: 12 months from identification of excessive  
deficit 
 
 Belgium, France, Netherlands+-------------------Germany 
 
 This was a relatively clear-cut issue, over which Germany was 
opposed by all other delegations (Agence France Presse, 1996a; European 
Report, 1996a). This was not an issue of particular significance to any 
individual state, nor to the dossier as a whole, and was described as 
something that was not difficult to compromise over (interview, Commission 
b). Nonetheless, it was necessary for Germany to compromise, in order that 
agreement could be reached (Agence France Presse, 1996), and the outcome 
reflects success for France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 
 Whether to define the following terms – ‘exceptional’,  
‘temporary’, ‘close to the reference value’ 
 
 Belgium – in favor of clear definition of ‘exceptional  
circumstances’ 
  
 France –  ‘exceptional circumstances’ should remain  
unspecified 
  
 Germany – in favor of clear definition of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ 
  
 Netherlands – in favor of clear definition of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ 
 
 Outcome: define terms 
 
 France-------------------+Belgium, Germany, Netherlands 
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 Although this is about defining three separate terms, the discussion 
quickly focused on one term: ‘exceptional circumstances’ (interview, British 
treasury). Leaving this unspecified would have been a huge step away from 
the automaticity that Germany was determined to approximate, and vice 
versa, would have been an important success for France.  
 
 Whether fines will be automatic*  
 
 Belgium – opposed automaticity, though not as strongly  
as the French; emphasis was on leeway with regard to EDP  
initiation, along the lines of ‘temporary’ and ‘close’to the  
reference value 
  
 France – strongly opposed to any degree of automaticity** 
  
 Germany – favored complete automaticity, though this was  
not possible if the SGP was to operate within the Treaty  
framework; favored as much automaticity as possible, within  
the Treaty framework** 
  
 Netherlands – favored semi-automatic, rather than entirely  
automatic fines** 
 




 As is clear from the illustration, both the French and German 
delegations succeeded at moving the issue to a middle ground compromise. 
In analyzing this outcome with regard to states’ performance, it is worth 
noting that full automaticity was not feasible given the early decision to fit 
the pact within the confines of the Maastricht Treaty, which means that the 
French were somewhat less instrumental in moving the outcome toward the 
middle ground, given the aid of legal requirements on their side. 
Nonetheless, the French were successful at moving the issue further away 
from the near automaticity that Germany advocated. This point is intricately 
related to the following issues, regarding ‘exceptional circumstances’ and 
defining a ‘severe recession’, insofar as the de facto degree of automaticity 
eventually included in the SGP, depended on the outcome of those issues.  
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What are exceptional circumstances and how can they  
be defined in terms of a drop in growth?* 
  
 Belgium – exceptional circumstances should be defined;  
expressed in terms of growth, based on past historical  
experience 
  
 France – in favor of Council discussing whether to apply  
sanctions if GDP drops at all, rather than a restrictive  
interpretation 
  
 Germany – wants definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
as specified in the Maastricht Treaty; along the lines of severe  
recession 
  
 Netherlands - wants definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’  
as specified in the Maastricht Treaty; along the lines of severe  
recession 
 
 Outcome: exceptional circumstances defined in terms of a drop  
in growth (severe recession) 
 
 France----------Belgium---+Germany, Netherlands 
 
 Both France and Belgium favored more flexibility here than did 
Germany and the Netherlands. France, in particular, wanted as much political 
discretion as possible in applying sanctions (Economist, 1996) – this was at 
the heart of their approach to negotiations, and related to their belief that 
ultimate wisdom should rest with politicians (interviews, French finance 
ministry, Dutch finance ministry a and Dutch finance ministry b). Belgium 
was willing to accept a greater degree of automaticity, i.e. less political 
discretion in the application of sanctions, but did not favor a specific, 
universal quantification (Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau, 1996). On the 
other hand, both Germany and the Netherlands wanted very specific 
conditions under which sanctions would be avoided (Agence Europe, 1996).  
 This was central to the German goal of achieving near automaticity, 
with the delegation focused on “limit[ing] the room for political 
interference”, and describing this as something that “could not be 
compromised on” (interview, German finance ministry a). A great deal of 
thought went into arriving at the German position on exceptional 
circumstances, and the aim was to allow for all things outside the control of 
governments to be accounted for, so that sanctions could work automatically 
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in all other cases (interview, German finance ministry a). The outcome was 
unquestionably in line with the German and Dutch positions, very much 
opposed to the French position and, to a lesser extent, opposed to the Belgian 
position as well. However, this outcome reflected more deliberate success on 
the part of the Germans than Dutch, the former exercising considerable 
influence over all question related to ‘exceptional circumstances’, as 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 The following, related, question of how to define the term ‘serious 
recession’ in the context of exceptional and temporary circumstances, and 
whether or not to quantify this, came to hold equal or greater political 
significance than the previous issue: 
 
 How to define the term ‘severe recession’ in the context of 
exceptional and temporary circumstances – whether or not to  
quantify this* 
 
 Belgium – no position 
  
 France – opposed to quantitative definition of ‘severe recession’ 
  
 Germany – in favor of quantitative definition of ‘severe recession’  
  
 Netherlands – in favor of quantitative definition of ‘severe  
recession’ 
 
 Outcome: quantitative definition 
 
 France----------------------+Germany, Netherlands 
 
The decision to quantify was taken quickly, and the more important question 
then became how to quantify a ‘severe recession’. 
 
 How to quantify a ‘severe recession’* 
 
 Belgium - no position 
  
 France - drop of .5% 
  
 Germany - drop of 2% 
  
 Netherlands - drop of 1% 
 
 Outcome: definition for automatic exceptions is GDP  
contraction of 2% or more; contraction between .75% and  
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2% would be subject to further consideration, for a  
possible exception 
 
 (This issue cannot be arranged along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 This issue went right to the end of negotiations at the Dublin 
European Council in December 1996, and was one of very few issues that 
had to be decided at the level of Heads of State and Government. In the end, 
the decision was much closer to the German position overall, in that the 
French had already compromised on the question of whether or not to 
quantify the definition of ‘severe recession’, and so any success over the 
exact quantification of that definition was merely an attempt to recoup losses 
from defeat over quantification. Ultimately, the compromise was based on a 
minor numerical point, representing a middle way between the positions 
taken by the French and German delegations.  
It is worth noting that while the German delegation stuck to their 
demand that a ‘severe recession’ be classified as an annual drop of 2% of 
GDP, they eventually compromised on a demand of 1.5% shortly in advance 
of the European Summit in Dublin, which is the position from which they 
negotiated at Dublin (European Report, 1996b). While the outcome 
agreement is also similar to the Dutch position, this is an example of 
accidental, rather than deliberate success on the part of the Dutch, who 
benefitted from occupying a position between France and Germany. Chapter 
7 expands on this point.  
 
To what extent should the Commission take account of any 
conclusions drawn with regard to existence of exceptional 
circumstances; what role should the Council play; how and  
on what should it take decisions 
 
 Belgium – while acknowledging the central role of the  
Commission, in favor of the Council taking key decisions,  
so as to provide political legitimacy to the process 
  
France – in favor of a limited role for the Commission;  
Ecofin Council should have power of interpretation over  
sanctions decisions 
  
 Germany – in favor of a limited role for the Council, as  
much as possible given confines of the Treaty; Commission  
should decide on exceptional circumstances, rather than  
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member states in the Council 
  
Netherlands – in favor of a leading role for the Commission,  
in terms of proposing and recommending, with Council taking  
the ultimate decision using QMV 
 





 This was ultimately a question of whether the application of fines 
would be politicized, with France and Belgium favoring more political 
involvement for the member states and Germany favoring the opposite, with 
the Commission seen as the less political of the two institutions. Belgium 
was less opposed than France to a large role for the Commission, and this 
French opposition related to a belief that politicians should always have the 
final decision, as well as a general French preference to limit the role of the 
Commission regarding application of the SGP (interviews, French finance 
ministry, Dutch finance ministry a and Dutch finance ministry b; Howarth, 
2007). Although it would normally be the case that small states support the 
Commission and large states support the Council, the Germans saw this as 
another way to enhance automaticity, which was the source of their support 
for Commission involvement (interview, German finance ministry a).  
 While the outcome envisaged a role for both institutions, the ultimate 
decision gave far more de facto power to the Council regarding the 
application of fines, which reflects French influence, and compounds 
German failure to secure automaticity in the imposition of sanctions. Thus, 
despite the location of the outcome agreement near to the Belgian and Dutch 
positions, it was French determination to see the pact follow their national 
preference for placing ultimate control in the hands of the politicians, that led 
to this accidental success on the part of Belgium and the Netherlands, and 
deliberate success on the part of the French. Interestingly, a French 
delegation member from the finance ministry indicated that this was a theme 
running throughout negotiations, namely that the inclination of other states to 
free operation of economic policy from political interference “was difficult 
for the French to understand” (interview, French finance ministry). This is 
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exemplified also by French determination, and ultimate success, in securing 
German acquiescence over a Stability Council, as an additional political 
component of EMU (European Report, 1997b).  
 
 Whether to add a resolution on growth and employment 
 
 Belgium – sympathetic to the idea 
  
 France – strongly in favor** 
  
 Germany – opposed 
  
 Netherlands – not considered; held the Council Presidency  
at this point 
 
 Outcome: resolution added 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 This issue reflects the French preference for more interventionist 
economic policy, along the lines of Keynesianism, as opposed to the German 
preference for stability-oriented policy above all else (for example Dyson, 
1994; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Howarth, 2007). The Germans were 
opposed to this and the French in favor, throughout negotiations over the 
pact, though the resolution was only added at Amsterdam following a 
surprise election victory for the Socialists in France (Barber, 1997b). This is 
not a resounding success for France; while inclusion of the resolution is in 
line with the French position, the content of the resolution reflects German 
opposition to any Keynesian-style emphasis on growth and full employment 
being bound up with EMU. Nonetheless, that it is included at all is evidence 
of French influence, given that the pact was essentially a done deal prior to 
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6.1b Issues and Outcomes - ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
 
 Whether to upgrade the issue of ms debt 
 
 Belgium – strongly opposed** 
  
 France – in favor of more attention to debt  
levels 
  
 Germany – in favor of more attention to debt  
levels 
  
 Netherlands – in favor of giving extra weight to debt  
levels 
  
 Status quo – debt target is not operational 
 
 Outcome: statement of intent to enhance focus on debt and  
ensure that states over reference value of 60%, are reducing  
debt at a satisfactory pace; de facto no change 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 Overall, this represents a success for Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, rather than Belgium, although the outcome is somewhat 
ambiguous in that there is hardly any change from the status quo, and states’ 
positions are particularly complex in this case. For example, the German 
delegation presented their position as being less about a need to upgrade the 
focus on debt per se, and more about highlighting the fact that, despite an 
excessive deficit, Germany was not a sustainability risk, which implicated a 
need to focus on debt as well as deficits (interview, German finance ministry 
b). This is colorfully illustrated by a description from a Council secretariat 
participant in negotiations, of a German representative explaining to others 
that: 
our deficit’s massive because we’re shoveling money into East 
Germany, so stop being silly, let’s look at our debt pile, how  
we’re gonna service it over the next 15 years - we are gonna  
havea massive boom because of the Harts IV reform, it’s gonna  
be fine. This is all about debt and sustainability      
(interview, Council secretariat b)  
 
Similarly, while the Dutch saw greater emphasis on debt as a goal in itself, 
they also considered it a way to ensure that some states, notably France and 
Germany, could not use a focus on debts as an excuse to run excessive 
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deficits without sanction. This can be seen in the following statement of 
Gerrit Zalm, paraphrased in Dutch daily Het Financieele Dagblad: while low 
debt countries can afford to run higher deficits than can high debt countries, 
reforms to reflect this would not help France and Germany (Broekhuizen, 
2004). Along those lines, the French, with a rapidly rising debt, were happy 
to see attention focused away from deficits, though were greatly opposed to 
operationalizing the debt criteria under a reformed pact, as addressed in the 
following issue (Howarth, 2007; interview, Council secretariat b).  
  
 How to operationalize the debt criteria; whether to introduce  
a quantitative benchmark to assess satisfactory pace of debt  
reduction  
 
 Belgium – opposed to any emphasis on debt, but favored  
loosest interpretation in any case** 
  
 France – favored qualitative criteria for debt reduction 
  
 Germany – favored qualitative criteria for debt reduction 
  
 Netherlands – in favor of a rigid framework and procedure  
for reducing debt 
  
 Status quo – debt target is not operational 
 
 Outcome: debt criteria, and pace of reduction, to be  
considered qualitatively 
 
 Belgium, SQ---+France, Germany-------------Netherlands  
 
 This is a resounding success for Belgium, in that their main concern 
was to limit additional restrictions being placed on high debt levels, 
particularly because they considered that the “emphasis on debt was an aim 
to compensate for increased flexibility” in a reformed pact, rather than a 
response to legitimate concerns about debt sustainability (interview, Belgian 
finance ministry b). This is a success for France and Germany as well, given 
that both states favored a loose, qualitative interpretation of the debt criteria 
(Agence Europe, 2004), not least because the motivation behind their drive to 
increase the focus on debt, was partly to provide a distraction from their 
excessive deficits, rather than a genuine concern with states’ debt levels 
(interview, Council secretariat b).  
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 How to improve interaction between EU institutions in terms of  
budgetary surveillance; which institution – Commission,  
Council or both – should be selected to take account of ‘relevant  
factors’ re. budgetary surveillance 
 
 Belgium – supported role of the Commission in surveillance, to  
avoid permanent contention with member states 
  
France – in favor of less monitoring power for the Commission, 
increased political discussion in the Council 
  
Germany – in favor of less monitoring power for the Commission, 
increased political discussion in the Council 
  
 Netherlands – in favor of enhanced role for the Commission,  
to limit political interference 
  
 Status quo – Commission recommends and Council decides 
 
 Outcome: factors to be judged by Commission and Council 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
  
 The outcome is ambiguous with regard to success, as two member 
states favored one outcome, two favored another, and the actual outcome was 
a combination. The reformed pact is essentially the same as the original on 
this point. Any practical change regarding the division of labor between the 
Commission and Council, over application of the pact, lay mainly in 
enhancing the flexibility of the pact to provide for Commission consideration 
of additional state-by-state circumstances, with the potential effect of 
reducing tension between the Commission and Council insofar as the former 
was previously expected to base recommendations on very narrow criteria, 
which contributed to the SGP crisis of 2003 (Howarth, 2006). Nonetheless, 
as France and Germany wanted a change in the direction of less influence for 
the Commission, and Belgium and the Netherlands wanted the opposite, the 
specific outcome of this issue is not a success for any of these states, 
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Whether to adjust the one-size-fits-all MTO to better  
account for differences in member states’ economic  
fundamentals, such as debt levels and expected debt  
dynamics 
 
 Belgium – accepted differentiated MTOs based on  
country-specific situations 
  
 France – wanted each country to have its own MTO 
  
 Germany – in favor of adjusting the MTO across countries 
  
 Netherlands – accepted differentiated MTOs, but only to  
the extent that they considered 3 parameters: debt level,  
deficit level and affordability of aging population  
  
 Status quo – common MTO for all member states 
 
Outcome: differentiated MTOs based on debt level,  
deficit level and affordability of aging population; between  
1% GDP for low debt/high potential growth countries and  
close to balance or surplus for high debt/low potential growth 
countries 
 
 France, Germany, Belgium-------+-Netherlands---SQ 
 
 This issue is a bit less straightforward than some others, in that all of 
the states considered were in favor of differentiated MTOs, though the 
difference in position lies in the basis on which MTOs are differentiated, a 
point that separates the Netherlands from the other three delegations. Further 
to that, a distinction can be made between the motivations behind states’ 
official positions, particularly France and the Netherlands. While the French 
delegation favored differentiated MTOs as a way to remove pressure on 
states to take drastic measures toward budgetary discipline, and to increase 
flexibility of the pact (Howarth, 2007), the Dutch, on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, supported differentiated MTOs for distinct reasons. Specifically, 
as illustrated by a Council secretariat participant, the Dutch perspective was 
that, if “we’re not just aiming to get under 3%, [and] everyone is supposed to 
define what keeps them solvent in the long-term, aim for it, achieve it and 
stay there”, then “you need to be absolutely clear and err on the side of 
caution and have a clear framework for establishing what those conditions 
are” (interview, Council secretariat b). In other words, while the Dutch 
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supported differentiated MTOs, this was to ensure that states with more to do 
to ensure sustainability, had this highlighted in their MTO. Thus, the 
positions can be mapped onto a strict/weak continuum, with the Dutch 
delegation on the strict end and the other three delegations on the weak end, 
while the outcome agreement reflects the Dutch position.  
 
 
 How to prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy; what kind of  
additional instruments and incentives would be required to  
ensure ‘budgetary discipline’ in good times 
 
 Belgium – accepted the idea of strict recommendations from  
the Commission if good times were not used to consolidate the 
budget, provided they were not excessively specific  
  
 France – opposed proposals to render the pact more ‘symmetric’  
by increasing constraint on fiscal policy during good times 
  
Germany – disliked pro-cyclical fiscal policy, but did not see 
necessity of changing the pact to reflect this 
  
Netherlands – strongly in favor of additional, concrete measures  
to ensure budgetary consolidation in good times** 
  
 Status quo – while there is a general goal to strive toward  
balanced budgets in normal times, there is nothing to compel this 
or penalize failure to do so; essentiallynon-operational 
 
Outcome: reference to avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal policy,  
focused on MTO; adjustment effort toward the MTO should be 
greater in good times, with states generally expected to achieve  
an annual adjustment of .5% GDP, cyclically adjusted, net of  
one-off and temporary measures; Commission can issue  
non-binding policy advice to states that fail to follow this  
adjustment path 
 
 France, Germany, SQ-------Belgium+---Netherlands 
 
 The outcome is close to the Belgian and Dutch positions, in that there 
is reference to pro-cyclical policy, and a measure to address states that fail to 
use good times for additional consolidation, yet no specific instruments to 
ensure consolidation in good times, which, if included, would have reflected 
the Dutch position more nearly than the Belgian one. Nonetheless, the 
outcome of this issue reflects Dutch influence, as elaborated in chapter 9.  
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May be a need to review the pact’s interpretation of  
Treaty Art. 104.2 re. ‘exceptional and temporary  
circumstances’* 
 
 Belgium – no position  
  
 France – broaden definition to include recession of any 
sort, as well as negative effects of long-term reforms 
  
Germany – in favor of Commission proposal re. terms on 
exceptional circumstances – redefine severe economic  
downturn and clarify circumstances surrounding onset of  
downturn, i.e. abruptness, as well as output loss relative  
to past trends 
  
Netherlands – accept that definition of recession necessary  
to qualify for an exception could be made less stringent, but  
must emphasize a focus on discipline and sustainability; e.g.  
the percentage of negative growth necessary to qualify for an 
exception could be lessened, coupled with consideration of  
whether the state used good times for budget consolidation  
and whether the state followed or ignored policy  
recommendations 
 
Status quo - definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as  
specifiedin the Maastricht Treaty, along the lines of severe  
recession 
 
Outcome: excessive deficit to be considered exceptional if  
resulting from negative growth rate or accumulated loss of  





 All delegations accepted the need for a review of ‘exceptional and 
temporary circumstances’, but the French delegation wanted a broader 
definition than others. While the actual outcome is closest to the German 
position, there is a question of whether to classify the German delegation as 
successful, given that the Germans did not move the outcome much from the 
original Commission proposal (European Commission, 2004). Along the 
same lines, neither were France or the Netherlands able to move the outcome 
much from the original Commission proposal. Although this issue was 
identified as particularly important to the negotiations, it was not the subject 
of intense political debate, with states in broad agreement over the need to 
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reform the status quo definition of exceptional circumstances, as seen in the 
positions noted above.  
 Further to that, while the decision to adjust the definition of 
‘exceptional and temporary circumstances’ was considered to be an 
important one, the specific outcome was attributed less significance than was 
the overarching decision to shift the pact away from this focus on 3% except 
in narrowly defined circumstances (interviews, Council secretariat b and 
German finance ministry b). For example, the Dutch were less concerned 
about the specific content of the issue outcome than about seeing the role of 
the Commission enhanced, as illustrated by a Dutch participant’s statement 
that “if the Commission could come up with recommendations before you 
breached the 3% [referring to Commission’s right to issue policy advice if 
good times weren’t used to reduce the deficit], that was in it for me, and less 
rigidity [in escaping the EDP] was in it for them” (interview, Dutch finance 
ministry c). Thus, the positions of member states are particularly complex in 
this case, and it is difficult to conclude as to the deliberate success of one 




Whether to remove certain categories of spending from  
calculation of deficits* 
 
 Belgium – opposed  
  
 France – in favor (R&D, defense, capital spending) 
  
Germany – in favor (R&D, education, innovation, capital  
spending, contributions to EU budget) 
  
 Netherlands – opposed** 
  
 Status quo – all spending categories are included in  
calculation of the deficit 
 
 Outcome: spending categories not removed from calculation  
of the deficit 
  
 (This issue cannot be considered along a strict-weak continuum) 
 
 This is a significant success for the Dutch delegation, as this was 
among the most important issues in the dossier for the Netherlands, as well 
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as for negotiations in general (interviews, Dutch finance ministry c, 
Luxembourgish finance ministry and Commission c). It was an important 
goal of the Dutch to ensure that no spending categories were removed from 
calculation of the deficit, which they considered would make the pact 
entirely ineffectual, as illustrated by a Dutch participant’s statement that “I 
calculated what would happen if we took all the exceptions requested, and in 
this case, you could claim to have a balanced budget if you had a deficit of 
6%” (interview, Dutch finance ministry c). Although the Belgian delegation 
did not identify this as one of the most important issues from a national 
perspective, it was a goal throughout negotiations for the Belgians to prevent 
the removal of spending categories from calculation of the deficit, as this 
would have been considered a major weakening of the pact (interview, 
Belgian finance ministry b; EU Observer, 2004). However, the Belgians did 
not deliberately influence this outcome as directly as the Dutch, a point 
expanded on in chapter 9.  
 
 
 If whole spending categories aren’t removed from calculation  
of deficits, there could be a list of relevant factors that the  
Commission should consider during evaluation of an excessive  
deficit  
 
 Belgium – no position 
  
France – consider spending on certain categories  
(R and D, defense, capital spending), consider whether state is 
net contributor or recipient to EU budget 
  
Germany – consider categories that make up the deficit, i.e. 
composition of budget and quality of budget, give special 
consideration for structural reforms, consider whether country  
is in recession when they break the rules and consider special 
burdens, i.e. German reunification** 
  
Netherlands – opposed to a specific list of measures for 
consideration in judging finances 
  
 Status quo – all spending is considered equally in calculation  
of the deficit 
 
 Outcome: specific categories of spending to be considered: 
investment, R & D, structural reforms (that have a long-term  
impact on budgetary sustainability), EU policy goals, European  
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unification, international ‘solidarity’ 
 
 France, Germany+-----------------SQ, Netherlands 
 
 This outcome is a significant success for France and Germany. The 
German delegation, in particular, succeeds at having a specific list of factors 
to consider in evaluating an excessive deficit, and one which reflects their 
main concerns (Agence Europe, 2005b). Further to that, this is identified as 
one of the most important issues for the German delegation, emphasizing 
specifically that the list of relevant factors should reflect Germany’s 
reunification burden. Along those lines, a German finance ministry official 
noted that “[the] government made a big mistake in judging [the] effects of 
reunification costs, which made us[Germany] unable to fulfill the pact [as it 
was]” (interview, German finance ministry b).  
The Dutch were entirely unconvinced by this argument, illustrated by 
a finance ministry participant’s statement that “[the] German argument about 
reunification was not a good argument, because they knew about this when 
they agreed the original pact” (interview, Dutch finance ministry c). The 
Dutch opposed having a specific list of factors to consider, not because they 
favored ultimate flexibility in evaluating deficits, but because they 
considered that the list would be too arbitrary, reflecting unique concerns and 
preferences of individual states, while a better option would have been to 
evaluate the quality of states’ budgets in light of the circumstances of a given 
case (Broekhuizen, 2004). Thus, this outcome clearly indicates French and 




6.2 Independent Variables  
This section presents the values for each independent variable, for Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations. In addition to providing the overall values for each state, for 
each variable, the values assigned to each state for all indicators considered 
in the total, are reported. The coding scheme applied to these indicators, and 
to the total value for each variable, is described in the preceding chapter, on 
research design. I briefly recap this with regard to each variable, and explain 
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the coding rationale further, where this was affected by empirical findings. 
Values are presented separately for the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, beginning with the values for all independent variables in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, and followed by the values for all independent 
variables in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
 
 
6.2a States’ Bargaining Resources in ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
Preference Intensity 
The indicators of preference intensity for ‘uploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Currency stability - state with de facto anchor currency  
 under ERM receives a 4; state that could operate within  
 narrowest bands against the de facto anchor currency receives  
 a 3; other states receive a 2 
  
 Domestic opinion toward EMU membership - states ranked from  
 1 to 4, with 1 representing domestic opinion that is most favorable,  
 based on average value of support less opposition over 1995-1997,  
 and 4 representing domestic opinion that is least favorable, based  
 onaverage value of support less opposition over 1995-97 
  
 Whether key trade partners are likely to qualify and join - this  
 indicator is treated dichotomously, with states that have key trade  
 partners likely to qualify and join receiving a 1, and those with key  
 trade partners less likely to qualify and join receiving a 2; based on 
 geographical division of states into Mediterranean and Northern  
 European trading blocs 
  
Whether state is pivotal to the project going ahead - this indicator is 
treated dichotomously, with states that are not pivotal receiving a 1, 
and those that are pivotal receiving a 4 
 
The following table reports state values for preference intensity: 
 
Table IV. States’ Values for Preference Intensity: ‘uploading’ 
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Information 
The indicators of information for ‘uploading’ negotiations are as follows: 
 
 Frequency of participation in restricted informal meetings  
 outside the direct negotiating sphere - this indicator is treated  
 dichotomously, with those states that participated in restricted  
 informals receiving a 4, and those states that did not receiving  
 a 1. This is a change from the original plan, to rank member  
 states from 1 to 4, with 1 representing least participation and 4  
 representing most participation. The reason for this is that data  
 collection revealed that some states participated nearly every  
 timethere was a restricted informal session, while others hardly  
 ever did, thereby pointing to a dichotomous treatment as the  
 more appropriate measure.  
  
Frequency of bilateral meetings with other member state 
representatives - member states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 
representing least bilateral meetings with other state  
representatives, and 4 representing most; empirics revealed  
that there was no effective difference between the frequency 
of bilateral meetings held by the French and Dutch delegations,  
and that there was a greater distinction between these  
delegations and the Belgians, than between these and the  
Germans, so the French and Dutch both receive a 3 
  
Bailer Index - member states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1  
representing the lowest score for information in the Bailer index,  
and 4 representing the highest score 
 
The following table reports state values for information: 
 
Table V. States’ Values for Information: ‘uploading’ 








































The indicators of content expertise for ‘uploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Fit between pre-EMU monetary policy and stability-oriented  
 policy of the ECB - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
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 with a 1 for those states that did not have a good fit, and a 2  
 for those states that had a good fit between pre-EMU monetary  
 policy and ECB policy 
  
Whether any of the delegation had been present during  
Maastricht negotiations over EMU - prior to data collection,  
there was a question over whether to treat this indicator 
dichotomously, with those that did have representatives at  
Maastricht receiving a 2 and those that did not, receiving a 1,  
or to rank states from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lack of repeat 
representatives or least number of repeat representatives, and 4 
representing the most; the empirics indicate that states should be 
ranked from 1 to 4, because there was a spread between number of 
repeat representatives, across states. Where states had the same 
number of repeat representatives, as in the case of Belgium and 
Germany, the state with more relevant representatives to the 
negotiations, meaning the delegation member who took part in the 
bulk of negotiations, which is the MC member, received a higher 
score 
  
Whether HoS/G had served as Finance minister or in the Finance 
Ministry - this indicator is treated dichotomously, with a 1 for  
those HoS/G that did not have a relevant background, and 2 for  
those HoS/G that did 
 
The following table reports state values for content expertise: 
 
Table VI. States’ Values for Content Expertise: ‘uploading’ 








































The indicators of process expertise in ‘uploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Tenure of the HoS/G - states ranked from 1 to 4, from  
 shortest to longest tenure 
  
Tenure of the Finance Minister - states ranked from 1 to 4,  
from shortest to longest tenure 
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Tenure of the MC representative - states ranked from 1 to 4,  
from shortest to longest tenure; for France and Germany, it  
was not possible to differentiate on the basis of tenure of the  
MC rep., because the difference was so minimal as to be  
irrelevant to the state’s effective process expertise - France and 
Germany were assigned an equal score of 2, because the French  
and German reps. were closer in tenure to the shortest-serving  
rep., than to the longest-serving rep. 
 
The following table reports state values for process expertise: 
 
Table VII. States’ Values for Process Expertise: ‘uploading’ 






































6.2b States’ Bargaining Resources in ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
 
Preference Intensity 
The indicators of preference intensity for ‘reuploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Initiation of EDP - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
 with those states that had been subject to and complied with  
 the EDP receiving a 4, those that had not receiving a 1 
  
 Deficit Level - prior to data collection, there was a question over 
 whether to treat this indicator dichotomously, such that those  
states near the deficit ceiling received a 1 and those far from it 
received a 4, or to rank states from 1 to 4, representing highest to 
lowest deficit;the empirics reveal that it is useful to rank states  
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing a deficit consistently over the 3% 
ceiling,  
 3 representing a deficit at or over the ceiling at times,  
 though on a downward trend, and 4 representing a deficit  
 well below the ceiling 
  
Debt Level - prior to data collection, there was a question  
over whether to treat this indicator dichotomously, such that  
those states near the debt ceiling received a 4 and those far  
from it received a 1, or to rank states from 1 to 4, representing  
lowest to highest debt level; the empirics indicate that it is  
useful to rank states from 1 to 4, with 1 representing lowest  
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debt, 2 representing debt above the 60% ceiling, though not 
significantly so, and 4 representing debt consistently well  
above the 60% ceiling 
 
The following table reports state values for preference intensity: 
 
 
Table VIII. States’ Values for Preferene Intensity: ‘reuploading’ 







































The indicators of information for ‘reuploading’ negotiations are as follows: 
 
Frequency of bilateral meetings with other member state 
representatives - member states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 
representing least bilateral meetings with other state  
representatives, and 4 representing most; empirics revealed  
that there was no effective difference between the frequency of 
bilateral meetings held by the French and Dutch delegations,  
and that there was a greater distinction between these delegations  
and the Belgians, than between these and the Germans, so the  
French and Dutch both receive a 3 
 
Frequency of contact with representatives from the European 
Commission - member states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1  
representing least frequent contact with Commission  
representatives, and 4 representing most; empirics revealed  
that there was no effective difference between the frequency of 
contact that the French delegation had with the Commission, and  
that the German delegation had with the Commission, while the 
Dutch delegation had only moderately less contact, and  
considerably more so than did the Belgians - the French and  
Germans receive a 4, the Dutch a 3 and the Belgians a 1 
 
Bailer Index - member states ranked from 1 to 4, with 1  
representing the lowest score for information in the Bailer  
index, and 4 representing the highest score 
 
The following table reports state values for information: 
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Table IX. States’ Values for Information: ‘reuploading’ 








































The indicators of content expertise for ‘reuploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Fit between pre-EMU monetary policy and stability-oriented  
 policy of the ECB - this indicator is treated dichotomously,  
 with a 1 for those states that did not have a good fit, and a 2  
 for those states that had a good fit between pre-EMU monetary  
 policy and ECB policy 
 
 Whether any of the delegation had been present during ‘uploading’  
 negotiations and/or Maastricht - prior to data collection, there was a  
 question over whether to treat this indicator  dichotomously, with  
 those that did have representatives at ‘uploading’/Maastricht  
 receiving a 2 and those that did not, receiving a 1, or to rank states 
 from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lack of repeat representatives or  
 least number of repeat representatives, and 4 representing the most;  
 the empirics indicate that states should be ranked from 1 to 4,  
 because there was a spread between number of repeat representatives, 
across states 
 
Whether HoS/G had served as Finance Minister or in the Finance 
Ministry - this indicator is treated dichotomously, with a 1 for those 
HoS/G that did not have a relevant background, and 2 for those 
HoS/G that did 
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Table X. States’ Values for Contente Expertise: ‘reuploading’ 







































The indicators of process expertise for ‘reuploading’ negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
 Tenure of the HoS/G - states ranked from 1 to 4, from shortest  
 to longest tenure 
  
 Tenure of the Finance Minister - states ranked from 1 to 4, from 
 shortest to longest tenure; for Belgium and Germany, it was not  
 possible to differentiate on the basis of tenure of the finance  
 minister, because the difference was so minimal as to be irrelevant  
 to the state’s effective process expertise - Belgium and Germany  
 were assigned an equal score of 3, because the Belgian and German 
 reps. were closer in tenure to the longest-serving rep., than to the  
 shortest-serving rep. 
 
Tenure of the EFC representative - states ranked from 1 to 4, from 
shortest to longest tenure; for France and the Netherlands, it was not 
possible to differentiate between states on the basis of tenure of the 
EFC rep., because the difference was so minimal as to be irrelevant  
to the state’s effective process expertise - France and the Netherlands 
were assigned an equal score of 1, because their reps. had the shortest 
tenure  
 
The following table reports state values for process expertise: 
 
Table XI. States’ Values for Process Expertise: ‘reuploading’ 
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Conclusion 
In reviewing member state performance for ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, it is clear that these negotiations were highly complex, with 
many issues overlapping, and states’ positions featuring a variety of 
dimensions, which implicates considerable difficulty in arriving at 
straightforward conclusions regarding negotiation success. Rather than being 
unique to the case of the SGP negotiations, this is typical of 
intergovernmental negotiations involving a multitude of parties and issues to 
be agreed, which is why this thesis emphasizes consideration of individual 
issues, and the role of specific bargaining resources in explaining states’ 
influence over those issues, to enhance understanding of negotiation 
outcomes.  
 Nonetheless, it is possible to offer the general conclusion that, 
considering the total number and importance of issues over which they 
secured an outcome closest to own positions, Germany negotiated most 
successfully in ‘uploading’, while the Netherlands negotiated most 
successfully in ‘reuploading’. The following chapters expand on this 
analysis, in order to address the role of each independent variable in 
explaining the outcomes this chapter has summarized. Along those lines, the 
values presented in this chapter for the independent variables, in ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’, lead, in conjunction with the hypothesized relationships 
between the independent, dependent and intervening variables, to specific 
predictions regarding states’ negotiation performance, which form the basis 
for discussion in chapters 7 through 10. Those states receiving the highest 
values for the independent variables are generally expected to negotiate most 
successfully, though this is subject to the intervening variable of negotiation 
context.  
 Turning to findings regarding the independent variables, beginning 
with preference intensity, the values for each member state, for ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, were as expected, with Germany and France having similarly 
low preference intensities, though the former with a slight advantage, and 
Belgium and the Netherlands having higher preference intensities. Similarly, 
values for preference intensity in ‘reuploading’ were in line with 
expectations. Findings regarding information were also unsurprising in the 
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case of both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, with France and Germany having 
joint highest levels of information in each case. This accords with findings 
from previous studies, that big member states, and the French and Germans 
in particular, tend to be at the center of communication networks in the EU 
(for example Beyers and Dierickx, 1997; Naurin, 2009).  
 One surprising finding was that Belgium had such a deficit in 
information, compared to the other states, in both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’. Perhaps this is to be expected, in light of the aforementioned 
findings regarding the informational advantage of big states, though it would 
seem that Belgium, at the center of the EU, might be better able than many 
other states to cultivate informal relationships, and thus gather information. 
Where Belgium was seen to excel was in both content expertise and process 
expertise, receiving joint highest and/or highest values for both variables, in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. This is in contrast to France, with low scores 
for both content expertise and process expertise, in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, which is another surprising result. This does, however, appear 
to relate to circumstances specific to the SGP negotiations, as France was the 
only state to experience a change of government over the course of 
‘uploading’ negotiations, and saw a frequent turnover in representatives to 
the EFC and Ecofin/Eurogroup, both prior to and during ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations.  
 Finally, it is interesting, if not unsurprising, that values for content 
expertise are closely clustered for most states, in both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’. This likely owes, in large part, to the fact that these are all 
wealthy countries with long-term membership in the EU, and whose 
representatives in these negotiations would have represented their states in 
other international economic organizations, such as the IMF and OECD, 
implying a certain baseline quality of content expertise. Thus, the value of 
the approach this thesis takes, analyzing the evidence qualitatively to observe 
variation that is not apparent from quantitative scores alone, is particularly 
apparent in this case, a point chapter 9 returns to. While beyond the scope of 
this study, further research into variation in content expertise, across the 
entirety of EU member states, would presumably reveal greater 
discrepancies, with interesting and important implications for the differential 
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Chapter 7 - Preference Intensity 
 
Introduction 
Preference intensity is often a crucial bargaining resource in 
intergovernmental negotiations (for example Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik 
and Nicolaïdis, 1999), with the case of the SGP being no exception. A state 
with a low preference intensity for concluding a supranational agreement, 
compared to the status quo policy option, is likely to be more successful at 
influencing any supranational agreement that is concluded, than a state with 
a high preference intensity for reaching agreement, compared to the status 
quo (for example Lax and Sebenius, 1985; Sebenius, 1992; Moravcsik, 
1998). However, the relevance of this resource is mediated by the context 
surrounding negotiations, and where the breakdown of negotiations would 
leave member states with existing domestic policy arrangements, as in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, a low preference intensity is indeed essential for 
achieving negotiation success, though this is not the case in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, where a breakdown would leave all parties with the existing 
EU-level policy they had set out to reform.  
 In other words, during ‘uploading’ negotiations, the member state(s) 
with the lowest preference intensity can determine the range of possible 
negotiated outcomes, because anything outside this range will prompt that 
state to exit negotiations, satisfied with the status quo.  In contrast to this, 
because the status quo arrangement in ‘reuploading’ is to maintain the policy 
states have set out to reform, the utility of preference intensity for 
influencing negotiations, which depends on a credible threat of exit, should 
be minimal in this context. With these points in mind, I set out the following 
hypotheses regarding preference intensity: 
 
 H1: The lower the preference intensity of a member state,  
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
  
 H1A: A low preference intensity is more important for  
negotiation success in the absence of established EU-level  
policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’. 
 
Thus, the expectation is that the state with the lowest preference intensity 
will be the most successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
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while the state with the lowest preference intensity in ‘reuploading’ 




7.1 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
In ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the four member states under 
consideration receive the following values for preference intensity: 
 
 Germany - 13 
 France - 11 
 Netherlands - 7 
 Belgium - 5 
 
Drawing on H1, which states that The lower the preference intensity of a 
member state, the more successful that state will be in negotiations, these 
values for preference intensity lead to the following predictions: 
 
 1.) Germany will be the most successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 2.) France will be less successful than Germany, though more 
 successful than Belgium and the Netherlands in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Germany and  
France, though more successful than Belgium in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 4.) Belgium will be the least successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 
As discussed previously, the reality of negotiations, with a host of complex 
issues, having differential importance to distinct delegations, and with states’ 
positions often containing multiple dimensions, as seen in chapter 6, renders 
it difficult to bundle together state successes over individual issues, to 
conclude as to the most successful state. However, taking into consideration 
the total number, and, crucially, the importance of issues over which they 
negotiated successfully, it is possible to accept prediction one, that Germany 
was the most successful state in ‘uploading’. Specifically, the German 
delegation achieved an outcome agreement that was closest to their position 
over important questions related to the imposition of sanctions under the 
EDP, including the question of how to calculate sanctions and whether there 
should be an annual or total cap on sanctions applied to any member state. 
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With regard to clarifying application of the EDP, the German delegation 
achieved an important success over the question of whether to define the 
terms ‘exceptional and temporary’, which formed an integral part of how the 
corrective arm of the SGP would work in practice. The German delegation 
also negotiated successfully over a number of issues that were identified as 
particularly important to the general process of negotiations, including such 
questions as whether and if so how, to define the term ‘serious recession’ as 
applied to ‘exceptional circumstances’ under the EDP, as well as what the 
quantitative definition of a ‘serious recession’ is, once the decision was taken 
to define this quantitatively (interviews, British treasury, Commission a and 
Commission b; Monetary Committee of the European Community, 1996).  
 Finally, the German delegation wielded significant influence, and 
some success, over the issue identified as most important to the Germans, 
which was the question of whether fines for breaching the 3% deficit ceiling 
would be automatic (interview, German finance ministry a); this issue came 
to encompass a whole range of additional questions, surrounding application 
of the EDP. While the outcome did not reflect the German position exactly, 
in that fines would not be automatic, this was largely because of legal 
constraints arising from the early decision to fit the pact within the confines 
of the Maastricht Treaty, which precluded full automaticity (Stark, 2001). 
Further to that, even the limited success of the German delegation over this 
issue becomes more significant, given that, as well as being most important 
to the Germans, this issue was identified as one of the most important 
questions to the negotiations generally, and was also identified as one of the 
most important issues to the French and Dutch (for example interviews, 
French finance ministry, Dutch finance ministry, Dutch finance ministry b, 
British treasury, Commission a and Commission b; Stark, 2001; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010).   
 In terms of the specific mechanisms linking a low preference 
intensity with negotiation success, the data confirms the posited causal 
process in the case of German success in these negotiations, to a large extent. 
The German delegation saw their low preference intensity, particularly 
bound up with their pivotal role in the project’s completion, as an important 
source of influence in these negotiations. This is illustrated by the statement 
  174 
of a German finance ministry representative that “Germany had leverage in 
these negotiations, because they [the Germans] said that without something 
like this [the SGP], there will be no monetary union” (interview, German 
finance ministry a). Further to that, given the need to “sell failure to achieve 
automaticity” to the German public, it was essential for the Germans to 
achieve “rules [that were] clear and watertight”, which led to the focus on a 
strict definition for ‘severe recession’, over which Germany threatened to 
abandon talks, in response to opposition from other states (interview, 
German finance ministry a; Helm, 1996; Palmer, 1996). Thus, it is 
documented that the German delegation threatened to exit negotiations (for 
example Helm, 1996, Traynor, 1996), though an important question, 
regarding the posited causal process linking preference intensity with 
negotiation success, is whether others deemed this threat to be credible.  
 While there is widespread acknowledgment that this was a potential 
source of influence for the Germans, there is also evidence of doubt that 
Germany would exit negotiations (interviews, Commission b and British 
treasury; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), indicating that the threat was not 
deemed to be entirely credible, which calls into question the posited process 
linking a low preference intensity with negotiation success. For example, 
Heipertz and Verdun (2010) raise the possibility that, while the Germans 
could have terminated negotiations over the SGP, they were unable, legally, 
to derail progress to the single currency, having committed to this in signing 
the Maastricht Treaty.  
On this point, it is pertinent that German representatives also 
specifically threatened to exit negotiations over the pact as they stood, and 
instead wait for EMU membership to be chosen in 1998, before 
recommencing negotiations with only those chosen members (Barber, 
1996a). While this is not equivalent to a threat to derail the EMU project 
entirely, it would have had the same implications for the host of states, 
including Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium, among others, that needed a 
political interpretation of the Maastricht criteria in order to gain first round 
membership in EMU, which would have been unlikely in the absence of a 
strict stability pact agreement (interview, British treasury; Elliot, 1996; 
Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Further to that, absent political interpretation of 
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the criteria, it was not clear that France would qualify for first round 
membership (Financial Times, 1996a), and given that French participation in 
EMU was deemed essential to the success of the singly currency (Heipertz 
and Verdun, 2010), this threat by the Germans can be seen as a politically 
acceptable way, in light of their commitment to full EMU under the 
Maastricht Treaty, to threaten to derail the project.  
 Aside from the legal question, the political commitment on the part of 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in particular, to see monetary union 
succeed, also raised doubts about the credibility of the German threat to exit 
SGP negotiations, with a British treasury participant describing the dynamic 
as “[T]hey [the Germans] looked to be in a strong position in some ways, 
because they could say ‘unless we agree, you’re not gonna get it [a single 
currency]’, but I suspect the negotiators in Buba [the Bundesbank] and [the] 
finance ministry were also looking over their shoulder at Chancellor Kohl”, 
who had invested a great deal of political capital in the single currency 
project (interview, British treasury). Revealingly, though, this participant 
also qualified his opinion, acknowledging that, the “French knew they had to 
move, [the] Germans knew they could give something, but if the French 
pushed them too far, then it could have all collapsed” (interview, British 
treasury). Along similar lines, a Commission official who participated in 
these negotiations stated that “[T]hroughout the negotiations, there was the 
issue that you couldn’t push the Germans too far” (interview, Commission 
a). Thus, the message emerging from this commentary on whether the 
German threat to exit was deemed credible, and one echoed in additional 
interviews, as well as media and secondary reports, is that, while the political 
costs surrounding exit would have been considerable, there was clear 
awareness that the Germans were giving up the most stable currency, and 
their demands for a commitment to budgetary discipline, in return, should be 
heeded (for example Heipertz and Verdun, 2004; 2010; Financial Times, 
1996b).  
 In terms of Germany influencing the outcome of a concrete definition 
for ‘severe recession’, this is a clear example of an issue over which the 
German delegation threatened to exit negotiations, and over which others 
conceded, despite the majority opposed to setting a concrete, numerical 
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definition (Ulbrich, 1996). However, the German delegation did not secure 
the exact numerical definition they were seeking on this point, which raises 
some questions surrounding the process through which preference intensity 
is posited to impact on negotiation performance. Nonetheless, as noted in 
chapter 6, compromising minimally on the specific number, whilst securing a 
concrete definition, remains a sizable achievement, reflective of considerable 
influence from the Germans in this case. 
 Turning to the remaining predictions of member state negotiation 
performance in light of H1, the prediction that France will be less successful 
than Germany, though more successful than Belgium and the Netherlands, is 
confirmed. Specifically, the French wielded influence and achieved some 
success over the question of division of labor between the Commission and 
Council, in applying the EDP, and the question of how to quantify a severe 
recession, the latter of which represented one of the most important issues to 
the negotiations overall (interviews, French finance ministry, Commission a 
and Commission b; Stark, 2001). Related to this, the French were successful 
in limiting the extent to which fines would be applied automatically, which 
was fundamental to the outcome of negotiations. As described by a finance 
ministry participant, “[O]n the French side, the finance ministry was 
somewhat sympathetic to the idea of automatic sanctions, but [we] were 
under instruction from the Elysee not to accept this”, and, under the French 
system “the President is [the] key player and all government align[ed] with 
positions taken at that level” (interview, French finance ministry).  
Though, as previously stated, the French delegation does not achieve 
the highest measure of deliberate success over the specific question of 
automatic fines, given that the French position is aided here by the legal 
constraint against automaticity in the form of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
French nonetheless wielded important influence in limiting automaticity, 
even within legal confines. Specifically, while the French did not explicitly 
threaten to exit negotiations over the question of setting a concrete definition 
for a ‘severe recession’, the French delegation held out on this point, refusing 
to compromise, with the result that this was one of very few issues that had 
to be decided by the Heads of State and Government in the European 
Council. Further to that, French refusal to accept a concrete definition of a 
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severe recession along the lines demanded by the Germans, ultimately led to 
an important compromise on that point, envisioning room for interpretation 
when recessions were not so severe as to meet the German limit of a 1.5% 
annual drop in GDP, but were at the level of a .75% annual fall.  
Rather than being a position that either the French or Germans 
favored, this outcome represented a middle way, so that neither state was 
forced to concede entirely, and, as described by a French negotiator, “[the] 
Germans could go home saying that there was a system for sanctions that 
was almost automatic and [the] French could go home saying there was no 
automaticity because at the end of the day, it’s a political decision” 
(interview, French finance ministry). This is indicative of a wider feature of 
‘uploading’ negotiations, namely that reaching compromise in a situation 
where some parties are refusing to cross certain lines, often requires 
sacrificing clarity of content in said compromise, with implications for the 
effectiveness of resultant policy, in the long-term. The concluding chapter of 
the thesis elaborates on this point, and on its relevance regarding the 
difficulties in the Eurozone today. Returning to the question of preference 
intensity specifically, while it is not possible to confirm the posited causal 
process in this case, given the absence of a threat to exit by the French, it is 
clear that France, like Germany, pivotal to the success of these negotiations, 
served as an effective counterweight to German influence, with the result 
that much creativity was required to bring the two sides together here, a point 
discussed at length in chapter 10, on process expertise.  
 Another example of French influence, which does support the posited 
role of preference intensity, can be seen in the question of whether to add a 
resolution on growth and employment, which the French identified as one of 
the most important issues to the delegation (interview, French finance 
ministry). Two points are particularly substantial here, regarding the content 
of the outcome and the mechanisms for influence. The first is that the French 
socialist party promised, in their election campaign, to renegotiate the pact to 
make it more growth friendly (Wolf, 1997), and the newly appointed 
socialist Finance Minister, Dominique Strauss-Khan, made clear to his 
colleagues in Ecofin that the delegation would not commit to the pact, absent 
some concession in this regard (interviews, Dutch finance ministry a and 
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Dutch finance ministry b; Barber, 1997a). A Dutch finance ministry 
participant recalls that “[T]he change of government in France toward the 
end was really a challenge. The French position was that they had to show to 
their electorate that ‘the world had changed’ and there was new emphasis on 
growth, stimulating the economy, etc.” (interview, Dutch finance ministry b). 
Thus, Strauss-Khan’s counterparts in the Ecofin Council were highly 
concerned about what the new socialist minister would demand, aware that 
the whole project was in jeopardy if the French could not be kept onboard 
(for example interviews, Dutch finance ministry a, Dutch finance ministry b 
and British treasury; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010).  
 The second, related point, is that Strauss-Khan did not actually ask 
for a particularly bold resolution on growth and employment, but explained 
to colleagues in Ecofin that he simply required something on the subject to 
sell to the French electorate, which affected the need for a resolution, rather 
than the specific content of any resolution (interview, Dutch finance ministry 
a). In response to this approach by Strauss-Khan, fellow member states 
ranged from supportive of the request, in the case of the Belgian delegation, 
to relieved and less hostile than they had expected to be, in the case of the 
Dutch delegation (for example interviews, Council secretariat a and Dutch 
finance ministry a; Agence France Presse, 1997). Thus, the socialists had set 
the stage for bold demands by tying their hands in the form of campaign 
promises, with the effect that other delegations were prepared to make 
concessions to keep the French onboard.  
 This example is supportive of the causal process posited regarding 
preference intensity as a bargaining resource, insofar as the French 
effectively threatened exit in the absence of concessions, with the Financial 
Times quoting the following statement by Strauss-Khan: “ ‘I am not saying I 
want to renegotiate the pact, but I am not saying I can accept it [in its present 
form]’’ (Barber, 1997a). This threat was deemed credible, and worrying, by 
others, not least because it came from a new government whose true 
intentions were not entirely known to other negotiators, and despite German 
Finance Minister Waigel’s statements to the contrary (see Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, 1997), the stage was set for some concession to be offered to the 
French (interview, Dutch finance ministry a). Again, in the end, the French 
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were not able to secure major changes to the pact, managing only to achieve 
inclusion of a limited ‘resolution on growth and employment’. The crucial 
point, though, is that the French secured a concession on this point with 
recourse to a low preference intensity for agreement, an integral component 
of which low preference intensity, was France’s pivotal role in the success of 
a single currency. Further to this, that Strauss-Khan did not ultimately 
demand significant concessions, reportedly stating, “ ‘I need something, I 
need a name, I need something about employment’ ’’ (interview, Dutch 
finance ministry a), indicates that the perceived French failure to secure 
something of substance on growth and employment, was not necessarily out 
of line with the goals of French negotiators in this case.  
 Turning to the third prediction advanced in line with H1, that the 
Netherlands, having a higher preference intensity than France and Germany 
but lower than Belgium, would be less successful than France and Germany 
but more successful than Belgium, is confirmed by the data, though only 
insofar as the Dutch enjoyed more accidental success than the Belgians, in 
‘uploading’. In terms of success achieved through deliberate influence, there 
is no meaningful distinction between the success of the Dutch and Belgian 
delegations in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, with the majority of issues over 
which these states secured an outcome nearest to their positions, being due to 
accidental rather than deliberate success. For example, on the question of 
whether the Commission or Council would take decisions regarding the 
existence of exceptional circumstances, this was a concession by the 
Germans, to the French, bound up with the overarching compromise 
regarding automaticity of sanctions, and specifically a concrete definition for 
‘severe recession’ (Agence Europe, 1996e). Specifically, this compromise, 
reached between the two delegations in Dublin, foresaw concrete numerical 
guidelines, combined with discretion for the Council in applying the EDP, 
within those guidelines (interview, Commission official). Thus, as noted in 
chapter 6, despite occupying positions nearest to the outcome agreement, 
neither the Belgian nor Dutch delegations influenced this outcome 
deliberately, to reflect their positions.  
 Additional examples include the questions of whether and how to 
quantify the definition of ‘severe recession’, with both resulting in accidental 
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success for the Dutch owing to German influence, as discussed previously in 
this chapter, and revisited in chapter 8. Thus, while it is possible to accept the 
third prediction advanced in line with H1, that the Netherlands would be less 
successful than France and Germany, though more so then Belgium, the data 
demonstrates that this superior performance of the Dutch delegation is due to 
accidental, rather than deliberate success.  
Finally, the data demonstrates limited success, and still more limited 
deliberate success for the Belgian delegation, thus confirming the prediction 
that Belgium would be least successful in these negotiations. Having 
reviewed the predicted and actual performance of each member state in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, in line with H1, it is thus possible to accept this 
hypothesis. as applied to the ‘uploading’ negotiations. Regarding the causal 
process posited for the role of preference intensity to explain negotiation 
performance, there is strong evidence to support this, in the cases of French 
and German performance in ‘uploading’. 
 
  
7.2 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
Drawing on H1, which states that The lower the preference intensity of a 
member state, the more successful that state will be in negotiations, it is 
possible to predict the performance of each member state, according to the 
scores each state receives for preference intensity, which are as follows: 
 
 Belgium - 9 
 Netherlands - 8 
 France - 4 
 Germany - 4 
  
Thus, I advance the following predictions regarding member state 
performance in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, in line with H1: 
 
 1.) Belgium will be the most successful state in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
 2.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Belgium,  
though more successful than France and Germany in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
3.) France will be less successful than Belgium and the  
Netherlands and as successful as Germany in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations 
4.) Germany will be less successful than Belgium  
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and the Netherlands and as successful as France in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
 
Taking into consideration the issues over which the Dutch delegation 
negotiated successfully, and in particular the fact that the delegation enjoyed 
success over multiple issues that were of utmost importance, both to the 
negotiations in general and to the Dutch more specifically, the data 
disconfirms the first two predictions advanced in line with H1, that Belgium 
would be the most successful state, and that the Netherlands would be less 
successful than Belgium. Specifically, the Dutch delegation achieved 
deliberate success over the key question of whether to remove certain 
categories of spending from calculation of the deficit, identified as one of the 
most important issues to the Dutch delegation and to the negotiations more 
widely (interview, Dutch finance ministry c; Bowley, 2004; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010). Additional questions over which the Dutch negotiated 
successfully include whether to upgrade the issue of debt in a revised SGP 
and how to differentiate MTOs to reflect the unique budgetary position of 
each member state. 
 Turning to the performance of Belgium in these negotiations, while 
the data does demonstrate that, in fact, the Netherlands was more successful 
than Belgium, there is also evidence of some success enjoyed by the Belgian 
delegation, including over the question of whether to operationalize the debt 
criteria qualitatively or quantitatively, which was among the most important 
issues to the delegation, especially given failure to prevent the issue of debt 
being upgraded in the reform agreement (interview, Belgian finance ministry 
b). The delegation also enjoyed some success over the question of how to 
prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy, how to differentiate MTOs and whether to 
remove certain categories of spending from deficit calculation in the 
reformed pact, though most of these issues represent instances where the 
Dutch wielded greater influence, and the Belgians enjoyed accidental 
success, a point substantiated further in chapter 9.  
 Finally, turning to predictions three and four, which state that France 
and Germany, having received equal scores for preference intensity, though 
lower than those of Belgium and the Netherlands, would be less successful 
than the latter states and as successful as one another, the results are 
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somewhat mixed. While neither of these states enjoyed a great deal of 
notable successes in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the German delegation 
appears to have been more influential than the French, and perhaps more 
successful as well, though these are subtle points that require a grasp not 
only of the stated positions by France and Germany, but also the reasons 
behind those positions, the latter being an integral component of EU 
negotiations generally (Tallberg, 2008). It is essential to elaborate this 
discussion, and this task is reserved for chapter 8, on the independent 
variable information.  
 Overall, considering the inaccurate predictions advanced in line with 
H1, it is possible to conclude that preference intensity cannot explain the 
performance of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, in the case 
of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Further to that, the mechanisms liking a low 
preference intensity with negotiation success, are not observed in the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, which is in line with H1A, stating that A low 
preference intensity is more important for negotiation success in the absence 
of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’. 
Thus, the following section, on comparing ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, discusses the extent to which H1A, and the causal process 
through which negotiation context in ‘reuploading’ is posited to diminish the 
utility of preference intensity as a bargaining resource, are confirmed in the 
case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
 
 
7.3 Comparing the role of Preference Intensity in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
Taking into consideration the data presented in previous sections, it is 
possible to conclude that a low preference intensity is an accurate indicator 
of member state negotiation performance in ‘uploading’ negotiations, though 
not in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. The role of contextual changes between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, and how these serve to mediate the relevance 
of preference intensity as a bargaining resource in each, is addressed with 
H1A, which states that A low preference intensity is more important for 
negotiation success in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the 
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case in ‘uploading’, than in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is 
the case in‘reuploading’. 
 
This hypothesis leads to the following predictions regarding member state 
negotiation performance in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations: 
 
1.) The German delegation can utilize a low preference  
intensity to achieve success in ‘uploading’ negotiations 
2.) Despite having a low preference intensity, the Belgian  
delegation must rely on more useful resources to achieve  
success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
 
 With regard to prediction one, section 7.1 has presented examples of 
the role of preference intensity in explaining German and French negotiation 
success in ‘uploading’, the latter state having a similarly low preference 
intensity to Germany’s. At this point, it is worth offering a more general 
assessment of the evidence surrounding whether Germany succeeded in 
influencing ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, with recourse to 
preference intensity. In addition to ample media reports and primary sources 
documenting the fact that Germany needed a strong stability pact in order to 
win over a skeptical public, as well as the Bundesbank, to the idea of the 
single currency (for example Helm, 1996; Traynor, 1996; Bundesrat 
Economic Committee, 1997), nearly all participants interviewed confirmed 
that German influence was unparalleled in these negotiations, as a result of 
the strong position the Germans found themselves in with the D-Mark (for 
example interviews, British treasury, Council secretariat a, Commission a, 
Commission b, Belgian finance ministry a). For example, one official 
representing the Commission went as far as to say that “[T]he only reason 
this [the SGP] was done was because there was concern that otherwise the 
Germans would not follow through with EMU”, and further to that, “if it had 
been presented by Italy or some other, it would have been discarded, just like 
that, but because it was coming from Germany, everybody said, we welcome 
the proposal, but how can we kill it [?]” (interview, Commission a).   
 Beyond the awareness of others that the Germans might credibly 
threaten to exit negotiations over the SGP and, related, the single currency 
project, it is crucial to recall the fact that the German delegation considered 
their low preference intensity to afford them “leverage” in these negotiations, 
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and saw the possibility to derail negotiations as a potential aid in defending 
the German perspective. This is illustrated by the following statement from a 
German finance ministry participant: “if agreement could not be reached, 
then the project would not go forward, [which] was helpful in negotiating 
from the German perspective (interview, German finance ministry a). Taking 
these points into consideration, it is possible to accept prediction one, that the 
Germans could rely on a low preference intensity to achieve success in 
‘uploading’ negotiations. Further to this, the data is supportive of the posited 
process through which a member state utilizes preference intensity to 
negotiate successfully, in the context of ‘uploading’.  
  Regarding the second prediction, neither the Netherlands, the most 
successful state in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, nor Belgium, the state with the 
lowest preference intensity, achieved the successes they did with recourse to 
low preference intensity. Although the Dutch had a low preference intensity 
in this case, tracing the process of negotiations demonstrates that the Dutch 
delegation in fact relied on content expertise to achieve the success they did 
in ‘reuploading’, while Belgium deployed process expertise to influence the 
outcomes they did. Chapters 9 and 10 discuss these findings at length. 
 In terms of the more specific process through which context is 
posited to diminish the utility of preference intensity in ‘reuploading’, 
namely by rendering the threat of exit infeasible, with the result that it would 
not be taken seriously and is thus absent from negotiations, it is possible to 
confirm that the threat of exit was not observed in these negotiations. One 
important reason for this is that a breakdown in negotiations to reform the 
SGP would have been detrimental for all concerned, given the negative 
implications for the stability of the single currency. Thus, as described by a 
Council secretariat participant, “there was a real fear that that [a loss of 
confidence in the euro] might happen” and “it was incumbent on member 
states to sort out reforms, because otherwise the Commission was just gonna 
propose what it wanted” (interview, Council secretariat b). Under such 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that individual threats to exit, and hence 
derail negotiations, would be deemed credible, regardless how low a state’s 
relative preference intensity for reform.  
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 This assessment is also supported by the statement of a Dutch 
participant, that “[I]f agreement couldn’t be reached, there would have been 
nothing. Well, we would have had the old pact, but it couldn’t have 
functioned after the decision on France and Germany...there was a general 
feeling that the euro could not function without some mechanism for 
budgetary discipline” (interview, Dutch finance ministry c). Further to these 
points, all participant interviews conducted on the subject reveal a 
widespread understanding that exiting negotiations was not an option, given 
the need to maintain confidence in the stability of the single currency, which 
required a reformed SGP. Thus, it is possible to accept prediction 2, as well 
as the process through which context was posited to mediate the utility of 




Beginning with the ‘uploading’ negotiations, main findings from this chapter 
were that preference intensity is a useful predictor of negotiation success in 
‘uploading’, and that both France and Germany relied on their low 
preference intensities for agreement, in order to influence the outcome of 
important issues in these negotiations. While the French did not negotiate as 
successfully as the Germans, the French delegation wielded considerable 
influence, and achieved some successes, notably the inclusion of a resolution 
on growth and employment, which was added to the SGP at the Amsterdam 
European summit in June 1997. Although, as discussed in section 7.1, this 
resolution on growth and employment was more of a stylistic concession to 
French negotiators, than one of great substance, this outcome nonetheless 
reflects the influence France brought to bear in ‘uploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP. Similarly, while German failure to secure full automaticity for the 
imposition of fines under the corrective arm of the pact, indicates a limit to 
German dominance, this was due in large part to the content of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which precluded full automaticity, as well as to the role of 
France as a counterweight to German influence. 
 On the other hand, evidence from this chapter demonstrated limited 
deliberate success for Belgium and the Netherlands, in terms of influencing 
outcomes to reflect their positions in the ‘uploading’ negotiations. While 
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both delegations enjoyed some success in these negotiations, this success 
tended to be accidental, as a result of occupying a middle ground position 
between two extremes or, particularly on the part of the Dutch delegation, 
occupying a position proximate to Germany and benefitting from German 
influence to secure an outcome at or near that position. These findings are 
highly supportive of hypotheses regarding the role of preference intensity in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, insofar as France and Germany had the lowest 
preference intensities and negotiated successfully. In addition to the accuracy 
of predictions advanced in line with H1, which stated that The lower the 
preference intensity of a member state, the more successful that state will be 
in negotiations, findings from this chapter support the posited process linking 
a low preference intensity with negotiation success, as seen in examples of 
French and German success in ‘uploading’.  
 Turning to the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, key findings were that 
Belgium had the lowest preference intensity, followed closely by the 
Netherlands and then France and Germany, the latter with equal values for 
preference intensity. However, the predictions advanced in line with H1, 
regarding states’ performance in light of these values for preference 
intensity, were largely inaccurate, with the Dutch seen to negotiate most 
successfully, despite Belgium having the lowest preference intensity. Further 
to that, in tracing the process through which the Dutch succeeded in 
‘reuploading’, it is clear that the posited mechanisms linking a low 
preference intensity with negotiation success are disconfirmed by the data.  
The Dutch delegation did not rely on a low preference intensity and 
did not view the threat of exit as a viable option. The Dutch delegation did 
not threaten to exit negotiations at any point, nor did they or any other 
delegations view this as a possibility. Taking into consideration H1A, which 
states that A low preference intensity is more important for negotiation 
success in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in 
‘uploading’, than in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the 
case in ‘reuploading’, it is unsurprising that the posited mechanisms for 
influence via preference intensity were not present in Dutch success in 
‘reuploading’. Along those lines, another key finding from this chapter is that 
H1A is confirmed by the data.  
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 Regarding the literature that argues for the importance of 
circumstance in impacting on the type of bargaining actors will employ in 
distinct settings (for example Krasner, 1991; Koremenos et al., 2001; 
Heritier, 2007; Naurin, 2009), this finds support in the change that occurred 
from ‘uploading’ to ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Specifically, the prevailing 
context in ‘uploading’ negotiations had the effect of making viable the threat 
of exit for a state with a low preference intensity, while the distinct context in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations removed this option of threatening to exit 
negotiations so as to secure concessions. Thus, the goal of negotiating 
successfully, or securing the most favorable distributional outcome, remains 
unchanged between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, while the 
change that occurs is in the mediating effect of context on the utility of 
preference intensity for achieving negotiation success in each case. These 
findings regarding the changing role of preference intensity, from 
‘uploading’ to ‘reuploading’ negotiations, question the argument advanced 
by Dür and Mateo (2010), that individual parties to a negotiation will employ 
certain strategies regardless the negotiation context, so long as they are 
possessed of the resources to facilitate such strategies. That neither Belgium 
nor the Netherlands relied on the threat of exit, despite bringing a low 
preference intensity to ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, is evidence 
of the need to consider context, as well as the resources possessed by 
individual parties, in order to explain the distributional outcomes of 
intergovernmental negotiations.  
 Findings from this chapter point to an important, if contingent, role 
for preference intensity in intergovernmental negotiations, and these should 
be considered in analyzing additional cases. While preference intensity has 
been shown here, and in previous contributions (for example Moravcsik, 
1998), to be an important determinant of states’ performance in 
intergovernmental negotiations, the causal process surrounding this involves 
a credible threat to exit, which no state was seen to have in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, and which no state would be likely to have in 
most other cases of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, given that states are 
effectively locked into cooperation following a successful ‘upload’. Thus, 
given the densely institutionalized cooperation by which the EU is 
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characterized generally, it is likely that preference intensity, seen here to be 
of limited utility in ‘reuploading’, would be similarly futile in additional 
instances of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Of course, it is essential to test this 
assumption in further research, and findings to the contrary would raise 
important questions about how the SGP might differ from other cases, with 
potential conclusions regarding how variation across negotiations, mediates 
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Chapter 8 - Information 
 
Introduction 
Information is a useful bargaining resource in intergovernmental negotiations 
generally (for example Mastenbroek, 1989), and in the specific case of the 
SGP negotiations analyzed here. Access to exclusive information about the 
positions of negotiation counterparts provides for the identification of the 
zone of agreement within which compromise can be achieved, which avails a 
negotiator of the opportunity to propose a compromise nearest their 
delegation’s position, within that acceptable range (Tallberg, 2006: 33, 114). 
Absent such knowledge about the reasons behind other parties’ stated 
positions, the potential is limited for a negotiator to identify room for 
maneuver in securing an agreement that reflects own positions (Tallberg, 
2008). However, the relevance of this resource in securing a favorable 
outcome is mediated by the context in which negotiations take place, and 
when a state would rather exit negotiations than compromise, no amount of 
information is likely to change that. Thus, information is a more important 
bargaining resource when there is little possibility for a state to exit 
negotiations, or threaten to do so, then vice versa.  
 The former circumstance is the case in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
where the default condition would leave all member states with the existing 
policy they have set out to reform. In ‘uploading’ negotiations, on the other 
hand, the default condition is different for all states, with the result that some 
may prefer their status quo alternative to compromise, and hence the threat of 
exit is a real possibility for a state or states with low preference intensity for 
reaching agreement, relative to the status quo option. While some states may 
prefer the status quo to certain compromise agreements in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations as well, the default condition does not in this case mean a return 
to individual policy arrangements but, again, maintenance of existing 
supranational policy. Thus, it would be difficult for a member state to claim 
that the default condition really leaves them in a much better position than 
any others, and so an exit threat is likely to be unconvincing in this context, 
which removes the restriction on information to work as an effective tool for 
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influence. With these points in mind, I set out the following hypotheses 
regarding information: 
 
 H2: The more information a member state has, the more  
successful that state will be in negotiations. 
  
 H2A: Information is more important for negotiation success  
in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in  
‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-level  
policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
Based on these hypotheses, I expect to find that the state with the highest 
level of information will be the most successful state in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, while the state with the most information in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, will not necessarily be successful, given the limits 
on information as an effective bargaining resource in that context. 
 
 
8.1 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
Drawing on the hypotheses regarding information, it is possible to predict the 
negotiation performance of each member state, based on their values for 
information: 
 
 France - 11 
 Germany - 11 
 Netherlands - 9 
 Belgium - 3 
 
Thus, drawing on H2, which states that The more information a member 
state has, the more successful that state will be in negotiations, it is possible 
to make the following predictions: 
 
1.) France will be more successful than Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as Germany in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations  
2.) Germany will be more successful than Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as France in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Germany and  
France, though more successful than Belgium in ‘uploading’         
negotiations 
4.) Belgium will be the least successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
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Interestingly, these are similar to the predictions advanced in line with H1, 
which states that The lower the preference intensity of a member state, the 
more successful that state will be in negotiations. In considering only the 
number and significance of issues over which each state negotiated 
successfully in ‘uploading’, the data does confirm predictions three and four, 
though disconfirms predictions one and two, in that Germany is slightly 
more successful than France, despite having an equal score for information, 
as seen in chapter 6. Nonetheless, these predictions advanced in line with H2 
are largely accurate, though it is essential to consider not only the 
relationship between the independent variable - information, and the 
dependent variable - negotiation performance, but also the specific 
mechanisms linking these variables. In other words, establishing a 
relationship between the German delegation having a high level of 
information and negotiating successfully, for example, requires analysis of 
the intervening processes. 
 In considering the mechanisms for influence, it is clear that, although 
the German delegation had a high level of information in these negotiations, 
the resource they relied on for influence was mainly a low preference 
intensity for reaching agreement, much more than information. The same is 
true of the French delegation, which had a low preference intensity and a 
high level of information in the ‘uploading’ negotiations and, though 
negotiating less successfully than Germany, did achieve some notable 
successes. Having already presented evidence, in the previous chapter, of the 
mechanisms linking preference intensity with negotiation success in the case 
of the German and French delegations in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, I will 
not restate those points here. Rather, I focus on the extent to which 
information can be observed in the processes of French and German 
influence in ‘uploading’, namely as a secondary resource to reenforce 
strategies based on preference intensity. 
 The hypothesized mechanisms linking information to negotiation 
success, which include knowing more about others’ positions and proposing 
compromise solutions that accommodate those positions whilst reflecting 
own position more nearly, are not well supported by the data in explaining 
German negotiation success in ‘uploading’. However, there is some evidence 
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of the effects of a high level of information, in the performance of the 
German delegation. Specifically, prior to making public the proposal for a 
stability pact, which then German Finance Minister Theo Waigel did in 
November 1995, he and other top officials from the German finance ministry 
visited fellow finance ministers in all member state capitals, as well as 
Commission officials in Brussels, in order to brief them on the proposal and 
gauge initial reactions (interviews, German finance ministry a and 
Commission a; Stark, 2001). This was a forum in which the German 
representatives could convey to their colleagues the necessity of such an 
agreement, which was “triggered by the reluctance of Buba [Bundesbank] to 
go ahead with monetary union absent political union, i.e.fiscal measures”, 
and by a general awareness that “we have to do more than what’s in the 
Maastricht Treaty” (interview, German finance ministry a).  
Thus, these meetings served two important aims. First, the German 
representatives were delivering information to other delegations, and so 
reenforcing a strategy based on preference intensity, and a credible exit 
threat, in that they made clear the necessity of a stability pact agreement for 
German participation in the single currency. As a second aim, the meetings 
provided a forum in which to gain information about the positions of other 
delegations. 
 These elements of information as bargaining resource were part of 
the German delegation’s strategy throughout. However, it is interesting to 
note that, as described by a German finance ministry participant, “Franco-
German meetings happened every few months, as always. Other than that, 
bilateral meetings tapered off as negotiations moved forward in the formal 
channels” (interview, German finance ministry a). Thus, while meetings 
between the German and French negotiators at all levels, from MC 
representative to Heads of State/Government, were a regular fixture over the 
course of negotiations, there was less effort to cultivate information toward 
reaching a compromise, with other delegations.  
A German finance ministry participant explains that this is because 
“others knew that when France and Germany agreed, that was it” (interview, 
German finance ministry a). This idea that other delegations would have 
accepted a compromise between France and Germany, and hence it was 
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mainly necessary to work toward bringing those states together, is a point 
echoed in media and secondary accounts of the negotiations (for example 
Wynia, 1996; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), as well in additional interviews 
with negotiation participants. For example, a Dutch participant explains that 
one aim of the Dutch delegation “was to play a kind of bridging function 
between the French and Germans”, and a Commission representative recalls 
that, “obviously it mattered that you wanted France and Germany to get 
along” (interviews, Dutch finance ministry b and Commission a). Similarly, 
if less subtly, a French participant states that “these negotiations were a 
bilateral process dominated by France and Germany” (interview, French 
finance ministry). While this is surely something of a simplification, given 
the important roles played by other states, such as Belgium, in identifying the 
ultimate compromise, as addressed in chapter 10, this focus on bridging the 
divide between France and Germany is illustrative of the dominance of 
preference intensity in ‘uploading’ negotiations, in that those states with the 
lowest preference intensities, fixed the boundaries for the zone of agreement.  
 An alternative conclusion might be that France and Germany 
happened to lie at opposing ends of the positional spectrum, as is often the 
case in matters relating to EMU, and any states occupying those opposing 
positions would have received the same attention, and had the same efforts 
devoted to bringing them together, as did France and Germany in 
‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. However, this interpretation does not 
accord with the data. In light of statements already mentioned, such as “if it 
[the SGP] had been presented by Italy or some other, it would have been 
discarded” (interview, Commission a), or a similar statement by another 
Commission representative that “Germany was obviously influential. 
Frankly if Greece had proposed it [the SGP], it wouldn’t have gone 
anywhere” (interview, Commission b), to name two examples, I am 
confident in accepting the interpretation that the need to bridge the gap 
between France and Germany, in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
owed in large part to the fact that these states possessed the most credible 
threats to exit negotiations, rather than to the composition of their positions 
alone.  
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 Turning to the question of the French delegation’s use of information 
to influence the outcome of ‘uploading’ negotiations, similar to the German 
approach, the role of information was as much about delivering as it was 
gathering, insofar as Franco-German meetings provided a forum in which to 
signal a credible commitment to not cross a certain line in striving for 
agreement, as well a forum in which to learn more about the nuance of the 
others’ positions (interviews, French finance ministry and German finance 
ministry a). Beyond Franco-German meetings specifically, this use of 
informal contacts to deliver, rather than gather information, can be seen in 
the description mentioned previously, of Strauss-Khan explaining to a 
relieved Dutch negotiator that “ ‘I need something, I need a name, I need 
something about employment’ ’’ (interview, Dutch finance ministry a). This 
is a clear example of how information was used by the French to demonstrate 
that they were not genuinely inclined to derail negotiations, and the best way 
to avoid doing so, would be to sell a cosmetic concession to their domestic 
electorate.  
 Thus, there is a role for information, in explaining French negotiation 
success, though the process through which information is posited to affect 
negotiation performance, is neither observed in the case of France, nor 
Germany. An illustrative example of this lies in the fact that the final 
compromise over the question of how to define a ‘serious recession’ in 
quantitative terms, a point that was settled only after acrimonious debate, and 
at the highest political level, came not from the information-endowed French 
or German delegation, but from the Belgians via the British (interviews, 
Commission a and French finance ministry; Agence Europe, 1996d; Barber 
and Buckley, 1996), a point chapter 10 discusses at length, in relation to 
Belgian influence via process expertise. In light of the causal process posited 
a priori, the wealth of information France and Germany brought to these 
negotiations, should have gone toward one or both of those delegations 
managing to craft a compromise that, whilst incorporating those of the other 
state, reflected own position as nearly as possible. In fact, as discussed 
previously, Germany threatened to exit negotiations if concessions were not 
granted on this issue and France failed to concede as far as desired, with the 
former move in particular reflecting reliance on a low preference intensity, 
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rather than information (Helm, 1996; Traynor, 1996; Moore, 1996). Thus, as 
later sections of the chapter expand on, the role of preference intensity in 
‘uploading’ negotiations serves to make secondary other bargaining 
resources, such as information, which may be used to reenforce a strategy 
based on preference intensity, as seen in the cases of France and Germany, 
but is unlikely to lead to negotiation success independently.  
 Turning to predictions 3 and 4, these state that, respectively, the 
Netherlands would be less successful than France and Germany, though 
more so than Belgium, and that Belgium would be the least successful state 
in the ‘uploading’ negotiations. While both of these states were seen to be 
less successful than France and Germany, and Belgium was the least 
successful state in ‘uploading’, the only measure on which the Dutch 
outperform the Belgians is accidental success. This is a significant finding, 
given the considerably higher level of information that the Dutch delegation 
was shown to have, in comparison to the Belgian delegation, in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. However, having provided various arguments, and evidence, 
for why information is not a good indicator of negotiation performance in the 
context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, this finding is as expected.  
It is clear that the predictions advanced in line with H2 are only partly 
supported by the data, and a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms 
through which states influenced these negotiations, reveals a rather limited 
role for information in the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. H2 is thus 
disconfirmed in the case of ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
 The evidence presented regarding the role of information in 
‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, does not appear to accord with the 
literature that argues for the importance of information as a bargaining 
resource in international negotiations (for example Winham, 1977; 
Mastenbroek, 1989; Tallberg, 2006; 2008). However, this is not to say that 
the evidence disconfirms the role of information in general. Rather, the 
findings regarding information in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP 
indicate that the utility of information as a bargaining resource is mediated 
by negotiation context. Thus, as the concluding section of the chapter 
expands on, findings support the theoretical argument that negotiation 
context matters (for example Keohane, 1984; Naurin, 2009), while the 
  196 
specific effects of context on negotiation performance are shown to be 
distinct from effects predicted by the literature.  
 
 
8.2 Predicting Member State Performance in reuploading’ Negotiations 
Drawing on H2, which states that The more information a member state has, 
the more successful that state will be in negotiations, it is possible to predict 
the performance of the member states analyzed, according to each state’s 
value for information: 
 
 France - 11 
 Germany - 11 
 Netherlands - 8 
 Belgium - 3 
 
Thus, I advance the following predictions regarding member state 
performance in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, in line with H2: 
 
1.) France will be more successful than Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as Germany in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations  
2.) Germany will be more successful than Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as France in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations 
3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Germany and  
     France, though more successful than Belgium in ‘reuploading’  
     negotiations 
 4.) Belgium will be the least successful state in ‘reuploading’  
negotiations 
 
Contrary to these predictions advanced in line with H2, the data reveals that 
the Netherlands is the most successful state in ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
over the SGP, followed by Belgium, France and Germany, with similar 
outcomes for negotiation performance, which is particularly surprising given 
the large numerical gap between the scores of the Belgian delegation and 
others, for information. I begin by presenting evidence of the actual 
performance of these member states to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the 
above predictions, and go on to consider the specific causal mechanisms 
posited to link information with negotiation performance, which sheds 
further light on the role, or lack thereof, played by information in these 
negotiations. 
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 With regard to the first two predictions, that France and Germany 
would be equally successful and more so than Belgium and the Netherlands, 
the data disconfirms this prediction. Specifically, the French delegation only 
achieved notable success over the inclusion of a list of relevant factors to be 
considered when the Commission evaluated whether a state had an excessive 
deficit, and while the outcome agreement did reflect the French position in 
this case, it was nearer the German position, and owed as much, if not more, 
to German influence. Other successes on the part of the French delegation, 
including the question of whether to upgrade the issue of debt in the 
reformed SGP, and how to operationalize the debt target, were not 
particularly important to the delegation, and the latter in particular was more 
a case of accidental than deliberate success. The Germans also enjoyed these 
successes regarding the debt issue, while the aforementioned success for the 
Germans over the list of relevant factors to be considered in decisions on the 
EDP, leads to the conclusion that, while enjoying comparable accidental 
success, the German delegation was more influential, and thus more 
deliberately successful, than the French delegation in this case, a conclusion 
this section of the chapter elaborates on, below.  
 Turning to the performance of Belgium and the Netherlands, the data 
shows predictions three and four to be inaccurate as well, given that the 
Dutch delegation negotiated successfully over multiple issues that were 
deemed most important to the delegation, and to negotiations as a whole, 
while the Belgians, though succeeding on fewer issues than the Dutch 
delegation, achieved success over those issues of greatest importance to 
Belgium specifically. In fact, Belgium arguably performed comparably to the 
French and German delegations overall, though this is not a straightforward 
conclusion to draw, and thus chapter 10 expands on this point, in discussing 
Belgian performance with recourse to process expertise. Chapter 9 expands 
on the above assessment of Dutch negotiation performance. 
  Having reviewed the predicted and actual performance of each 
member state, in line with H2, I must reject this hypothesis in the case of 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. There are a number of ways to 
explain the failure of H2 to predict the negotiation performance of member 
states in ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. One explanation is that the 
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indicators used to measure the information of each delegation, were not 
effective in capturing actual information levels. While this is always a risk in 
research that seeks to measure such subtle points as the information a 
delegation possesses about others’ positions, the process-tracing method I 
utilize in analyzing these negotiations, serves to minimize such risk 
(Vennesson, 2008).  
There is, however, some role for measurement in explaining the 
failure of H2 to predict member state negotiation performance in the cases of 
France and Germany. Specifically, one reason why these states score highly 
on information, in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, is that 
frequent Franco-German meetings were a feature in both cases. Where the 
delegations held opposing positions, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, these 
frequent meetings could have facilitated compromise in that, as predicted by 
the literature on information in international negotiations, such meetings 
provided a forum for each state to gather nuanced information about the 
others’ positions, such as the reasons behind a particular stance, and to 
identify the points on which movement was more or less possible (Tallberg, 
2006; 2008). As discussed in the previous section, this information exchange 
was, in the specific case of ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, a way for 
each delegation to reinforce bargaining strategies based on preference 
intensity, rather than the main channel through which France and Germany 
influenced the outcome of ‘uploading’ negotiations, though there remained 
an important role for information, not least in clarifying the resolve of these 
parties.  
 On the other hand, this specific role of information would have been 
far less effective in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where the French and 
German delegations did not occupy opposite ends of the positional spectrum. 
To be sure, there were significant differences in the positions of these 
delegations, but bridging the gap between them would not have solved a 
majority of political differences over the SGP dossier, with the result that 
frequent Franco-German meetings increase the values of these states for 
information, but would not have afforded much informational advantage in 
the search for compromise agreements acceptable to all delegations. Thus, it 
is possible that the effective information levels of the French and German 
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delegations in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, are not accurately reflected by 
the high scores these states receive.  
 In order for this to impact on the accuracy of H2, there would need to 
be evidence not only that the Dutch, as the most successful delegation in 
these negotiations, had an effective level of information that was higher than 
that of the French and Germans, but that the Dutch delegation utilized this 
resource to achieve negotiation success. Again, this is where the detailed 
method used to analyze negotiations, as well as the multiple indicators used 
to capture validly member state resources, serve as useful checks. With 
regard to the first point, having traced the process of negotiations through 
documentary evidence and in-depth interviews, it would have been clear if 
the Dutch delegation had used information as a resource to achieve 
negotiation success in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, just as the data 
demonstrates how the French and German delegations utilized information as 
a bargaining resource in the ‘uploading’ negotiations. Not only does the data 
fail to reveal any such processes, it reveals how the Dutch delegation did in 
fact achieve negotiation success in ‘reuploading’, with recourse to content 
expertise, rather than information.  
 In addition to the utility of the process-tracing method in guarding 
against the potential effects of measurement error, the multiple indicators 
considered in arriving at total values, serves to increase the validity of 
measures of state information, and reduces the likelihood that I have 
overstated the information of the French and German delegations overall, 
simply because of the potential failing of one indicator in this case. While the 
frequency of Franco-German meetings contributed to the receipt of a high 
information score for both delegations, the frequency of contact with 
Commission representatives, for both delegations, was also an important 
factor, among others, in my conclusion that the French and German 
delegations had a high level of information in these negotiations (for 
example interview, Commission d). Along those lines, there is some 
evidence that information was relevant for what success the German 
delegation, specifically, enjoyed in these negotiations.  
 In describing the strategy through which they sought to influence 
negotiations, the German delegation identified meetings with the 
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Commission, and with other member state delegations, as crucial (interview, 
German finance ministry b), and a representative of the Commission 
describes meetings with the German delegation as far more frequent than 
those with other states, while confirming that this was how the Germans 
influenced negotiations (interview, Commission d). However, in terms of the 
specific mechanisms, the data does not confirm the posited causal 
mechanisms linking information with negotiation success, in that the German 
strategy was not about gaining an informational advantage toward the goal of 
proposing compromise solutions that would sit within the zone of agreement, 
though as near as possible to their own positions. Rather, the German 
strategy was more about clarifying their positions to other delegations, as 
illustrated below. 
 One issue that shaped perceptions of German demands in these 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, was that the SGP crisis of 2003 saw the Germans, 
in collaboration with the French, avoid the escalation of the excessive deficit 
procedure through political machination, thereby emasculating the pact as it 
was (for example, Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Following this incident, the 
Germans had little choice but to argue that the pact needed to be reformed to 
enhance flexibility, because the alternative would have been to argue that 
only Germany should be allowed to defer short-term concerns about 
budgetary sustainability, in order to undertake structural reforms. In other 
words, as described by a German finance ministry official, “there was a 
strong effort [by the Germans] for structural reforms under Agenda 2010, 
and we were in a recession. It made no sense to consolidate further, so we 
asked for an exception under the pact” (interview, German finance ministry 
b). Thus, the drive for reform was seen by the Germans as a necessary 
solution to this short-sighted lack of flexibility in the original pact, while the 
same finance ministry official argued that, in contrast to German 
motivations, the French sought reform because “France did not engage with 
the pact. France was not engaged in fulfilling the pact, nor in making 
structural reforms. Their situation was different” (interview, German finance 
ministry b). This is in line with the perception of a Council secretariat 
participant in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, who explains that 
 [A]lthough following the court case, France and Germany  
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were lumped together in terms of criticism over what had  
happened, they weren’t coming at it from the same position.  
France’s perception had always been that the rules were rigid. 
Germany was in a position where they had to say yes, we  
need to make this pact more sensible, because it was  
misapplied or open to misinterpretation, so we need to be  
clear, but the point is not to have less rigor – it is to have  
appropriate rigor and to target the right things  
 (interview, Council secretariat b). 
  
Thus, while the circumstances of the 2003 SGP crisis meant that France and 
Germany were grouped together in the minds of other delegations, as states 
that did not want to be subject to the rigors of fiscal discipline, this was not 
entirely accurate. To some delegations, such as Italy, this perception would 
have made France and Germany their allies in the drive to weaken the pact 
(interview, Council secretariat a; Chang, 2006; Fabbrini and Piattoni, 2008), 
but to others, such as Austria and the Netherlands, this would have made 
them their enemies, whose efforts, if successful, could have deleterious 
consequences for the stability of the single currency (interview, Dutch 
finance ministry c; Bowley, 2004; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). This can be 
seen in a New York Times article, in which Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit 
Zalm is quoted referring, among other things, to the German position in 
favor of considering its role as a net contributor to the EU budget in judging 
German finances, as open reform questions that risk “ ‘burying the pact’ ” 
(Bowley, 2004).  
 For these reasons, the utility of information for the German 
delegation was, through delivering rather than gathering, to demonstrate that 
their goals regarding pact reform were not to weaken, but to enhance 
flexibility in a very specific way. The success of this strategy is reflected in 
the most important issue over which the German delegation achieved 
negotiation success, namely the inclusion of a list of relevant factors to be 
considered when the Commission evaluated whether a state had an excessive 
deficit. The outcome agreement for this issue accommodates the German 
position almost entirely, and the Germans achieved this succes by convincing 
other delegations, notably the Dutch, that they did not favor the French 
approach of removing items from calculation of the deficit to allow for 
deficits upwards of 10% of GDP without incurring sanctions, but that they 
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needed to address obstacles raised by the pact as it stood, which were 
specific to their national situation, and were compatible with the goals of 
fiscal discipline and currency stability that the pact was intended to safeguard 
(interviews, German finance ministry b; Council secretariat b).  
This is seen in the following description of the process offered by one 
Dutch finance ministry participant: “Zalm and I visited Eichel in Berlin 
multiple times to discuss the problem. [The] Germans wanted to stick to it 
[the SGP], but couldn’t. [The] French were never happy with the pact, have 
always seen flexibility as desirable” (interview, Dutch finance ministry d). 
Thus, the mechanisms through which the German delegation utilized 
information to achieve negotiation success in this case, appear to have been 
clarifying their position and the reasons behind it, in order to move other 
delegations to accept their favored outcome, rather than, as posited, gaining 
information about others’ positions so as to propose an acceptable 
compromise that was nearest their own position.  
 The causal process posited initially, reflects assessments in the 
negotiation literature of the utility of information as a bargaining resource, 
insofar as gathering information about the positions of other parties should 
offer an advantage to the delegation possessed of said information (for 
example Bailer, 2006; Tallberg, 2006; 2008; Naurin, 2009). However, 
findings regarding the role of information in ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP indicate that the utility of information was in delivering, rather than 
gathering. In other words, Germany, the only delegation that appears to have 
relied on information to achieve success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
achieved that success by delivering information to other delegations, in order 
to clarify the German position, rather than by gathering an informational 
advantage about the positions of other delegations. While it might be implicit 
in the literature that, if holding additional meetings with other delegations 
serves to enhance the information held by those latter delegations, about 
positions of the former, then the purpose of those meetings is necessarily also 
to deliver information about own positions, this is certainly not the causal 
role of information that is emphasized in arguing for the utility of 
information as a bargaining resource (see for example Mastenbroek, 1989; 
Bailer, 2006; Tallberg, 2006; 2008; Naurin, 2009).  
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It is not possible, at this point, to generalize these findings regarding 
information beyond the case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
Nonetheless, evidence about the role of information in explaining German 
performance in these ‘reuploading’ negotiations, certainly warrants further 
study, to uncover whether the utility of information might rely more than is 
currently assumed, on delivery, rather than gathering.  
 
 
8.3 Comparing the role of Information in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
Negotiations 
This section draws on results presented in the previous section, in order to 
examine the impact of contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, and how those changes might mediate the 
relevance of information as a bargaining resource in each case. The 
hypothesized impact of changes between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in 
mediating the importance of information, is addressed in H2A, which states 
that A high level of information is more important for negotiation success in 
the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, 
than in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in 
‘uploading’ .  This hypothesis leads to the following predictions regarding 
member state negotiation performance in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’: 
 
1.) The French and German delegations can utilize their  
information to achieve success in‘reuploading’ negotiations 
2.) Despite having a high level of information, the French  
and German delegations must rely on more useful resources to 
achieve success in ‘uploading’ negotiations 
 
With regard to the first prediction, the previous section presented evidence 
that the German delegation did rely on information to influence 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, though this led to only limited success. With this 
in mind, it is interesting to note that, while not entirely conclusive, the data 
indicates that information was not a particularly useful bargaining resource 
in these ‘reuploading’ negotiations, hence the failure to achieve much 
success by those delegations with a high level of information.  
Drawing on the literature regarding the role of information as a 
bargaining resource in international negotiations (for example Tallberg, 
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2006; 2008), I arrived at the posited process linking information with 
negotiation success, namely a delegation possessing superior knowledge 
about the positions of other delegations can use that knowledge to propose a 
compromise solution that will accommodate the positions of others, whilst 
more nearly reflecting their own position, thereby achieving negotiation 
success. However, as noted by Bailer (2006), and in line with the preceding 
argument, in order for information to be useful, there must be a discrepancy 
in knowledge between delegations, because absent this, there is no potential 
informational advantage at play, and any one delegation is as capable as any 
other of proposing compromise solutions that fit within the zone of 
agreement. There are four main reasons to believe that this latter situation 
characterized ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP.  
 First, at the time of these negotiations, there had already been a set of 
negotiations over the SGP, that is the ‘uploading’ negotiations, in which a 
great many of the same issues had been covered, with the result that 
delegations were already familiar with the positions of others, especially over 
politically sensitive issues that had been well-publicized in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. To be sure, positions change over time as a result of leadership 
changes or a host of other circumstances, but the vast majority of issues 
involved in both sets of SGP negotiations, were about where a delegation lay 
on the question of whether fiscal policy should be more politicized or rules-
based (for example interviews, Commission b and Council secretariat b; 
Howarth, 2007), and changes in orientation toward such a fundamental 
question are, generally speaking, rare and/or notable. One exception to this is 
Germany, widely touted as an example of a state that had experienced a 
complete change of position since the original SGP negotiations. However, 
as discussed in the previous section, the Germans had not in fact shifted from 
a position in favor of fiscal discipline, but had been rudely awakened to the 
difficulty of implementing rules-based fiscal policy without recourse to 
flexibility in the case of long-term, structural reforms (interviews, German 
finance ministry b and Council secretariat b). Thus, there was a role for 
information in clarifying the German position and the reasons behind it, 
though this was about the German delegation using information as a resource 
to clarify own positions, in order to make their demands more palatable to 
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some other delegations, which is a causal process that appears to have been 
uniquely suited to the Germans in this case.  
 A second, related reason why an informational advantage regarding 
other delegations’ positions may not have been useful in these negotiations, 
is the frequency with which the relevant parties met, independent of the SGP 
negotiations. Since the launch of the euro in 1998, all of the finance ministers 
and EFC representatives had met in full Ecofin and EFC meetings 
respectively, as well as in the respective fora of the Eurogroup and its 
equivalent at EFC level. This would have further enhanced the understanding 
of all delegations, about the positions of others regarding fiscal policy and 
related factors that contributed to their stance over the SGP negotiations.  
Thus, in addition to the view of positions from formal negotiation 
rounds over SGP reform, those members with any sort of tenure in their roles 
would have seen the evolution of national positions, rather than the snapshot 
that most intergovernmental negotiators gather in formal rounds. This 
frequency of contact, and increasingly frequent contact between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’, could arguably have a more general impact on the 
contextual differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, which is not 
something discussed in highlighting distinct contextual features between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in chapter 3, though it is certainly worth 
considering in future research. In the specific case of ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, this change between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ appears to have had the effect of minimizing the utility of 
information as a bargaining resource, in the latter. 
 The third piece of evidence to suggest that there was not much of a 
discrepancy in knowledge between delegations in this case, is that restricted 
informal sessions on the side of negotiation rounds were not a feature of 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, despite being an important feature of ‘uploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP (for example, interviews, French finance ministry 
and Commission a; Barber and Buckley, 1996). In fact, frequent restricted 
informal sessions were an integral part of ‘uploading’ negotiations, and were 
eventually essential to reaching agreement at Dublin over the original SGP, 
as illustrated by the following description of those events in Agence Europe: 
“in order to break the deadlock, Council President Ruari Quinn had 
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informally met a group of ministers or state secretaries” (Agence Europe, 
1996g). That such sessions do not appear to have played any great role in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, indicates that there may have been no perception 
of a barrier to full disclosure in the presence of all member states, in 
‘reuplaoding’.    
Related to this, a fourth and final distinction regarding knowledge 
differentials between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, is that during the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, there was no question of EMU membership 
surrounding the debate, which there was in ‘uploading’ negotiations. The 
impact of this would have been to ease the restrictions on what certain states 
could advocate in formal negotiating rounds. Specifically, member states that 
wanted to gain first round membership in EMU, but were considered 
potential risks to the stability of a future single currency, could not openly 
oppose certain German positions in favor of strict budgetary rules, during the 
original pact negotiations, for fear of giving the impression that they were 
not committed to fiscal discipline and so hurting their chances to gain 
membership. This is illustrated by the statement of a British treasury 
participant that “[T]hey just wanted to be round the table and be part of the 
end game. As a result, they could never say ‘we want a very lax system’, on 
the basis that the immediate reply from the Germans would be ‘well if that’s 
the case, you shouldn’t be here’” (interview, British treasury). Of course, this 
constraint was absent from ‘reuploading’ negotiations, at which point the 
membership decision was no longer looming.
28
  
 Taking into consideration these points regarding the role of 
information in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, it seems that the failure of H2A to 
predict the importance of information as a bargaining resource in that 
context, may relate to the specific case of the SGP negotiations, rather than 
the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations more generally. In this regard, it is 
necessary to question whether the features of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP, highlighted above, are unique to this case, or characteristic of 
‘reuploading’ negotiations in other policy areas and institutions. While it is 
                                       
28
 This is only so for negotiations amongst Eurozone states - new member states wishing to 
gain entry into the euro were wary of expressing a preference that might reveal budgetary 
weaknesses (interview, Council secretariat b). 
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not possible, with existing data, to confirm or disconfirm this, the evidence 
clearly indicates that information does not work as posited in the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. As there is reason to believe the 
characteristics that limit the utility of information as a bargaining resource in 
this case, would be present in other ‘reuploading’ negotiations, it may be that 
the usefulness of information as a bargaining resource is subject to further 
constraints than the contextual factors examined in this study. I return to this 
discussion in the concluding section of the thesis. 
 Turning to the second prediction advanced in line with H2A: Despite 
having a high level of information, the French and German delegations must 
rely on more important resources to achieve success in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, section 8.1 has already presented evidence to confirm this 
prediction. Despite the accuracy with which H2 predicted German 
negotiation success in ‘uploading’, section 8.1 presented evidence to confirm 
that the posited causal mechanisms linking information with negotiation 
performance were largely absent in this case. Rather, as predicted by H2A, 
the German delegation achieved success in ‘uploading’ as a result of a more 
relevant bargaining resource, namely preference intensity, and used 
information only to reenforce the strategy based around their low preference 
intensity for reaching agreement.  
Along the same lines, the French delegation relied on preference 
intensity to achieve some notable successes in ‘uploading’, though this was 
not equal to the success of the German delegation because, despite having an 
equally high level of information to the Germans, the French did not have as 
low a preference intensity as the Germans, in ‘uploading’. Thus, in the 
context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, it did not matter that the French and 
German delegations had comparable levels of information, because 
preference intensity is more relevant in determining member state 
negotiation performance in that context. Further to that, the fact that the 
Dutch delegation had a level of information in ‘uploading’ that was much 
nearer that of the French and German delegations, than it was to the low 
level of information held by the Belgian delegation, yet achieved similarly 
limited success as the Belgians, is additional evidence that information alone 
could not lead to negotiation success in the context of ‘uploading’.  
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In other words, having nearly as much information as the French and 
German delegations did not lead the Dutch to negotiate almost as 
successfully as France and Germany, because this resource was not 
accompanied by the potential threat of exit in the case of the Dutch, as it was 
for France and Germany. Thus, the discrepancy in information between the 
Dutch and Belgian delegations does not lead to the same discrepancy in 
negotiation performance, in the context of ‘uploading’, because the Dutch 
delegation could not rely on information alone, to achieve negotiation 
success.  
Taking all of these points into consideration, it is possible to accept 
the second prediction advanced in line with H2A. However, the data does not 
provide support for the first prediction, which states that the French and 
German delegations can utilize their information to achieve success in the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. While there is clear evidence of the role of 
contextual change in mediating the importance of information as a 
bargaining resource in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, it is not clear that these 
are in line with the predicted effects as stated in H2A, and thus H2A is 





The most important findings to take away from this chapter are that the 
German and French delegations had the joint highest levels of information in 
both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, while the Dutch delegation 
had a slightly lower value for information than the French and Germans in 
both cases. The Belgian delegation had the least information, by a 
considerable measure, in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. While H2, 
which states that The more information a member state has, the more 
successful that state will be in negotiations, was accurate in predicting that 
the German delegation, with the highest level of information, would be most 
successful in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, section 8.1 also discussed the 
extent to which the causal mechanisms through which the German delegation 
achieved success in ‘uploading’, demonstrated that the hypothesized role of 
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information, and the mechanisms linking information with negotiation 
performance, were largely absent in this case.  
Nor were these mechanisms confirmed in the case of French 
negotiation success, with the data revealing instead that the French and 
German delegations achieved their respective negotiation success mainly 
with recourse to low preference intensities for reaching agreement. Thus, 
another important finding from this chapter is that H2A, which states that 
Information is more important for negotiation success in the presence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the 
absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, is 
accurate with regard to ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Specifically, 
while the French and German delegations utilized information to reenforce 
their bargaining strategies in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the low preference 
intensity was, for both states, the focal point.  
 The predictions regarding Dutch and Belgian performance in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations were largely disconfirmed by the data, in that the 
Dutch only achieved greater success than the Belgians as a result of the 
former’s proximity to the German position over a number of issues. Neither 
the Dutch nor Belgians enjoyed significant deliberate success in these 
negotiations, though the data indicates that this was due to a comparatively 
high preference intensity for reaching agreement, rather than the information, 
or lack thereof, held by the delegations. Taken in conjunction with findings 
regarding the limited use of information by the French and German 
delegations in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the data demonstrates that there 
was little direct role for information in achieving success in ‘uploading’. 
 Turning to the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, key findings were that, 
again, contrary to predictions advanced in line with H2, which stated that the 
German and French delegations would be equally successful and more so 
than the Dutch and Belgian delegations, the Dutch delegation was in fact 
most successful. A host of explanations, related to measurement error and the 
specific conditions of the SGP reform negotiations, were considered in 
explaining the failure of H2 to predict the performance of member states in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Careful analysis of the data served 
to confirm that measurement error was not the likely cause, and in fact it was 
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revealed that the German delegation did achieve some success in these 
negotiations as a result of a high level of information, accurately reflected in 
the state’s value for that variable. However, the posited causal mechanisms 
linking information with negotiation performance were not at work in the 
German case. Specifically, the utility of information observed in the German 
case, lay in delivering additional knowledge about own positions, rather than 
gathering knowledge on the positions of others, the latter being the causal 
role for information that negotiation literature tends to highlight (for example 
Tallberg, 2006; 2008).  
 Related to this, and concerning findings in regard to H2A, which 
states that Information is more important for negotiation success in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than 
in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, 
certain features of the SGP reform negotiations appeared to limit the 
importance of information as a bargaining resource in ‘reuploading’. These 
were not features relating specifically to the hypothesized impact of 
changing context between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, but 
appear to be separate from those contextual factors, and may be unique to the 
case of the SGP reform negotiations, rather than ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
more generally. While this is an interesting question to pursue, existing data 
cannot confirm or disconfirm this, and so it is a subject for future research. 
Nonetheless, the concluding section of the thesis revisits these questions, and 
the possibility to explore them further.  
Given existing data, I was forced to reject H2 as applied to both 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, as well as H2A as applied to 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. The data does, however, confirm the prediction 
of H2A that, despite having a high level of information, the French and 
German delegations must rely on more important resources to achieve 
negotiation success in ‘uploading’.  
 These findings have very interesting implications for theorizing the 
role of information as a bargaining resource more generally. To begin with 
some more tentative findings, it appears that there is a need to consider 
whether the role of information in explaining influence in international 
negotiations, is more about delivering, than gathering, the latter being the 
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focus of present theory (see for example Mastenbroek, 1989; Bailer, 2006; 
Tallberg, 2006; 2008; Naurin, 2009). Beyond this, findings for the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations have the further implication of calling into 
question how useful information is, conceived as heightened knowledge of 
others’ positions, in the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Specifically, 
discrepancies in knowledge about others’ positions, among negotiating 
parties, does not appear to have been particularly pronounced in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. This explains the limited success of 
H2 and H2A, at predicting states’ performance in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
While any findings in this regard cannot be generalized beyond the case of 
the SGP, absent further research, there is reason to suspect that the 
contextual features of the SGP reform negotiations, which rendered 
information less relevant as a bargaining resource there, might be common to 
other instances of ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
 Further research is certainly warranted, in order to uncover such 
effects and address debate in the literature regarding whether information is 
of use in international negotiations, absent contingencies (for example 
Mastenbroek, 1989; Bailer, 2006; Tallberg, 2008; Naurin, 2009). This is 
particularly so in light of the fact that findings regarding the role of 
information in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, reveal the effects of 
context in diminishing the utility of information as a bargaining resource in 
‘uploading’. That the two delegations with most information and lowest 
preference intensities for reaching agreement in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
privileged the latter resource to wield influence in that context, supports the 
argument that information is differentially useful under distinct contexts, and 
is also supportive of a rational choice institutionalist reading of the 
relationship between negotiation context and bargaining resources, in 
explaining states’ negotiation performance (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). 
Given that the presence of distinct default conditions, and hence 
differentially attractive alternatives to agreement, is a feature of ‘uploading’ 
negotiations generally, there is reason to believe that the effects of context in 
limiting the utility of information in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
would be observed in other cases of intergovernmental negotiations, though, 
again, further research would be essential to confirm this.  
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Content expertise is an important determinant of member state performance 
in intergovernmental negotiations. Such negotiations often involve complex 
technical issues, a thorough understanding of which is difficult to accomplish 
across all levels of a state’s delegation. Those states with superior technical 
knowledge of the issues under negotiation are better positioned to identify 
potential agreements, which provides for greater opportunity to shape the 
compromise agreement in their own favor (for example Beach, 2005; 
Tallberg, 2008).  
 However, because the utility of content expertise as a bargaining 
resource is in working through the complexity of issues to identify potential 
agreements, when the range of agreements is fixed by a state that will exit 
negotiations rather than shift position, no amount of technical knowledge is 
likely to change that. Thus, the relevance of content expertise as a bargaining 
resource is mediated by negotiation context, specifically the distinct context 
in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. In the former, where 
preference intensity is a crucial bargaining resource that can provide a state 
with the credible threat to exit negotiations, content expertise is not nearly as 
useful as in the latter negotiations, where it would be very difficult for any 
state to credibly threaten exit. With this in mind, I set out the following 
hypotheses regarding content expertise: 
 
 H3: The more content expertise a member state has, the  
more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
 H3A: Content expertise is more important for negotiation  
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is  
the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established  
EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
Based on these hypotheses, I would expect to find that the delegation with 
the highest level of content expertise will be the most successful state in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, while the delegation with the 
highest level of content expertise in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, will not 
necessarily be successful.  
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9.1 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
Drawing on the above hypotheses, it is possible to predict the negotiation 
performance of each member state under analysis, based on the following 
values for content expertise: 
 
 Belgium - 6 
 Germany - 6 
 Netherlands - 6 
 France - 4 
 
Before advancing predictions regarding each delegation’s negotiation 
performance, in line with these scores, it is worth commenting on the 
similarity of scores, as well as the explanation for treating these scores 
differently, in terms of expected performance for each state. First, it is not 
surprising that these states receive similar scores for content expertise, given 
that all are wealthy countries with long-term membership in the EU, and 
whose representatives in these negotiations would have represented their 
states in other international economic organizations, which implies a certain 
baseline quality of content expertise. For this reason, it is necessary to 
capture subtle differences in content expertise across delegations in the SGP 
negotiations, which is why I consider multiple indicators in measuring this 
variable, and why I analyze the results qualitatively, in order to observe 
variation that is not apparent from quantitative scores alone.  
 Chapter 5, on research design, provides justification for the indicators 
considered in capturing delegations’ content expertise, so I will not restate 
those points here. However, it is important to note here that, considering the 
numerical scores for the Belgian, German and Dutch delegations, H3 would 
predict that these states enjoy equal success in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
yet on qualitative consideration of the content expertise of each delegation, it 
is possible to predict that the Belgian and German delegations will perform 
more successfully than the Dutch in this case. This is because, as stated in 
the research design chapter, one of the indicators of content expertise - 
whether the Head of State or Government had served as finance minister or 
in the finance ministry - would only have been relevant in determining the 
outcome agreement for those issues that were sent up to the European 
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Council for decision. Given that the Dutch delegation would receive a lower 
score for content expertise than the Belgian and German delegations, absent 
consideration of this indicator, it is possible to conclude that over the issues 
not decided at the level of HoS/G, but rather in Ecofin or the MC, which 
includes the vast majority of all issues analyzed, the Dutch delegation would 
have had slightly less content expertise than the Belgian and German 
delegations, and the French delegation’s score would be similarly decreased. 
With these points in mind, and drawing on H3, which states that The more 
content expertise a member state has, the more successful that state will be 
in negotiations, it is possible to make the following predictions: 
 
1.) Belgium will be more successful than France and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as Germany in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
2.) Germany will be more successful than France and the 
Netherlands, and as successful as Belgium in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Belgium and 
Germany, though more successful than France in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
4.) France will be the least successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 
With regard to the first prediction, the data thoroughly disconfirms this, in 
that Belgium was in fact the least successful of all four delegations in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations. Specifically, Belgium did not achieve deliberate 
success over any of the issues analyzed, and neither was the delegation was 
widely influential. This is distinct from the experience of the French 
delegation, for example, which, while failing to achieve an outcome closest 
to their position over many issues in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, exercised 
considerable influence nonetheless. Taking into consideration H3A, which 
states that Content expertise is more important for negotiation success in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than 
in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, it 
is not surprising that Belgium, having the highest preference intensity for 
reaching agreement in these negotiations, did not negotiate successfully, 
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on this point, in providing a comparative look at the role of content expertise 
in ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
  In addition to the inaccuracy of the first prediction advanced in line 
with H3, it is also necessary to reject the second prediction, in part, which 
states that Germany will be as successful as Belgium in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. In fact, Germany achieved far more success than did the 
Belgian delegation, and was the most successful state in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, which confirms only the second part of the prediction, that 
Germany would be more successful than France or the Netherlands. 
However, the posited mechanisms linking content expertise with negotiation 
performance are not confirmed in the case of German success in ‘uploading’. 
Section 9.3, which compares the context in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
with regard to the utility of content expertise as a bargaining resource, 
expands on this point as well.  
 The third prediction, that the Netherlands would be less successful 
than Belgium and Germany, though more successful than France, is also 
disconfirmed by the data, in that the Dutch delegation was in fact less 
successful than France and Germany, though more so than the Belgians, 
albeit largely accidentally, as explained in previous chapters. The prediction 
is correct insofar as the Dutch are the third most successful state in these 
negotiations, but in terms of the mechanisms through which they achieved 
the limited success they did, I have already demonstrated in the previous 
chapter that Dutch success resulted more from proximity to the Germans 
over a number of issues, rather than deliberate influence on the part of the 
Dutch delegation.  
Turning to the fourth prediction, that France would be least 
successful in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the data, which demonstrates that 
the French performed less successfully than the Germans, but more 
successfully than the Dutch and Belgian delegations, disconfirms this 
prediction as well. Thus, it is clear that content expertise is not a good 
indicator of member state negotiation performance in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, and in this case, I must reject H3, which states that The more 
content expertise a member state has, the more successful that state will be 
in negotiations. However, as touched on previously in this section, the failure 
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of H3 to predict member state negotiation performance in ‘uploading’, is 
unsurprising in light of H3A, which states that Content expertise is more 
important for negotiation success in the presence of established EU-level 
policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. Section 9.3 presents data in 
support of this hypothesis. 
 In terms of the theoretical argument regarding content expertise as a 
relevant resource for influence in international negotiations (see for example 
Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008), findings presented in this section clearly point 
to the contingent utility of content expertise. It is not possible to discuss 
whether the theoretical arguments and more specific posited causal process, 
accurately predict how content expertise can be used to wield influence in 
international negotiations, given that this was not a resource states relied on 
in the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. This does, of course, point to 
the accuracy of theoretical arguments regarding the role of context in 
mediating the utility of specific bargaining resources, a point which receives 
further attention in section 9.3. The following section, which presents 
findings for the role of content expertise in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
provides for more in-depth assessment of the literature regarding this 
bargaining resource, as it is central to the analysis of negotiation process and 





9.2 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
Drawing on the hypotheses regarding content expertise, it is possible to 
predict the negotiation performance of each member state in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, based on the following values for content expertise: 
 
 Belgium - 7 
 Netherlands - 6 
 France - 5 
 Germany - 4 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is not surprising that these states 
receive similar scores for content expertise, and the qualitative approach I 
take to analyzing these negotiations, serves to capture the subtle differences 
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in content expertise between delegations. Drawing on H3, which states that 
The more content expertise a member state has, the more successful that 
state will be in negotiations, it is possible to make the following predictions: 
 
 1.) Belgium will be the most successful state in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
2.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Belgium,  
though more successful than France and Germany in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
3.) France will be less successful than Belgium and the  
Netherlands, though more successful than Germany in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
4.) Germany will be the least successful state in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations 
 
Although the first prediction, that Belgium will be the most successful state 
in these negotiations, is not confirmed by the data, the Belgian delegation 
does enjoy some notable success in these negotiations, achieving their central 
goal of preventing the inclusion of a quantitative benchmark to assess the 
satisfactory pace of debt reduction in the reformed SGP. Other successes for 
the Belgian delegation include the outcome agreement over the question of 
how to prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy and ensure budgetary discipline in 
good times, and preventing certain spending categories being removed from 
calculation of the deficit. Despite these successes, when considering the 
superior performance of the Dutch delegation, as well as the specific 
mechanisms utilized to wield influence in these negotiations, it is not 
possible to accept the first prediction, that Belgium would be most successful 
in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
Regarding the superior performance of the Netherlands, in 
comparison with Belgium, I demonstrate this in the presentation of data 
regarding performance of the Dutch delegation, so I will not elaborate on that 
here. Regarding the specifice mechanisms utilized by the Belgians, while it is 
the case that the delegation brought significant content expertise to these 
negotiations, and enjoyed considerable success, the posited mechanisms 
linking content expertise with negotiation success were not present in the 
process through which the Belgian delegation influenced the outcomes they 
did. What influence the Belgian delegation brought to bear on the SGP 
negotiations, in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, was largely the result of 
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process expertise, rather than content expertise, and the following chapter 
presents data to this end. 
 It is, however, useful to comment here on the failure of H3 to predict 
the negotiation performance of Belgium, insofar as this relates to the way in 
which content expertise is measured. Specifically, as discussed in the 
research design chapter, one indicator used to capture the content expertise 
of a delegation in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, is whether any of their 
members had been present at the Maastricht negotiations over EMU and/or 
‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Without restating points that are 
rightly covered in the research design chapter, it is worth noting briefly that 
the justification for this indicator lies in the enhanced knowledge a 
delegation would have of the agreements resulting from these two 
negotiations, namely the Maastricht Treaty and original SGP, as a result of 
first-hand experience there. That Belgium is the only member state with a 
representative who was also member of the delegation in Maastricht and in 
the ‘uploading’ negotiations, is a significant part of the high value received 
by the Belgian delegation for content expertise.  
This is as it should be, not least because nearly all participants 
interviewed, confirmed that having delegation members with first-hand 
experience of prior agreements was potentially a useful means of influence in 
both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’. Further to that, as will be demonstrated 
in reviewing the performance of the Dutch delegation in ‘reuploading’, the 
data not only reveals that this is a potential source of influence, but one the 
Dutch delegation relied on to achieve success over multiple issues in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. However, in the case of the Belgians, this was 
not a strategy the delegation utilized, and the fact that their EFC 
representative, Gregoire Brouhns, had been in the same role since before the 
Maastricht negotiations, afforded an advantage in both content expertise and 
process expertise, which is reflected in the high scores of the delegation for 
both variables. Thus, in capturing something that would accurately indicate a 
high level of both content expertise and process expertise, namely the tenure 
of a key member in the delegation, I rely on the process-tracing analysis to 
disentangle the effects of each independent variable, and to observe which 
type of expertise the Belgians actually deployed, to influence negotiations.  
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 Turning to the remaining predictions advanced in line with H3, 
prediction two states that the Netherlands will be more successful than 
France and Germany, though less successful than Belgium. This prediction is 
accurate in that the Dutch delegation performed more successfully than the 
French and Germans in ‘reuploading’, though it is inaccurate in predicting 
that the Netherlands would be less successful than Belgium. In fact, the 
Dutch delegation was the most successful in these negotiations, securing 
their favored outcome over such important questions as whether to remove 
certain categories of spending from calculation of the deficit and how to 
differentiate MTOs to reflect the unique budgetary position of each member 
state, as well as exercising considerable influence over additional outcomes, 
including how to prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Having offered a 
preliminary explanation for the failure of H3 to predict the performance of 
the Belgian delegation in these negotiations, one which I expand on in the 
next chapter, I consider the data to be fairly supportive, on balance, of the 
second prediction advanced in line with H3, namely that the Netherlands will 
be more successful than France and Germany, though less successful than 
Belgium. 
 Further to that, the mechanisms linking content expertise with 
negotiation performance are apparent, though not entirely in line with the 
process posited a priori, in the case of Dutch success in ‘reuploading’. 
Specifically, Dutch success was due in large part to the delegation’s content 
expertise, and in particular the fact that the Dutch Finance Minister during 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, Gerrit Zalm, had represented the Netherlands 
also during ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. The first-hand knowledge 
that Zalm had of the original SGP agreement was crucial to Dutch success in 
‘reuploading’, not only in having their positions incorporated into the 
outcome agreement, but in preventing measures they opposed.  
To begin with an example of the latter point, those states seeking a 
reformed pact that would loosen restrictions on fiscal policy by, for example, 
having infrastructure spending removed from calculation of the deficit, 
referred to the inclusion of the word ‘growth’ in the SGP, and argued that 
this clearly provided for reforms to the pact that would encourage growth-
enhancing measures, such as spending on infrastructure. As described by a 
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Council secretariat official who participated in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations,  
 the French did argue that it was absolutely clear that the  
original intention was to have a pact that wasn’t just about  
stability, but was all about growth. Not many people had been  
around to see the discussion where growth was put in the title  
and nothing was put in the articles of the original pact...So that  
side of the debate was leveraged on a minimal understanding  
[of the original pact]      (interview, Council secretariat b) 
 
In other words, the original intention was to change the title from Stability 
Pact to Stability and Growth Pact, as a cosmetic concession to facilitate 
compromise (for example Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), though this was by 
no means explicit in the content of the agreement. Thus, as described by the 
same Council secretariat participant, “I think it did help to have been around 
and to know the meaning behind the original pact” (interview, Council 
secretariat b), which knowledge enabled the Dutch Finance Minister to 
explain, with authority, that what was being proposed by the French was a 
misreading of the original agreement, and there was no space for the pact, as 
intended, to accommodate such demands as removing infrastructure and 
other categories of spending from calculation of the deficit. Along those 
lines, a fellow member of the Dutch delegation described as particularly 
helpful the fact that, “when Zalm spoke, everybody realized he had 
experience with the subject” (interview, Dutch finance ministry d). While 
this does not reflect the posited causal process associated with content 
expertise, it is a clear example of how content expertise can impact on a 
state’s negotiation performance, and more specifically how the Dutch 
exercised preventive influence over the content of the SGP reform 
agreement, with the outcome that all categories of spending were to be 
considered in calculating states’ deficits.  
 In addition to this preventive influence, the content expertise of the 
Dutch delegation also afforded a more proactive advantage in influencing the 
outcome agreement in ‘reuploading’. An important reason why the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP were so complex was the political 
difficulty surrounding compromise in the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP. In order for agreement to be reached, it was necessary to leave some 
questions open, such as the aforementioned example of what it meant to add 
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the word ‘growth’ to the title of the agreement, or the frequent inclusion of 
the term ‘as a rule’ in multiple sections of the SGP, which was intended to 
signify that some procedures would generally be followed, but there would 
be room for maneuver at the same time (interviews, British treasury, Dutch 
finance ministry a, Dutch finance ministry b and German finance ministry a).  
One result of this was arguably that the pact did not work as intended, 
as witnessed in the SGP crisis of 2003. Another result was that the main aim 
of the pact, essentially to guarantee the stability of the single currency 
regardless the economic climate, was not as apparent in the language of the 
SGP agreement alone, as it was when combined with knowledge of the 
context surrounding the original agreement, a point illustrated by the 
statement of a Council secretariat official, quoted above (interviews, Council 
secretariat b; Commission d). To the extent that a majority of states in the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations no longer sought to safeguard the stability of the 
single currency, this latter point would be irrelevant. However, if the goal 
remained to safeguard the stability of the single currency, then having first-
hand knowledge of the context surrounding the original SGP, and where 
compromises had been made that rendered the agreement less operational, 
should afford a negotiator some advantage in proposing outcomes that reflect 
the same goal, yet enhance the workability of the agreement as well.  
 As evidenced by interviews and documentary evidence, the majority 
of states did see an agreement that would provide for a stable currency as in 
their interest, both at the time of ‘uploading’ negotiations, and at the time of 
‘reuploading’ negotiations as well (for example interviews, Council 
secretariat b, German finance ministry b, Dutch finance ministry c, Dutch 
finance ministry d and Luxembourgish finance ministry; Stark, 2001; Chang, 
2006). Thus, first-hand knowledge of the flawed way the original pact’s 
creators had tried to achieve that, afforded an advantage to the Dutch in 
proposing reforms that addressed the flaws without losing sight of the goals, 
yet also reflected an experience with and preference for stability-oriented 
policy that was not shared as enthusiastically by all states. In other words, the 
Dutch delegation’s superior knowledge of the technical issues involved, led 
to a position that ostensibly incorporated the positions of others, whilst 
reflecting their goals more nearly. Thus, it was not in formulating 
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compromise proposals more quickly than others, that the Dutch were aided 
by content expertise, but in bringing a nuanced, workable, and defensible 
proposal to the negotiating table, which is distinct from the process posited a 
priori.  
 An illustrative example of this is seen in the question of how to 
define MTOs to better reflect the individual budgetary position of each 
member state, so as to reform the status quo of a common MTO for all 
member states. While it was the goal of the French, for instance, to loosen 
their MTO (Howarth, 2007), the Dutch saw differentiated MTOs as a way to 
force greater efforts at budgetary consolidation from those states that had 
more to do toward ensuring sustainability (interview, Council secretariat b). 
Thus, the position of the Dutch delegation could be framed as an acceptable 
compromise in that it loosened the requirement for all states to strive toward 
a particular MTO, yet had the effect of tightening this aspect of the reformed 
pact as compared to the original, in that the outcome agreement in the 
reformed SGP sets very specific parameters to be taken into consideration 
when setting each state’s MTO, and there is enhanced focus on states’ 
progress toward the MTO in good times, both of which were key Dutch 
goals in these negotiations (see chapter 6).  
 Further to that, this example of the MTO is part of a wider Dutch 
initiative to see the pact made more symmetrical, which a leading member of 
the Dutch delegation identifies as the main issue he wanted to see changed 
(interview, Dutch finance ministry c). Aware that there was no majority in 
the Council in favor of the strict Dutch opinion, yet determined to ensure that 
the pact would not be made toothless in the face of the challenge to ensure 
stability of the single currency (NRC Handelsblad, 2004), the Dutch finance 
minister identified an important trade-off in the original pact, whereby it was 
very strict on the 3% limit, yet asked no additional consolidation effort of 
states experiencing a positive economic cycle (interview, Dutch finance 
ministry c). This, coupled with the absence of any strict target associated 
with the MTO in the original pact (see chapter 6), rendered highly ineffective 
the proactive elements of the SGP. In response to this, the Dutch sought to 
shape the debate surrounding pro-cyclical fiscal policy, in terms of how to 
ensure budgetary consolidation in good times, and, related, newly defined 
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MTOs, along the lines of a concession for enhanced flexibility regarding the 
3% deficit target (interview, Dutch finance ministry c). The delegation met 
with some notable success in this regard, particularly in terms of the MTO, 
though also in securing greater emphasis on consolidating budgets in good 
times, as well as the possibility for the Commission to issue policy 
recommendations to states, for failure to undertake satisfactory progress to 
the MTO (see chapter 6).  
 It would be possible to classify this purely along the lines of clever 
bargaining tactics on the part of the Dutch, which is surely accurate, though 
the more specific role of content expertise lies in identifying an appropriate 
link in the original pact between an apparently strict, yet politically 
complicated deficit target, and an apparently strict, yet non-operational 
medium-term target, and proposing a compromise that operationalizes the 
medium-term target and emphasizes consolidation in good times, whilst 
leaving the 3% target largely as is, in terms of the political difficulty 
surrounding application of both the original and reformed EDP. It is worth 
recalling, here, the fact that the outcome of the MTO in the original pact was, 
against the positions of the Dutch and Germans, a decision to commit states 
to strive toward an MTO of close-to-balance-or-surplus, rather than fixing a 
target of 1% (see chapter 6). However, only awareness of the political 
motivation to ask for ‘striving’ rather than setting a target, would call 
attention to the weakness of this outcome regarding the actual implications 
for policy, and this is an important point when it comes to grasping the 
distinct motivations of the Dutch and French, in pushing for differentiated 
MTOs in ‘reuploading’, as well as the impact of the actual outcome, in terms 
of potentially increasing practical limits on policy (see chapter 6; Howarth, 
2006; 2007).  
 Whilst indicating how the Dutch relied on content expertise to 
influence the outcome of ‘reuploading’ negotiations, these examples do not 
reflect the posited causal mechanisms linking content expertise with 
negotiation performance, because it was not an ability to propose 
compromises more quickly that aided the Dutch delegation, as expected. 
Rather, the content expertise of the delegation led to negotiation success in 
allowing them to effectively oppose the positions of others, and in shaping 
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and promoting a nuanced compromise that was apparently compatible with 
those of other delegations, yet uniquely capable of safeguarding the stability 
of the single currency as envisaged in the original pact. Taking into 
consideration this evidence regarding the mechanisms through with the 
Dutch delegation influenced the outcome of ‘reuploading’ negotiations to 
reflect their positions, it is possible to accept H3, whilst rejecting the posited 
causal process linking content expertise with negotiation success. 
 Turning to the remaining predictions advanced in line with H3, that 
France would be less successful than Belgium and the Netherlands, though 
more so than Germany in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the data does 
confirm the first part of this prediction, but disconfirms the second part. 
Specifically, the Germans were slightly more successful than the French, as 
seen in their securing a list of factors to be considered in evaluating an 
excessive deficit, which reflects the German position more so than the 
French, and in the case of reviewing the pact’s interpretation of Treaty 
Article 114.2, regarding ‘exceptional and temporary circumstances’, the 
outcome of which matches the German position almost entirely, and more so 
than that of the French position.  
Thus, the data also disconfirms the final prediction advanced in line 
with H3, that Germany would be the least successful state in these 
negotiations. Having already presented evidence, in the previous chapter, to 
explain the success of the German delegation in this case, I conclude that, 
while content expertise is not a good indicator of German negotiation 
performance in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, this is due to the fact that the 
German delegation was able to rely on information to achieve what success 
they did, rather than any failing on the part of H3.  
 In terms of the implications of these findings for the literature on 
content expertise as a bargaining resource, while the posited mechanisms 
linking content expertise with negotiation performance are not confirmed in 
the case of Dutch success in ‘reuploading’, this does not particularly 
contradict arguments advanced in the literature. Specifically, while the 
negotiation literature is clear in advancing the theoretical argument that 
content expertise should facilitate influence in intergovernmental 
negotiations, roughly because a better and deeper grasp of the material under 
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consideration, and the potential effects of various proposals, provides for 
greater flexibility and command in negotiations (for example Tallberg, 
2008), this literature does not represent a particularly well-specified causal 
argument. Thus, for the purposes of analysis undertaken here, the literature 
was drawn on in order to posit a causal process that explicitly linked these 
arguments with an outcome of negotiation success, via the potential to 
construct complex proposals comparatively quickly (see chapter 4). While 
this might be a feasible explanation of the causal process linking content 
expertise with negotiation success in some circumstances, it was not the 
process observed in negotiations over the SGP.  
Rather, the causal role of content expertise in explaining Dutch 
negotiation performance lies more in facilitating the reconciliation of 
concrete proposals with a generally accepted narrative of what reforms 
should aim at, namely combining enhanced flexibility with increased 
discipline, particularly in a way that exploits first-hand knowledge of the 
original agreement on the part of the Dutch Finance Minister. Of course, this 
unique instance does not allow for much of a contribution to the wider 
literature on content expertise, except insofar as it points to the likelihood 
that negotiators’ reliance on content expertise may depend very much on the 
circumstances surrounding a particular negotiation, which in turn could 
explain why contributions to date have not specified particularly clearly the 
causal role of content expertise, for explaining influence in international 




9.3 Comparing the role of Content Expertise in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
This section expands on the previous sections’ discussion of member state 
negotiation performance in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negations, in order 
to discuss the impact of contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, on the role of content expertise as a bargaining resource. The 
hypothesized impact of these contextual changes is addressed in H3A, which 
states that Content expertise is more important for negotiation success in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than 
in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
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This hypothesis leads to the following predictions regarding member state 
performance in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP: 
 
1.) The Belgian delegation can utilize their content  
expertise to achieve success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
2.) Despite having a high level of content expertise, the Belgian  
and German delegations must rely on more useful resources  
to achieve success in ‘uploading’ negotiations 
 
With regard to the first prediction, the data is somewhat supportive, though 
not entirely so. Specifically, while the data demonstrates that the Belgian 
delegation did not in fact rely on content expertise to wield influence in the 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, there is nothing to indicate that this was due to 
the irrelevance of the resource, but rather that the Belgians opted for a 
bargaining strategy that relied on process expertise, in aiming to influence 
the ‘reuploading’ negotiations. The following chapter, on the independent 
variable process expertise, presents evidence of this.  
In terms of the more general question of context, and how that 
mediates the relevance of bargaining resources, it is useful to point out that 
the Dutch delegation, the most successful in these negotiations, did rely on 
content expertise in order to achieve that success, as discussed in the 
previous section of the chapter. The Dutch example is illustrative of the fact 
that content expertise was a viable resource for success in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, despite the fact that the Belgian delegation did not choose to 
utilize this particular bargaining resource. Thus, despite the inaccuracy of the 
first prediction advanced in line with H3A, the data is generally supportive of 
H3A as applied to ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP.  
 With regard to the second prediction, that the Belgian and German 
delegations cannot utilize content expertise to achieve success in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, the performance of both member states in 
‘uploading’ can be seen to support this prediction. Beginning with the 
Belgian case, according to the hypothesized mechanisms linking content 
expertise with negotiation performance in the context of ‘uploading’, a 
delegation with a high level of content expertise would not be expected to 
advance proposals in support of their position, or to have those proposals 
accepted if they did advance them, unless that state also has a low preference 
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intensity for reaching agreement and/or the proposals they advance reflect 
the position(s) of the state or states with the lowest preference intensity for 
reaching agreement. As is shown in the following chapter on process 
expertise, the Belgian delegation did put forward one of the most important 
compromise proposals, which provided for agreement over the question of a 
quantitative definition of a ‘serious recession’ under which a state would 
qualify for exemption from the EDP, and this proposal was accepted with 
little change at the Dublin European Council. However, this proposal did not 
reflect the Belgian position independent of the positions of other delegations, 
but, crucially, represented a compromise between the French and German 
positions (European Report, 1996c). This is supportive of the hypothesized 
mechanisms linking content expertise with negotiation performance as 
mediated by context, although a careful analysis of the process reveals that it 
was not content expertise, but rather process expertise at work in this case. 
Chapter 9 returns to, and expands on this point  
 The following discussion of the German delegation’s performance in 
‘uploading’ negotiations provides further support for the second prediction, 
that the Belgian and German delegations must rely on a resource other than 
content expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’. Two examples are 
illustrative of this point. First, regarding the indicator of content expertise 
that considers whether member(s) of the delegation had been present in the 
Maastricht negotiations over EMU, Germany receives a higher score than 
France and the Netherlands, because the German Finance Minister during 
‘uploading’ negotiations, Theo Waigel, had also been Finance Minister 
during the Maastricht negotiations. Thus, the first-hand knowledge afforded 
to the German delegation, from having a representative who was present at 
the Maastricht negotiations and thus aware of the intended meaning behind 
the vague language of which Maastricht, like other EU treaties, is composed, 
could be expected to enhance their ability to judge whether and how certain 
positions could be accommodated within the confines of the Treaty, and to 
shape compromise proposals accordingly (Beach, 2005).  
However, one of the most notable failures of the German delegation 
in ‘uploading’ negotiations, to secure full automaticity of fines under the 
EDP, was due largely to the legal constraint of Maastricht that precluded 
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automatic fines, which had been the most important goal of the German 
delegation for the SGP agreement (Stark, 2001). Very much to the contrary 
of what would be predicted for the process linking content expertise with 
negotiation performance, then, the German delegation set out to achieve an 
outcome that could not be accommodated with Maastricht in place. It is 
worth noting that, when the Germans originally proposed the stability pact, 
they intended for this to be a separate agreement, outside the Maastricht 
Treaty, which is why they thought it would be possible to achieve full 
automaticity (interview, German finance ministry a). Nonetheless, if the 
hypothesized role of content expertise were at work, the finding should be 
that the German delegation utilized the advantage afforded by Waigel’s first-
hand knowledge of Maastricht, to seek a way to maneuver automaticity in, 
by arguing that the meaning of some piece of language was intended to 
provide for this, for instance.  
One could make the argument that achieving automatic fines simply 
wasn’t feasible in this particular case and so there was no point in pursuing 
such a strategy. However, the data confirms that the German delegation’s 
attempts to secure automatic fines were indeed a central feature of these 
negotiations, as illustrated by an Agence Europe (1996a) statement that “the 
problem of sanctions represented the most controversial aspect of the 
stability pact and over which the MC spent a great deal of time...essentially 
due to the difference between Germany (recommending automatic sanctions) 
and other states.” This indicates the absence of content expertise in the 
German approach to influencing the outcome of automatic fines in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, rather than the absence of that goal from the 
German approach to these negotiations.  
 The second example to demonstrate the limited utility of content 
expertise in the context of ‘uploading’, relates to the quantitative definition 
of a ‘serious recession’ under which a state would qualify for exemption 
from the EDP. Throughout most of the negotiations over the SGP, the 
German delegation maintained that the quantitative definition of a ‘serious 
recession’ should be a 2% drop in GDP annually, with anything less than that 
triggering the EDP in the event of a deficit in excess of 3% of GDP (for 
example Brunila et al., 2001; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). The source of this 
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position on the question of defining a ‘serious recession’, was extensive 
analysis conducted by the German finance ministry, in advance of their 
original proposal for a stability pact in November 1995, to determine an 
appropriate quantitative definition to trigger the so-called escape clause 
(interview, German finance ministry a). As described by a German finance 
ministry official, “[W]e spent months and months trying to define 
quantitatively a serious recession; this is where -2% came in.” Taking into 
consideration the effects of such incidents as natural disasters or other 
unforeseen shocks to the economy, the German delegation determined that 
automatic stabilizers could work within the 3% limit, up to the point of a 2% 
annual drop caused by unknown exceptional circumstances (interview, 
German finance ministry a).  
 Thus, the German position was based on careful analysis from a 
finance ministry with considerable experience under a regime of stability-
oriented policy similar to the conditions for the future single currency. 
However, the process of negotiations, and eventual agreement over a 
quantitative definition for a ‘serious recession’, give the impression that 2% 
was simply a number the Germans arrived at randomly, and one which they 
were eventually forced to compromise on for the political goal of securing 
agreement with the French (for example European Report, 1996b; Karacs 
Bonn, 1996). That the outcome agreement was still close to the German 
position, was a result of the fact that all delegations knew the Germans 
would only compromise up to a certain point, or else the entire single 
currency project was in jeopardy, rather than that the German delegation had 
drawn up a technically workable proposal with recourse to content expertise 
(for example interview, Commission a; Staunton, 1996; Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2010).   
 Taking into consideration the above points, the data serves to confirm 
the second prediction advanced in line with H3A. Specifically, the German 
and Belgian delegations could not utilize content expertise to negotiate 
successfully in ‘uploading’ and, in the case of the German delegation, relied 
on the more relevant bargaining resource of a low preference intensity, while 
in the Belgian case, lacking a low preference intensity, failed to negotiate 
successfully. Having presented evidence in support of the first prediction as 
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well, insofar as content expertise was a viable bargaining resource for the 
Dutch to achieve success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, albeit via a different 
causal process than that originally posited, I am confident in accepting H3A, 
which states that A high level of content expertise is more important for 
negotiation success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the 
case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-level policy, as 




This chapter presented several important findings on the role of content 
expertise in explaining negotiation performance, as well as the impact of 
context in mediating the utility of content expertise, in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. To begin with findings regarding 
content expertise in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the data revealed that, 
while there was a great deal of similarity in the content expertise of the 
Belgian, German and Dutch delegations, the Belgian and German 
delegations had a slight advantage over the Dutch in content expertise, and 
the French delegation had the lowest level of content expertise. Thus, the 
predictions advanced in line with H3 were that the Belgian and German 
delegations would perform most successfully in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
followed by the Dutch and finally the French, as the least successful 
delegation.  
In fact, the evidence revealed that the Belgian delegation was the 
least successful and the French delegation was less successful only than the 
Germans in these negotiations. However, taking into consideration H3A, 
which states that A high level of content expertise is more important for 
negotiation success in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the 
case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-level policy, as 
is the case in ‘uploading’, it was not surprising to find that the Belgian 
delegation did not perform successfully in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
despite having a high level of content expertise. Further to that, data reveals 
that the German delegation did not achieve their negotiation success in 
‘uploading’ as a result of content expertise, but rather as a result of a low 
preference intensity for reaching agreement. Thus, the failure of H3 to 
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predict member state performance in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, is 
explained by the accuracy of H3A. 
 With regard to the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the Belgian delegation 
again had the highest value for content expertise, followed by the Dutch 
delegation and the French and German delegations, with the second lowest 
and lowest values respectively. Thus, according to H3, it was predicted that 
the Belgian delegation would be most successful, followed by the Dutch, 
French and finally the German delegation, as the least successful, in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Although the data revealed some 
success for the Belgian delegation, they were not in fact as successful as the 
Dutch in these negotiations, and so the first and second predictions were 
disconfirmed by the data.  
With regard to the Belgian delegation, evidence was presented to 
indicate that their high value for content expertise was due in large part to the 
fact that the measurement of content expertise picked up on a high level of 
process expertise held by the Belgian delegation, a point the following 
chapter expands on. Thus, although the predictions regarding content 
expertise could not be confirmed, given that the Dutch performed better than 
the Belgians and the Germans performed better than the French in 
‘reuploading’, the data does confirm H3 to a large extent, as explained at 
length in preceding sections. With regard to the specific mechanisms, 
evidence was presented to demonstrate the causal mechanisms linking 
content expertise with negotiation success for the Dutch delegation, and 
although this led to disconfirmation of the posited process linking content 
expertise with negotiation success, the data nonetheless showed that the 
Dutch did utilize content expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘reuploading’. 
 In comparing the role of content expertise between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, the data served to confirm H3A. Although the 
first prediction advanced in line with H3A, that the Belgian delegation could 
utilize content expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘reuploading’, was not 
confirmed by the data, this was because the Belgian delegation utilized 
process expertise to achieve the success they did in ‘reuploading’, rather than 
because of any limitation on the utility of content expertise as a bargaining 
resource in the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Further to that, the data 
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confirmed that the Dutch did utilize content expertise to negotiate more 
successfully than any other state in ‘reuploading’, which demonstrates the 
relevance of content expertise for negotiation success, as hypothesized.  
The second prediction advanced in line with H3A, that the German 
and Belgian delegations would require a more important resource than 
content expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’, was confirmed by 
the data in a number of ways. Thus, H3A was confirmed in the case of 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. 
 With regard to the body of literature that examines content expertise 
as a bargaining resource, it was not possible to contribute very conclusively 
to the debate, on the basis of findings from this chapter. Specifically, as 
discussed in section 9.2, the attempt to clarify causal mechanisms at work in 
linking content expertise with negotiation performance, which are 
underspecified in the literature (see for example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 
2008), was unsuccessful in light of the fact that the data disconfirmed the 
posited causal process derived for testing here (see chapter 4). While the data 
revealed that the Dutch did rely on content expertise to achieve success in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the causal process was distinct 
from that posited a priori. Given that no other member states relied on 
content expertise to negotiate successfully in this case, it was not possible to 
determine whether the process observed in the case of Dutch performance 
should be considered a unique example, or more representative of how 
content expertise works to facilitate success in intergovernmental 
negotiations. Future research should aim to uncover the specific causal 
process through which content expertise operates, so as to clarify this further, 
and determine whether the case at hand is indeed unique or representative.  
 Findings regarding the use of content expertise by the Dutch 
delegation in ‘reuploading’ certainly indicate the importance of considering 
context, in conjunction with the specific resources possessed by individual 
parties to a negotiation, to explain the process and outcome. The Dutch 
delegation’s reliance on content expertise to negotiate successfully in 
‘reuploading’ can be usefully contrasted with the German delegation’s 
evident decision to privilege a low preference intensity as the more relevant 
resource for achieving success in ‘uploading’ negotiations, despite also 
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having a high level of content expertise. That the German delegation was 
possessed of both content expertise and a low preference intensity in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, yet relied almost exclusively on a low preference 
intensity, at the expense of the former resource, indicates that the delegation 
chose the resource deemed most relevant to achieving success in that 
context.  
 In contrast to the argument advanced by Dür and Mateo (2010), then, 
there is a need to look beyond the resource capabilities of negotiating parties, 
in order to explain the strategies they adopt for influencing negotiations. 
Crucially, the context of negotiations must be considered, insofar as rational 
actors can be expected to adapt their strategies accordingly, and privilege 
distinct resources, depending on the utility of those resources in a given 
context (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). Further to that, while additional 
research should seek to confirm this, there is reason to believe that the 
limited utility of content expertise in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
would be characteristic of additional cases of ‘uploading’ negotiations, with 
the general implication that, while content expertise is apparently highly 
effective in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, it is not a particularly useful 
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Process expertise is a useful bargaining resource, in that superior knowledge 
of, and experience with, the decision-making procedures of an organization, 
formal and informal, enhance the potential of a delegation to craft 
compromise solutions, and propose them in a manner conducive to their 
acceptance (for example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008). However, this 
advantage in process expertise will only be useful when states are prepared 
to compromise, because when a state will exit negotiations rather than shift 
position, no amount of process expertise is likely to make viable a 
compromise proposal that does not reflect this former state’s position. Thus, 
the utility of process expertise as a bargaining resource is mediated by 
negotiation context, and the context in ‘uploading’ negotiations is such that a 
low preference intensity for reaching agreement is far more important than 
process expertise, given that a state with a low preference intensity can exit 
negotiation rather than shift their position.  
 This limit on the effectiveness of process expertise is absent in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, where no state is likely to have a credible threat 
to exit negotiations rather than compromise. Thus, in the context of 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, the ability to craft compromise proposals 
effectively and in a timely fashion, will be a crucial bargaining resource for 
negotiation success. With this in mind, I set out the following hypotheses 
regarding process expertise: 
 
 H4: The more process expertise a member state has, the more  
successful that state will be in negotiations. 
 
 H4A: Process expertise is more important for negotiation success  
in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in  
‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-level policy,  
as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 
Based on these hypotheses, I expect to find that the delegation with the most 
process expertise will be the most successful state in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, while the delegation with the most process expertise in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, will not necessarily negotiate successfully. 







10.1 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘uploading’ Negotiations 
Taking into consideration the above hypotheses, it is possible to predict the 
negotiation performance of each member state under study, based on the 
following values for process expertise: 
 
 Belgium - 11 
 Germany - 9 
 Netherlands - 7 
 France - 4 
 
Thus, I advance the following predictions regarding member state 
performance in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, in line with H4: 
 
 1.) Belgium will be the most successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
2.) Germany will be less successful than Belgium, but more  
successful than the Netherlands and France in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Belgium and 
 Germany, though more successful than France in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations 
4.) France will be the least successful state in ‘uploading’  
negotiations 
 
Contrary to the first prediction advanced in line with H4, that Belgium will 
be the most successful state in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the data 
demonstrates that Belgium was in fact the least successful state in these 
negotiations. However, as section 9.3, on comparing ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, articulates, the reason for the failure of Belgium 
in this case was due to the limited utility of process expertise for negotiation 
success in the context of ‘uploading’, rather than any failing on the part of 
H4. 
 Turning to the second prediction advanced in line with H4, that 
Germany would be more successful than France and the Netherlands, though 
less so than Belgium, the data confirms this prediction only in part. 
Specifically, it is accurate that Germany negotiated more successfully than 
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France and the Netherlands in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, though it is 
inaccurate that Germany was less successful than Belgium, given that the 
German delegation was the most successful state in these negotiations. With 
regard to the specific mechanisms through which Germany achieved this 
success, the data reveals that the posited mechanisms linking process 
expertise with negotiation success were not present in this case. Rather, as 
discussed in previous chapters, the primary bargaining resource the German 
delegation utilized to achieve negotiation success in ‘uploading’ was a low 
preference intensity for reaching agreement, though a high level of 
information was also deployed to reenforce this strategy.  
 With regard to the third prediction advanced in line with H4, that the 
Netherlands would be less successful than Belgium and Germany, though 
more so than France, the data confirms this to the extent that the Netherlands 
was less successful than Germany, and disconfirms this to the extent that the 
Netherlands was less successful than France and more successful than 
Belgium, albeit by accident, rather than deliberate influence in the latter case. 
Regarding the French delegation’s performance, while the prediction 
advanced in line with H4, that France would be the least successful state in 
the ‘uploading’ negotiations, is disconfirmed by the data, it is clear that the 
French delegation relied on a comparatively low preference intensity for 
reaching agreement and, to a lesser extent, a high level of information, to 
negotiate successfully over the issues they did.  
Thus, while the predictions advanced in line with H4 are shown to be 
largely inaccurate, this is easily explained with reference to the role of other 
bargaining resources, as well as the specific context in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. Taking this into consideration, it is not possible to accept H4 as 
applied to the ‘uploading’ negotiations, though this is not to disconfirm the 
importance of process expertise for negotiation success generally, but to 
disconfirm its relevance for the delegations in question, in the context of 
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10.2 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
In the ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the four member states under 
consideration receive the following values for process expertise: 
 
 Belgium - 9 
 Germany - 8 
 France - 6 
 Netherlands - 6 
 
With these points in mind, and drawing on H4, which states that The more 
process expertise a member state has, the more successful that state will be 
in negotiations, I advance the following predictions: 
 
 1.) Belgium will be the most successful state in ‘reuploading’  
negotiations 
2.)Germany will be more successful than France and the  
Netherlands, though less successful than Belgium in  
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
3.) France will be less successful than Belgium and Germany,  
and as successful as the Netherlands in ‘reuploading’  
negotiations 
4.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Belgium and 
Germany, and as successful as France in ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations 
 
The first prediction advanced in line with H4 is partly supported by the data, 
in that Belgium did achieve some notable success in these negotiations, and 
could be considered more successful than France and Germany, though 
Belgium took positions over fewer issues than did the former states, and 
some success enjoyed by the Belgian delegation, for example over the 
question of whether to remove certain spending categories from calculation 
of deficits, owed more to Dutch, than to Belgian influence. Further to that, as 
Belgium was less successful than the Netherlands, the prediction is 
disconfirmed in that regard, though the success of the Netherlands to a 
greater extent than Belgium is explained insofar as the Dutch delegation 
utilized another bargaining resource, content expertise, in order to negotiate 
successfully in ‘reuploading’. Regarding the mechanisms through which 
Belgium achieved the success they did, data reveals that process expertise 
was the main bargaining resource deployed by the Belgians in these 
negotiations.  
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 Specifically, drawing on their experience with the formal and 
informal processes of such intergovernmental negotiations as those over the 
SGP, the Belgian delegation determined that the most appropriate way to 
wield influence in this case, would be to privilege a selection of vitally 
important issues over which to push their position. This approach of focusing 
on only a select number of vitally important issues, was a viable way for the 
Belgian delegation to wield influence in these negotiations, for two main 
reasons. The first, related specifically to size, is that, as described by a 
Luxembourgish finance ministry participant, “being small, they have fewer 
or at least lesser issues of importance, so they are more trustworthy in 
addition to being more able to compromise” (interview, Luxembourgish 
finance ministry). Further to that, the second reason, described by a Council 
secretariat participant, is that those states with one overriding interested 
“kept their heads down on the other elements, so as not to use up any 
negotiating capital, and then come the end of the thing they said, all we ever 
wanted was one thing” (interview, Council secretariat b).  
This accords with explanations of how issue-specific power provides 
for disproportionate influence by small member states, over questions of 
particular national importance in EU negotiations (Tallberg, 2008), as well as 
resonating with findings that issues, and states’ preference ordering over 
issues, for example, serve as an explanatory factor for the bargaining 
strategies they pursue in EU negotiations (McKibben, 2010). While the 
literature does not find an explicit relationship between the size of states and 
the number of issues they aim to influence in EU negotiations, as described 
by the Luxembourgish official cited above, there are findings to indicate that 
the number of issues, and salience states attach to those issues, within a 
negotiation setting, can impact on how states influence outcome agreements 
(for example Tallberg, 2008; McKibben, 2010). This is evident in the 
approach of the Belgian delegation to ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP.  
 Having a great deal of experience, then, and knowledge of the 
informal rules at play that this experience affords, the Belgian representatives 
chose to emphasize the select issues of key importance to them, notably 
those questions relating to the debt target (interview, Belgian finance 
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ministry b). While the delegation did not succeed entirely over the question 
of whether to upgrade the issue of debt, they did enjoy considerable success 
in limiting the outcome agreement to a slight upgrading, which, in the 
presence of their most notable success of preventing a quantitative 
benchmark to assess the pace of debt reduction, renders any failure over the 
first point moot. Further to this, the Belgians were opposed by the Dutch, 
French
29
 and Germans, among others, over the question of upgrading debt in 
a reformed pact, which makes even limited success on the issue all the more 
remarkable.  
 Another key point regarding Belgian use of process expertise, is that 
the effectiveness of the delegation’s approach, focusing on achieving success 
over a limited number of key issues, was aided by the continuity of their 
representation, in that their positions were considered credible. In terms of 
the Belgian position over debt, it had been a stated priority of Belgian policy 
over the previous decade and a half to reduce the public debt to a sustainable 
level. The two finance ministers who had represented Belgium in the Ecofin 
Council over this time period, as well as the single MC/EFC representative 
over that entire period, had stuck to this goal and delivered on it to a 
considerable extent, with the effect that other delegations had great respect 
for the Belgians and did not see their approach to debt as a stability risk 
(interviews, Council secretariat b, German finance ministry b and 
Luxembourgish finance ministry). This is illustrated by the following 
statement from a Luxembourgish finance ministry participant in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations: 
 [The] [R]ule was that those over 60% should bring their  
debt down to a reasonable level at a reasonable pace, but  
that was simply not done. The Belgians had been doing it  
since 1982, since devaluation, otherwise they would have  
had real problems getting into the euro. This is why there  
was never any real panic about the Belgian debt, because  
they could show that year after year, coming also from  
135%, they managed to slowly but surely bring it down  
 (interview, Luxembourgish finance ministry) 
 
                                       
29
 The French position was nuanced, in that they favored upgrading the debt, though with a 
number of caveats that would have limited the effective impact on high debt states 
(interview, Council secretariat b) 
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In contrast to this, the Italian delegation, for example, had no such continuity 
and no such credibility, which was a handicap in defending positions, such as 
maintaining a non-operational debt target, that appeared to reflect a 
preference for a weak pact (Fabbrini and Piattoni, 2008). To be sure, there 
were incredibly skilled, respected officials representing Italy in the MC/EFC 
in particular, throughout the history of economic and monetary integration, 
but the lack of continuity in Italian representation and policy commitments, 
meant that the Italian delegation did not derive the same level of credibility 
as did the Belgian negotiators, particularly regarding the debt question 
(interviews, Luxembourgish finance ministry and Council secretariat b). 
Rather than being an isolated incident in the SGP negotiations, this has been 
highlighted as a general trend in Italy’s influence in the EU, specifically a 
diminished capacity to influence economic matters, owing to budgetary 
mismanagement (Tallberg, 2008).  
 Thus, while continuity of representatives is expected to indicate 
process expertise, which then operates via a series of mechanisms to affect 
negotiation performance (see chapter 4 and Tallberg, 2008 for example), it 
seems that in the Belgian case, the continuity of representatives was also an 
element of the causal process through which the delegation achieved 
negotiation success, with recourse to process expertise. In other words, the 
credibility of the Belgians, in terms of signaling a commitment to reduce 
debt, made Belgian opposition to fixing strict terms for debt reduction in a 
reformed SGP, appear more reasonable and less concerning to stability-
oriented states, as indicated by the following statements from an interview 
with Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm, in Il Sole 24 Ore:  
 he[Zalm] favours a ‘different treatment between countries,  
according to their level of debt’, citing Italy, Belgium and  
Greece as states with high debt. Belgium accepts the idea of  
‘more rigour’ for states with public debt of more than 60 pct  
of GDP       (AFX, 2005) 
 
Thus, while Belgium greatly opposed the inclusion of any specific debt 
target in a reformed SGP, this was not perceived to result from a lack of 
willingness on the part of the Belgians to tackle their debt burden, and there 
was general awareness that “[W]hat they [the Belgians] really wanted to 
defend was, if you’re going in the right direction on debt, you’ll get some 
  241 
praise for that, you’ll get some credit, and you won’t get killed for being 90, 
when you were 100 four years ago” (interview, Council secretariat b). These 
factors, in conjunction with awareness that the push for a focus on debt was 
in part a red herring for those states with deficit troubles, led to acceptance of 
the Belgian proposal that setting a strict target for debt reduction would not 
facilitate this necessarily slow process, nor improve operation of the pact, 
and should hence be excluded from the reform agreement (interviews, 
Belgian finance ministry b, Luxembourgish finance ministry and Council 
secretariat b). 
 Returning to the discussion of the selective issues over which the 
Belgian delegation took strong positions, while not leading to deliberate 
success on many points, which would require actively seeking to influence 
the outcome, this approach facilitated the Belgian delegation’s goal of aiding 
the Luxembourgish presidency in securing a compromise, and in preventing 
the general outcome of a reformed pact that would threaten the stability of 
the single currency (interviews, Belgian finance ministry b, Luxembourgish 
finance ministry and Council secretariat b). With these points in mind, it is 
possible, to an extent, to accept the prediction that the Belgian delegation 
would negotiate most successfully in ‘reuploading’, given that other 
delegations potentially only achieve a greater measure of success than the 
Belgians, as a result of taking a position over a greater number of issues (see 
chapter 6), and actively seeking to influence a wider variety of outcomes.  
While it is debatable whether the public defense, and hence success, 
over a greater number of issues represents a more successful performance 
overall, given that the Belgians could have refrained from taking a strong 
position simply because they knew their position was defended by other 
delegations, yet in that way still achieved an outcome closest to their 
position, the evidence does not support this reading of the outcome. First, the 
in-depth interviews conducted in order to capture the detailed process of 
negotiations reveal that the Belgian delegation, while strategically choosing 
to privilege a select number of issues, was able to do this because they had a 
more narrow range of concerns than those states that took positions over all 
issues, rather than because they were confident in seeing their position win 
out regardless (interviews, Council secretariat b, Luxembourgish finance 
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ministry and Belgian finance ministry b). Further to that, it would require 
indisputable evidence, before crediting the delegation with deliberate 
influence, that the Belgians purposely refrained from defending a position 
they wanted to see in the agreement outcome, as a way to increase their 
chances of seeing a wider range of their positions incorporated into the 
agreement. In fact, given the definition this thesis adopts for negotiation 
success, it is not even clear that such an approach would provide for the 
delegation to be credited with success, regardless any evidence that this was 
their intention. This last point is ultimately an interesting conceptual 
question, and one that the concluding chapter of the thesis returns to, in 
regard to Diana Panke’s concept of ‘negotiation effectiveness’ (Panke, 
2012). 
 Turning to the second prediction advanced in line with H4, that 
Germany will be more successful than France and the Netherlands, though 
less successful than Belgium in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the evidence 
is mixed. The prediction is not entirely accurate, given that the Netherlands 
was in fact more successful than Germany, though it is relatively 
straightforward to explain this inaccuracy, as the Dutch delegation relied on 
content expertise to achieve the success they did, which is discussed in the 
previous chapter. With regard to the the first part of the prediction, in 
considering the mechanisms through which the German delegation achieved 
somewhat greater success than the French and Belgians, it is apparent that 
the Germans relied on information, rather than process expertise, and thus 
the posited mechanisms linking process expertise with negotiation 
performance cannot be confirmed in the case of German successes in 
‘reuploading’. 
 The third prediction, that France would be less successful than 
Germany and Belgium, though more successful than the Netherlands in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, is largely inaccurate. Again, this is due in part to 
the fact that predictions advanced in line with H4 do not account for the 
Dutch delegation’s recourse to content expertise for influence in these 
negotiations, as discussed in the previous chapter, which explains the 
superior success of the Dutch, relative to the French.  
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Regarding the first part of the prediction, the data does confirm that 
Germany negotiated more successfully than the French, and wielded more 
influence generally, though this was due to information, rather than process 
expertise on the part of the German delegation. As discussed previously, it is 
difficult to compare the Belgian performance with that of other delegations, 
given the Belgian approach of privileging a limited number of issues in these 
negotiations. Nonetheless, data indicates that France did not enjoy much 
deliberate success in ‘reuploading’ negotiations either, which leads to the 
general assessment that these states performed comparably, while Belgium 
might be considered more successful overall, which is further support for the 
first part of prediction three. Finally, the inaccuracy of the fourth prediction 
can also be explained by the fact that this prediction is based on the Dutch 
delegation possessing a low level of process expertise, while the Dutch in 
fact negotiated successfully in ‘reuploading’ with recourse to content 
expertise, as seen in chapter 9.   
 Thus, despite the mixed results of predictions advanced in line with 
H4, it is clear that these failings owe more to the variety of bargaining 
resources at play in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, than to any failing of the 
part of H4. Considering the case of the Belgian delegation, and the evidence 
in support of process expertise as the resource through which the Belgians 
achieved success in these negotiations, it is possible to accept that process 
expertise is an important, effective bargaining resource in the context of 
‘reuploading’, though it is not possible, in this case, to accept H4, which 
states that The more process expertise a member state has, the more 
successful that state will be in negotiations.  
Findings are supportive, then, of the literature that highlights the role 
of process expertise in explaining member state influence in 
intergovernmental negotiations (for example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008). 
However, the arguments advanced by Beach (2005) and Tallberg (2008), for 
example, do not pay sufficient attention to the role of negotiation context in 
mediating the utility of process expertise as a bargaining resource. The 
following section, which addresses this effect of negotiation context, 
demonstrates why it is essential to consider changing context in theorizing 
the utility of bargaining resources in intergovernmental negotiations, and 
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reveals more specifically how process expertise remains relevant for 
influence in the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations, though much less so for 
achieving negotiation success.  
 
 
10.3 Comparing the role of Process Expertise in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ Negotiations 
The hypothesized impact of the distinct context in ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, on the relevance of process expertise for negotiation success, 
is captured in H4A, which states that A high level of process expertise is 
more important for negotiation success in the presence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. This hypothesis 
leads to the following predictions regarding member state performance in the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations: 
 
1.) The Belgian delegation can utilize their process expertise 
      to achieve negotiation success in ‘reuploading’ 
2.) Despite having a high level of process expertise, the Belgian 
delegation must rely on more useful resources to achieve 
negotiation success in ‘uploading’ 
 
With regard to prediction one, the data confirms this, as demonstrated in the 
previous section’s discussion of Belgian performance in ‘reuploading’. Thus, 
without restating the above discussion, I am confident in accepting the first 
prediction, as well as H4A, as applied to the case of ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations.  
 Turning to the second prediction, and application of H4A to the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, the data serves to confirm this in a number of ways. 
In terms of the necessity to rely on a more useful bargaining resource than 
process expertise, to succeed in ‘uploading’ negotiations, the fact that the 
Belgian delegation had a clear advantage in process expertise, yet did not 
negotiate successfully, goes some way toward confirming the prediction 
already. Further to that, and with regard to the specific mechanisms linking 
process expertise with negotiation performance, the data reveals that the 
Belgian delegation did manage to influence the outcome of a very important 
issue, with recourse to process expertise. However, as predicted, this was 
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only possible to the extent that the compromise proposed by the Belgians 
reflected the position(s) of the state or states with the lowest preference 
intensity for reaching agreement.  
 Specifically, over the question of how to define a ‘serious recession’, 
and how to quantify that definition, once the decision was taken to define 
this quantitatively, the Belgian delegation did not take a position, yet was 
instrumental in determining the outcome agreement over this issue. Both 
Nigel Wicks, Chairman of the Monetary Committee, and then Belgian 
Finance Minister, Philippe Maystadt, had a part in orchestrating the final 
compromise on this point. The ‘grey box’ proposal by Maystadt (based on 
the ‘Wicks box’ proposal in the MC
30
), which envisaged freedom of 
interpretation for the Council in granting exemptions from the EDP in the 
case of recessions ranging from .5% to 2% of GDP, with 2% or higher 
qualifying as an automatic exception, lay the groundwork for the final 
compromise reached at the Dublin European Council, between French 
President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In fact, this 
final agreement was nearly identical to Maystadt’s proposal (see chapter 6; 
European Report, 1996c), which is credited with breaking deadlock in the 
Ecofin meeting on the eve of the European Council summit, during which 
Maystadt aided the Irish Presidency representative in mediating between 
French and German negotiators (Buckley et al., 1996).  
The reason this example of influence by the Belgian delegation can 
be credited to process expertise, rather than content expertise, is that it was 
not the technical merits of the proposal that made it acceptable, nor was this 
even an original proposal by the Belgians, with any credit for its technical 
character due to MC Chairman Nigel Wicks. Rather, this is described as an 
entirely political solution to a political problem, given that, by this point in 
the negotiations, there was little technical difference between the positions of 
the French and German delegations, with the disagreement surrounding a 
minor numerical point that had become incredibly politicized (for example 
interviews, Commission a, French finance ministry and German finance 
ministry b; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Along those lines, the reason cited 
                                       
30
 See Monetary Committee of the European Community, 1996 for full contents of this 
proposal. 
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for acceptance of the Belgian proposal, was the timing and strategy of the 
Belgian representative in presenting it. As described by a finance ministry 
official from the French delegation,  
 He [Maystadt] had been sleeping [hyperbole from speaker]  
for a very long time, but he had the compromise with him. He  
was a very old Ecofin minister, so he knew how it worked and  
he waited until exactly the right moment to put the compromise  
on thetable. If he had put it two or four hours sooner, it might  
not have worked, but by 3am, after many efforts, everyone was  
prepared to accept it      (interview, French finance ministry) 
 
This proposal was accepted by ministers in Ecofin, and, again, led to 
agreement in the European Council meeting the following day. Crucially, 
though, this proposal did not reflect a uniquely Belgian position, but rather a 
compromise that the Belgian finance minister believed would be acceptable 
to the French and Germans, which is why this can be considered an example 
of Belgium wielding influence, absent success. In other words, the causal 
process through which process expertise is posited to impact on negotiation 
performance in the context of ‘uploading’, predicts that a state with process 
expertise could advance a proposal, and this proposal could be accepted, 
though only if it reflects the positions of the the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity for agreement (see chapter 4). Thus, the evidence in this 
case is highly supportive of the process through which context mediates the 
role of process expertise, in ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
 In addition to influencing the outcome over this specific issue, 
multiple interviewees confirm that this was a typically Belgian strategy, 
facilitated by the experience of the delegation and, related, the esteem in 
which Belgian representatives were held by their counterparts in the MC and 
Ecofin Council (for example interviews, Council secretariat a, French 
finance ministry, Commission a and Commission b). Evidence of Belgian 
influence in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations certainly supports this, and the 
success enjoyed by the delegation in the context of ‘reuploading’, as 
compared to their limited success in ‘uploading’ negotiations, provides 
strong support for H4A, which states that A high level of process expertise is 
more important for negotiation success in the presence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’.  
  247 
Conclusion 
To begin with the ‘uploading’ negotiations, key findings regarding process 
expertise were that the Belgian delegation had the most process expertise, 
followed by the Germans, while the French and Dutch delegations had the 
joint least process expertise. Contrary to predictions advanced in light of 
these values, the Belgian delegation was the least, rather than most 
successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations. However, as discussed in section 
10.3, the failure of the Belgian delegation to negotiate successfully in 
‘uploading’ was due to the limited utility of process expertise in the face of a 
state with a low preference intensity for reaching agreement, and hence a 
credible threat to exit negotiations, rather than any failing on the part of H4, 
which states that The more process expertise a member state has, the more 
successful that state will be in negotiations.  
Taking into consideration a key finding from the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, that the Belgian delegation had the most process expertise and 
deployed that resource to negotiate successfully in this case, I accepted 
predictions advanced in line with H4A, that Belgium could use process 
expertise to achieve negotiation success in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
but would require a more important resource for negotiation success in 
‘uploading’. Further to that, while the Belgian delegation could not utilize 
process expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘uploading’, this resource was 
deployed by the Belgians in order to facilitate agreement on the stability 
pact, specifically in helping to bridge the gap between the French and 
German positions over one of the most important issues involved in the 
negotiations. Thus, another key finding from this chapter is that data 
confirms H4A, which states that A high level of process expertise is more 
important for negotiation success in the presence of established EU-level 
policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’. 
 Another interesting finding from this chapter is that observations of 
the Belgian approach to ‘reuploading’ negotiations, speak to findings that 
there is an explanatory role for issues, and states’ orientation toward issues in 
a dossier, in determining the bargaining strategies states adopt for EU 
negotiations (McKibben, 2010). To the extent that, as indicated by the 
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Belgian example, having a strong interest in only a limited number of issues 
in a dossier, in conjunction with awareness of the institutional nuance on the 
part of a delegation possessing process expertise, has the effect of facilitating 
negotiation success, this would be an important contribution to theorizing the 
explanatory role of issues in determining states’ bargaining strategies (see 
McKibben, 2010). Provided further research uncovered similar findings to 
those described here, regarding the case of Belgian reliance on process 
expertise, this would mark a useful coming together with other strands of the 
negotiation literature (for example McKibben, 2010; Panke, 2012).  
 As touched on in previous sections, there is a need to refine 
understanding of process expertise as a bargaining resource, such that greater 
consideration is given to the role of context in mediating the utility of 
process expertise for negotiation success. Specifically, as predicted by the 
causal process explaining the mediating effect of context on the potential for 
process expertise to lead to negotiation success, the Belgian delegation could 
only rely on process expertise to facilitate a compromise between the French 
and German delegations in ‘uploading’, rather than utilizing process 
expertise to influence the outcome in support of their own position. In 
contrast to this, in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the Belgian delegation 
certainly relied on process expertise to achieve the success they did. While 
findings regarding Belgian strategy and performance in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations support the hypothesized role of process expertise, as derived 
from existing literature, there is no consideration in the literature of the 
contextual conditions surrounding process expertise as an explanatory factor 
for negotiation success (see for example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2008), which 
marks an important point of departure for this thesis.  
 These findings also address the question of whether and how context 
matters, and point to the importance of considering both context and states’ 
bargaining resources, to explain negotiation outcomes. That a mixture of 
what Dür and Mateo (2010) might call ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ bargaining tactics 
was clearly present in ‘uploading’ negotiations, with German reliance on a 
low preference intensity as an example of the former and Belgian reliance on 
process expertise as an example of the latter, is supportive of their argument 
that what matters is the resources actors are possessed of, rather than any 
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uniform tendency toward particular bargaining styles, under different 
circumstances. Having said that, there remains a need to understand why the 
German delegation, possessed of similarly high process expertise as was the 
Belgian delegation, opted for a bargaining strategy focused on preference 
intensity, rather than process expertise, in ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
It is, of course, the aim of this thesis to provide an answer to such 
questions, with recourse to a rational choice institutionalist approach that 
advocates a focus on how negotiation context mediates the strategies, and 
hence resources, most useful to negotiating parties, for securing the fixed 
goal of negotiation success in any context (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). 
Thus, the decision of the German delegation to privilege preference intensity, 
rather than process expertise in ‘uploading’ negotiations, is supportive of this 
argument that resource capabilities matter, yet context plays a crucial part in 
determining the strategies states will pursue, and the ultimate outcome of 
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Section 5 - Conclusion 
 
Chapter 11 - Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analyzed the negotiation performance of Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, in order to answer the following research 
question: 
Do differences between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
affect member state performance in each?  
It has drawn conclusions regarding the effects of specific bargaining 
resources, including preference intensity, information, content expertise and 
process expertise, on the potential for member states to influence 
negotiations, as well as the way in which negotiation context mediates the 
utility of those resources. In so doing, this thesis has arrived at a host of 
interesting findings, and contributed to several bodies of literature, from 
empirical, conceptual and theoretical standpoints. As this section will 
elaborate further, the findings in this thesis also have important policy 




11.1 Summary: Contributions and Findings 
The dependent variable that this study has sought to explain is negotiation 
performance, defined as the extent to which a member state influences 
negotiations to affect the outcome agreement (Bailer, 2004; Thomson et al., 
2006). While negotiation performance is considered to be a neutral concept, 
negotiation success refers to a state deliberately influencing negotiations to 
achieve an outcome that is close to, or similar to, own policy positions over 
the issues negotiated. As discussed previously, drawing the distinction 
between deliberately influencing negotiations to secure a favorable outcome, 
and securing a favorable outcome by some accident or good fortune (Bailer, 
2004), has been essential for arriving at valid conclusions in this study.  
 The independent variables that have been analyzed include various 
bargaining resources expected to impact on member state negotiation 
performance, namely preference intensity, information, content expertise and 
process expertise. Preference intensity was defined as “the relative value [a 
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state] places on an agreement compared to the status quo alternative,” 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 62); information was defined as knowledge about 
participants’ policy positions, the reasons behind those positions, and the 
level of salience attached to them (Naurin, 2009); content expertise was 
defined as “technical knowledge of the issues under negotiation” (Tallberg, 
2008: 701); and process expertise was defined as “knowledge of the 
institutional framework of negotiations” (Tallberg, 2008: 701). The argument 
that has been tested is that, as values of the independent variable increase, or, 
in other words, as member states possess these bargaining resources to a 
greater extent, then values of the dependent variable, or, states’ negotiation 
performance, should improve.  
 The role of negotiation context has also been analyzed, with the 
incidence of ‘uploading’ or ‘reuploading’ negotiations serving as an 
intervening variable. The argument that has been tested regarding the role of 
context is whether specific bargaining resources are more or less useful 
under distinct negotiation contexts, with the expectation that preference 
intensity would be more relevant for negotiation success under the context of 
‘uploading’, while information, content expertise and process expertise 
would be more relevant for negotiation success under the context of 
‘reuploading’. The case of the SGP was selected, because it satisfies 
important criteria, including the opportunity to analyze nested cases, namely 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, the four member states 
whose performance in the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ over the SGP have 
been the subject of study here. The SGP also fulfills additional criteria and 
facilitates research design in a number of ways, all of which were described 
in chapter 5 on research design.  
 Following the introductory chapter of the thesis, chapter 2 provided 
historical context on the SGP, including its role in the architecture of EMU 
and how historical processes toward EMU are intricately related to the 
establishment and reform of the pact. As noted in previous chapters, and 
returned to later in this chapter, viewing the SGP in the context of the 
historical drive toward a single European currency has been useful in 
analyzing the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, and 
in reflecting on the implications of this analysis for the future of the 
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Eurozone. In addition to providing some relevant context, chapter 2 
discussed the empirical contribution this thesis makes to studies of the SGP. 
In undertaking a detailed comparative analysis of the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, as well as the differential influence 
wielded by distinct member states, in each negotiation context, this study 
contributes an alternative treatment of the SGP, which serves to heighten 
understanding of why the original and reformed pact were designed as they 
were, and functioned, or failed to function, accordingly.  
 Following chapter 2, the theoretical framework section, including 
chapters 3 and 4, articulated the conceptual distinction between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’, and outlined the rational choice institutionalist approach 
through which the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, 
would be analyzed. Chapter 3 introduced the Europeanization literature from 
which the concepts of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ were derived. While 
this literature has treated the concept of ‘uploading’ at great length, 
consideration of ‘reuploading’ has been far more limited. Thus, an important 
contribution this thesis makes is to build on existing conceptualizations of 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, in order to identify important distinctions 
between these negotiation contexts, which have the potential to impact on the 
process and outcome of negotiations in each case. These differences between 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, namely default condition, preference 
composition, interdependence and distributional conflict, were described in 
chapter 3, so as to set the backdrop against which chapter 4 explains the 
theoretical approach taken to analyzing the effects of these differences.  
 Specifically, chapter 4 introduced the rational choice institutionalist 
approach, which highlights how contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations can be expected to impact on the process by 
which negotiating parties will seek to influence the outcome agreement in 
each instance. In other words, in line with a rational choice institutionalist 
approach, delegations to the SGP negotiations, as rational actors with the 
fixed goal of achieving negotiation success, can be expected to privilege 
distinct bargaining resources in ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, depending on the relative utility of these resources in each 
context. Thus, as elaborated in chapter 4, an essential complement to the 
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rational choice institutionalist approach, for the purposes of this thesis, was a 
framework through which to theorize the effects of bargaining resources, on 
member state performance in intergovernmental negotiations.  
In order to expand the literatures this thesis could engage with, it was 
useful to go beyond EU-specific analyses, to consider bargaining resources 
that are addressed in the wider body of negotiation literature, ranging from 
one-off international negotiations (for example Zartman and Rubin, 2001) to 
contractual negotiations in the workplace (for example Lax and Sebenius, 
1985). This led to the identification of four bargaining resources for analysis, 
including preference intensity, information, content expertise and process 
expertise. As explained in chapter 4, there were a variety of reasons behind 
the decision to examine these specific bargaining resources, not least because 
the rational choice institutionalist approach pointed to the differential 
importance of these resources in ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, a predicted effect of changing context that this study aimed to 
test.  
 Turning to the research design through which the theoretical 
constructs elaborated in chapters 3 and 4, were operationalized to collect and 
analyze data, chapter 5 presented a detailed overview of concept 
measurement, data collection and analysis, as well as explanation of the case 
study approach taken in this thesis. As discussed in chapter 5, the case study 
approach was a useful complement to the process-tracing analysis this thesis 
undertakes (Gerring, 2004; Vennesson, 2008). Further to that, the subtle 
concepts this thesis sought to examine, and the absence of widely agreed 
indicators for measuring these concepts, in existing literature, implicated a 
need to consider multiple indicators for each concept, to enhance validity. 
Thus, a single case that provided for synchronic and diachronic variation, as 
the SGP did, was an effective way to introduce variation on key explanatory 
factors, whilst maintaining comparability across observations (see chapter 5; 
Gerring, 2004).  
Along the same lines, chapter 5 justified the decision, and explained 
the process, for selecting Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
from within the universe of states that participated in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Specifically, limiting the analysis 
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in this way was essential to the successful completion of the study, given the 
considerable data requirements, and the need to conduct interviews with 
negotiation participants who were not widely available, particularly in the 
case of ‘uploading’ negotiations, which took place nearly 20 years ago. 
These interviews proved invaluable to completing the process-tracing 
analysis, as documentary evidence, while useful, could not capture all of the 
dynamics that were apparent to participants, and essential to observe, in 
checking the posited causal processes under examination here.  
 The member states selected for study proved highly effective for 
generating interesting findings, not only in providing for the necessary 
variation on independent variables, but also because Belgium and the 
Netherlands, in particular, do not typically feature in studies of the SGP as a 
political outcome. Including these states in the analysis revealed the 
important roles both indeed played in the SGP negotiations. This is discussed 
further in regard to summarizing the empirical chapters, below, though it is 
worth noting here that observations of Dutch and Belgian influence in the 
SGP negotiations, serve to challenge findings that big member states tend to 
prevail in EU negotiations (see for example Moravcsik, 1998; Thomson et 
al., 2006; Kaarlejärvi, 2007). While this study certainly found evidence of 
considerable dominance by big member states, particularly in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, there was not a direct causal link between their 
size and negotiation success, the latter owing rather to their low preference 
intensities for reaching agreement, and the utility of that bargaining resource 
in the context of ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
 The empirical section of the thesis began with chapter 6, which 
presented an overview of findings regarding the dependent variable - 
negotiation performance - and the independent variables - preference 
intensity, information, content expertise and process expertise - for each of 
the member states under analysis, in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. As explained in the research design section that 
preceded chapter 6, each issue in the SGP dossier over which there were at 
least two opposing positions, was addressed individually, in arriving at 
conclusions regarding member state performance in the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations. In addition to arriving at an assessment of 
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member state performance for each issue, the aim of chapter 6 was to 
provide insight into the positions of each delegation regarding questions 
addressed in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, as well as to 
highlight some points over which it is difficult to find that one member state 
negotiated more successfully than another, given the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of various aspects of the dossier, in both negotiations.  
It was, thus, difficult to arrive at a general assessment of member 
state performance in ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP, though consideration of the number and significance of issues over 
which they secured an outcome closest to own position, ultimately led to the 
conclusion that Germany negotiated most successfully in ‘uploading’, while 
the Netherlands negotiated most successfully in ‘reuploading’. In light of the 
values for these member states, for each of the independent variables, it was 
not immediately possible to determine which bargaining resource(s) the 
delegations relied on to achieve this success. Specifically, Germany 
displayed a high value for multiple bargaining resources in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, including preference intensity, information and content 
expertise, which indicates that the delegation might have relied on any one of 
these, or a combination therein, to achieve the success they did. Similarly, 
the Dutch delegation had high values for both preference intensity and 
content expertise, in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, which precludes 
identification of the key explanatory factor for Dutch negotiation success in 
‘reuploading’, absent further investigation.  
Of course, this was an important aim of the process-tracing analysis, 
namely to overcome the ambiguity surrounding which bargaining resources 
states relied on to achieve the success they did, as well as how these 
processes of influence interacted with changing context between ‘uploading’ 
and ‘reuploading’. Therefore, following chapter 6, the subsequent four 
chapters presented more detailed findings regarding each of the independent 
variables. The following table summarizes findings for each of the 
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Table XII. Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
H1: The lower the preference intensity of a member 
state, the more successful that state will be in 
negotiations. 
Confirmed in the case of 
‘uploading’; disconfirmed in 
the case of ‘reuploading’ 
H1A: A low preference intensity is more important for 
negotiation success in the absence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the 
presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘reuploading’.  
Confirmed 
H2: The more information a member state has, the 
more successful that state will be in negotiations.  
Disconfirmed in the case of 
‘uploading’; disconfirmed in 
the case of ‘reuploading’ 
H2A: Information is more important for negotiation 
success in the presence of established EU-level policy, 
as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the absence of 
established EU-level policy, as is the case in 
‘uploading’.  
Disconfirmed 
H3: The more content expertise a member state has, 
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
Disconfirmed in the case of 
‘uploading’; confirmed in the 
case of ‘reuploading’ 
H3A: Content expertise is more important for 
negotiation success in the presence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the 
absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case 
in ‘uploading’. 
Confirmed  
H4: The more process expertise a member state has, 
the more successful that state will be in negotiations. 
Disconfirmed in the case of 
‘uploading’; disconfirmed in 
the case of ‘reuploading’ 
H4A: Process expertise is more important for 
negotiation success in the presence of established EU-
level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’, than in the 




 Chapter 7 addressed findings for the independent variable preference 
intensity. Main findings were that, as predicted, Germany pursued a 
bargaining strategy focused on preference intensity, in order to negotiate 
successfully in ‘uploading’. Despite possessing a high level of information 
and content expertise, Germany privileged preference intensity as the most 
useful bargaining resource to influence the outcome of ‘uploading’ 
negotiations. Further to that, the posited causal process through which 
preference intensity was expected to operate, via a credible threat to exit, was 
largely supported by the empirical evidence, though there was seen to be 
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some question as to the credibility of the German exit threat. Nonetheless, 
Germany did threaten to exit ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, and 
other states responded to this threat by granting concessions to Germany, 
though France, the other state with a relatively low preference intensity for 
agreement in ‘uploading’, refused to concede fully, which ultimately led to a 
stand-off at the highest level of decision-making, settled only through clever 
political maneuvering, a point returned to later in this chapter.  
Having a low preference intensity was also seen to explain French 
performance regarding the issue of a resolution on growth and employment, 
which the French delegation succeeded at working into the final version of 
the SGP that emerged from the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. In this 
example, the process through which preference intensity operated did appear 
to be in line with the mechanisms posited a priori.  
  Regarding the effects of context, chapter 7 discussed the irrelevance 
of preference intensity in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, where 
this variable played no role in Dutch negotiation success, despite the Dutch 
negotiating most successfully, and having a relatively low preference 
intensity for reaching agreement in this case. Neither did the Belgians, with 
the lowest preference intensity, rely on this resource to influence negotiations 
in ‘reuploading’. Further to that, the posited causal process regarding the 
effects of context in mediating the utility of preference intensity, found 
support insofar as participant interviews confirmed that the threat of exit was 
not deemed viable for any member state in ‘reuploading’, regardless their 
relative preference intensity for reaching a reform agreement, and this tactic 
of threatening exit was not observed in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
 Chapter 7 also addressed the extent to which these findings contribute 
to existing literature. First, regarding the role of preference intensity as a 
bargaining resource, it was noted that findings confirmed the utility of 
preference intensity in international negotiations, as theorized by Moravcsik 
(1998), for example. However, it was also noted that findings regarding 
preference intensity in ‘reuploading’, indicate a need to consider context in 
theorizing the effects of preference intensity on states’ negotiation 
performance, given that the utility of preference intensity was seen to be 
diminished significantly in the context of ‘reuploading’.  
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These findings are broadly supportive of the literature that 
emphasizes the explanatory role of negotiation context (for example Krasner, 
1991; Koremenos et al., 2001; Heritier, 2007; Naurin, 2009), though the 
specific effects of changing context, in mediating the utility of preference 
intensity as a bargaining resource, are in line with the rational choice 
institutionalist approach this study takes, which is in contrast to other 
approaches that privilege collective goal orientations as bound up with 
changing context (for example Elgström and Jönsson, 2000; Odell, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the weight given to context as an explanatory factor for 
negotiation processes and outcomes, is a unifying factor between this and the 
aforementioned contributions, and marks a division from approaches to 
explaining negotiation outcomes that privilege the explanatory role of 
bargaining resources, independent the effects of negotiation context (for 
example Dür and Mateo, 2010).  
The following table summarizes findings regarding the role of preference 
intensity in the SGP negotiations: 
 
Table XIII. Summary of Findings for Preference Intensity 
Variable Posited Causal Process Findings 
Preference 
Intensity 
(‘uploading’) low preference intensity!state will 
use the threat of exit(1)!threat of exit is taken 
seriously by other states(2)!other states respond to 
demands of the state that utilizes this bargaining 
tactic(3)!the positions of that state are 
accommodated in the negotiated 
agreement(4)!state has negotiated successfully(5) 
Confirmed in the 
case of French and 
German success in 
‘uploading’, though 
with some question 
over step 2, in 
regard to Germany 
Preference 
Intensity 
(‘reuploading’) low preference intensity!state 
will not use the threat of exit(1)!threat to walk 
away from negotiations would not be taken 
seriously by other states(2)!the threat of exit is not 
a feasible bargaining tactic(3)!this tactic will be 
absent in ‘reuploading’ negotiations(4) 
Confirmed in the 




 Main findings from chapter 8, regarding the independent variable 
information, were that France and Germany had the joint highest levels of 
information in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP. However, this was not found to be the main explanatory factor for 
French and German negotiation performance in either ‘uploading’ or 
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‘reuploading’. Regarding ‘uploading’ negotiations, while both France and 
Germany relied on information to enhance strategies based on preference 
intensity, the former played only a secondary role. The process-tracing 
analysis revealed that France and Germany utilized information largely to 
signal resolve regarding certain issues in the SGP dossier, in aid of furthering 
strategies based on preference intensity. Further to that, information did not 
appear to have explanatory power for French and German negotiation 
success, except in the presence of each state’s low preference intensity for 
reaching agreement, in ‘uploading’.  
 While the predicted effects of context to limit the utility of 
information in ‘uploading’ negotiations, were thus confirmed, the 
mechanisms through which information was seen to operate, in combination 
with a low preference intensity, were not as predicted. In fact, the posited 
causal process through which information was predicted to affect negotiation 
performance was not confirmed by empirical evidence, in either ‘uploading’ 
or ‘reuploading’ negotiations. In both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, the utility of information was seen to be in delivering 
information about own positions, more than gathering information about the 
positions of other states, the latter being the process through which 
information was posited to operate, a priori.  
Regarding ‘reuploading’ negotiations specifically, contrary to 
predictions that information would be an important explanatory factor for 
negotiation success in the context of ‘reuploading’, information was not seen 
to be particularly useful for wielding influence in this case. Neither Germany 
nor France, the states with the highest levels of information, negotiated most 
successfully in ‘reuploading’. While Germany achieved some negotiation 
success with recourse to information, the process-tracing analysis revealed 
that information did not operate as predicted, namely as a way to gather 
preference information about other parties to the negotiation. Interestingly, 
the process-tracing analysis revealed that the causal process through which 
the German delegation deployed information in ‘reuploading’, was 
dependent on circumstances unique to Germany in these negotiations, and in 
any case led to only limited success.  
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 Thus, chapter 8 presented an in-depth discussion of possible reasons 
for the failure of the independent variable information to accurately predict 
states’ performance in ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, ultimately 
arriving at the conclusion that certain features of these negotiations, apart 
from the contextual distinctions between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ that 
are the main subject of analysis in this thesis, rendered information largely 
irrelevant for success in the specific case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP. Having said that, it was acknowledged in chapter 8 that these 
features of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, which have the 
cumulative effect of increasing total information, and reducing informational 
asymmetries amongst negotiating parties, as compared to ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, may be characteristic of ‘reuploading’ negotiations beyond the 
case of the SGP, and should thus be considered in analyzing the effects of 
contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations more 
generally. This would be a worthwhile endeavor for future research, given 
the implications of such a contextual change for the role of information as a 
bargaining resource in EU negotiations, a point returned to later in this 
chapter. 
 Chapter 8 also discussed how findings regarding the French and 
German strategies of privileging preference intensity, rather than 
information, to influence ‘uploading’ negotiations, are supportive of the 
rational choice institutionalist approach, which predicts that negotiating 
parties will adjust bargaining strategies in line with context, to achieve the 
fixed goal of negotiation success (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). In light 
of the limited utility of information in the context of ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, a logical question might then be why the German delegation 
relied on information to attempt to wield influence in ‘reuploading’. As 
discussed previously in the current chapter, and in chapter 8, information as 
delivery, rather than collection, was relevant for German success in these 
negotiations, though this was for reasons unique to Germany. Thus, it can be 
considered rational for the German delegation to attempt to deploy 
information as a bargaining resource for negotiation success, in the context 
of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, despite this resource being 
comparatively irrelevant to ‘reuploading’ negotiations beyond the German 
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case, and potentially more generally. Further to that, the Germans did not 
have an abundance of resources to choose from in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, which provides further explanation for the decision to rely on 
information.  
The following table summarizes main findings regarding information in the 
SGP negotiations: 
 
Table XIV. Summary of Findings for Information 
Variable Posited Causal Process Findings 
Information (‘uploading’) high level of information !know 
more about others’ positions than what is stated at 
formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate common 
ground(2)!situation remains the same unless others’ 
positions are nearer to the state(s) with the lowest 
preference intensity than was previously known(3) 
Disconfirmed from 
step 1 in the case of 
French and German 
use of information 
in ‘uploading’ 
Information (‘reuploading’) high level of information!know 
more about others’ positions than what is stated at 
formal negotiating sessions(1)!locate common 
ground(2)!propose compromises that encompass 
this common ground, whilst reflecting own positions 
as much as possible(3)!proposals are acceptable as 
they address others’ positions over crucial 
issues(4)!proposals incorporated into final 
agreement(5)!state has negotiated successfully(6) 
Disconfirmed from 
step 1 in the case of 




 Following chapter 8, chapter 9 discussed the independent variable 
content expertise. Chapter 9 presented the finding that, for the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands displayed 
equal numerical values for the independent variable content expertise, yet it 
was possible to make a qualitative distinction between the expertise of the 
Dutch delegation, and the Belgian and German delegations, whereby the 
former ultimately had less effective content expertise than the latter two. 
Thus, chapter 9 predicted that Germany and Belgium would negotiate most 
successfully in ‘uploading’, though this was disconfirmed by the evidence, 
insofar as Germany did negotiate most successfully, while Belgium was the 
least successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations. Nonetheless, Germany did 
not achieve this success with recourse to content expertise, but rather 
preference intensity, which, as hypothesized, was more relevant for success 
in the context of ‘uploading’ than was content expertise.  
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This also explains why Belgium did not negotiate successfully, 
despite having a high level of content expertise in ‘uploading’. Further, 
chapter 9 revealed that content expertise did not feature as a bargaining 
resource for any of the states under analysis, in ‘uploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP. This is fairly unsurprising in light of the expectation that context 
would serve to diminish the utility of content expertise for negotiation 
success, in ‘uploading’.  
 Main findings for the ‘reuploading’ negotiations were that the 
Belgian delegation had the highest level of content expertise and, while 
achieving some notable success in these negotiations, did not negotiate as 
successfully as did the Dutch. The Dutch were found to have a high level of 
content expertise, and to have relied on this resource to negotiate 
successfully in ‘reuploading’, while the Belgian delegation was seen to 
utilize process expertise rather than content expertise, to influence the 
outcome of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. While contrary to the actual 
predictions advanced regarding content expertise, in light of each states’ 
value for this independent variable, the finding that the Dutch relied on 
content expertise to negotiate successfully in ‘reuploading’, nonetheless 
supported the hypothesized role of content expertise in the context of 
‘reuploading’.  
However, the evidence regarding Dutch negotiation performance in 
‘reuploading’ disconfirmed the posited causal process linking content 
expertise with negotiation success. Specifically, as discussed at length in 
chapter 9, the Dutch relied on content expertise to prevent some states’ 
positions being accommodated in a reformed SGP, and to frame their own 
proposals as in line with the intentions of the original pact, rather than 
relying on content expertise to propose technically acceptable compromises 
more quickly than other delegations, which was the process posited a priori.  
 Given that other delegations did not rely on content expertise in either 
‘uploading’ or ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP, there was a lack of 
additional evidence against which to compare observations of how the Dutch 
deployed content expertise in ‘reuploading’, so as to determine whether the 
causal mechanisms seen here are unique to the case at hand, or applicable 
more widely. Further to that, as discussed in chapter 9, the relevant literature 
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does not specify clearly the causal mechanisms through which content 
expertise operates to affect negotiation performance (for example Beach, 
2005; Tallberg, 2008), which complicated the process of positing a causal 
process a priori, and complicates that of assessing whether the findings from 
this case are unique or more typical. Clarifying the causal mechanisms 
through which content expertise operates to affect states’ negotiation 
performance was in fact one of the aims of this study. While findings from 
this thesis have produced conclusions regarding the case at hand, which 
contribute to an understanding of how content expertise can work to affect 
states’ negotiation performance, they have also generated further questions to 
be tackled in future research, surrounding the wider applicability of these 
observations. Specifically, there is a need to undertake similarly detailed 
studies as this thesis does, to enhance understanding of the intervening 
processes through which content expertise operates, and findings herein have 
laid the groundwork for such studies, in generating testable propositions.  
 Turning to the question of context, chapter 9 presented evidence that 
content expertise was not particularly useful in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
with the example of Germany eschewing content expertise in favor of a 
strategy based on preference intensity, discussed in that chapter. This 
reinforces, yet again, a central conclusion of the study, that there is a need to 
consider negotiation context in evaluating the role of specific bargaining 
resources. Further to that, chapter 9 discussed the need to look beyond the 
resources states have, in predicting their bargaining behavior, or their 
influence in negotiations, because the negotiation context matters in 
mediating the utility of said resources. This is in contrast to the approach 
taken by Dür and Mateo (2010), for example, who emphasize the resources 
states possess as the determinant of their bargaining strategy, apart from the 
wider context of negotiations. Such an approach leaves open the question of 
why the German delegation relied on preference intensity and, to a lesser 
extent, information, rather than content expertise, to influence ‘uploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP. This thesis has offered an approach to answering 
that question, which could be usefully applied to additional cases of EU 
negotiations. 
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The following table summarizes findings regarding the role of content 
expertise in the SGP negotiations: 
 
Table XV. Summary of Findings for Content Expertise 
Variable Posited Causal Process Findings 
Content 
Expertise 
(‘uploading’) high level of content expertise!know the 
technical boundaries for possible issue 
outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the range of 
agreement and propose compromises(2)!proposals reflect 
own positions within a technically acceptable range of 
agreement(3)!proposals rejected unless they reflect 
positions of the state(s) with the lowest preference 
intensity(4) 
Inconclusive, as 
no state was seen 





(‘reuploading’) high level of content expertise!know the 
technical boundaries for possible issue 
outcomes(1)!quicker to narrow down the range of 
agreement and propose compromises(2)!proposals reflect 
own positions within a technically acceptable range of 
agreement(3)!proposals incorporated into negotiated 
agreement(4)!state has negotiated successfully(5) 
Disconfirmed 
from step 1 in the 





 Turning to the final independent variable, chapter 10 discussed 
findings for process expertise. Regarding the ‘uploading’ negotiations, 
Belgium was found to have the highest level of process expertise, yet 
Belgium negotiated least successfully in ‘uploading’. While this 
demonstrates the lack of explanatory power for process expertise, as applied 
to ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, this is in line with the 
hypothesized role of context in limiting the utility of process expertise for 
achieving success in ‘uploading’ negotiations. Interestingly, in line with the 
posited process through which process expertise would operate in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, Belgium was able to wield influence with recourse 
to process expertise, though this was in aid of brokering a compromise 
between France and Germany, the two states with the lowest preference 
intensities for reaching agreement, rather than in support of uniquely Belgian 
positions. Thus, evidence presented in chapter 10 served to confirm the 
predicted role of process expertise in ‘uploading’ negotiations.  
 With regard to ‘reuploading’ negotiations, Belgium also had the most 
process expertise in ‘reuploading’, though the Belgians did not achieve the 
most success in ‘reuploading’. As discussed in chapter 9, on content 
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expertise, the Dutch negotiated most successfully in ‘reuploading’, which 
begs the question of whether content expertise is a more useful resource than 
process expertise generally. Despite achieving less negotiation success than 
the Dutch, chapter 10 presented evidence that the Belgians did negotiate 
successfully in ‘reuploading’, and did so with recourse to process expertise.  
While the causal mechanisms through which process expertise 
affected Belgian performance, in both ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, were largely in line with a priori predictions, there were 
important observations about the operation of process expertise in 
‘reuploading’ negotiations in particular, which had not been predicted. 
Specifically, while tenure of delegation members was included in the 
analysis as an indicator of member state process expertise, this was not 
expected to play a role in the causal process. Nonetheless, the credibility of 
Belgian negotiators, owing to their tenure and to policy continuity, was seen 
in chapter 10 to have played a role in the causal process through which 
Belgium achieved negotiation success in ‘reuploading’, specifically 
regarding the question of debt in a reformed SGP. It is not possible to 
conclude as to whether this is typical of the causal mechanisms through 
which process expertise operates, though further research should certainly 
strive to confirm this.  
 Regarding more conclusive contributions to existing literature, 
chapter 10 discussed how there is a clear need to consider context in 
evaluating the role of process expertise as a bargaining resource. This can be 
seen in the differential role of process expertise, as deployed by Belgium, in 
the ‘uploading’ versus ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Further to 
that, the use by Belgium of process expertise to facilitate compromise in 
‘uploading’ negotiations, serves to question the overarching distinction 
between bargaining and problem-solving in analyzing negotiation situations 
(for example Elgström and Jönsson, 2000). In other words, the presence of a 
cooperative bargaining tactic, exemplified by Belgian reliance on process 
expertise in ‘uploading’, and a competitive bargaining tactic, exemplified by 
German reliance on preference intensity in the same negotiations, indicates 
that cooperative and competitive bargaining, or bargaining and problem-
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solving behavior, tend to coexist in any one negotiation situation, as argued 
by Dür and Mateo (2010).  
 Where the argument advanced by Dür and Mateo (2010) is not so 
effectively supported by the evidence, though, is in the case of Belgium 
eschewing preference intensity to privilege process expertise, and the 
Netherlands similarly eschewing preference intensity for a strategy based on 
content expertise, in ‘reuploading’ negotiations. It is not clear from the 
approach taken by Dür and Mateo (2010) why a state would at times choose 
to deploy some resources rather than others, which have the effect of 
conveying hard versus soft bargaining tactics, absent some consideration of 
the negotiation context and the extent to which this mediates the utility of 
specific bargaining resources.  The rational choice institutionalist approach 
taken to analyzing the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP, is an attempt to overcome such open questions, and, as advocated 
repeatedly, this approach could be usefully applied to analyses of additional 
EU negotiations.   
The following table summarizes findings regarding the role of process 
expertise in the SGP negotiations: 
 
Table XVI. Summary of Findings for Process Expertise 
Variable Posited Causal Process Findings 
Process 
Expertise 
(‘uploading’) high level of process expertise!aware 
of institutional nuance surrounding 
negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for 
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose 
compromises that reflect own positions(3)!proposals 
rejected unless they reflect positions of the state or 
states with the lowest preference intensity(4) 
Confirmed in the case 
of Belgian use of 




(‘reuploading’) high level of process 
expertise!aware of institutional nuance surrounding 
negotiations(1)!identify effective routes for 
influence(2)!exploit this route to propose 
compromises that reflect own positions(3)!proposals 
incorporated into negotiated agreement(4)!state has 
negotiated successfully(5) 
 
Partly confirmed in the 
case of Belgian use of 
process expertise in 
‘reuploading’, though 
evidence from this case 
points to a causal role 
for the tenure of 
delegation members, 
which might be part of 
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11.2 Comparing ‘uploading’, ‘reuploading’ and the 2011 Negotiations 
Earlier chapters advanced the theoretical argument that the distinct context in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations would impact on the relevance of 
specific bargaining resources in each case, and thus the resources member 
states must privilege to negotiate successfully in each. A great deal of 
empirical evidence has been offered in support of this argument, with a focus 
on the role of independent variables - bargaining resources - in explaining 
the dependent variable - states’ negotiation performance, as well as the 
specific mechanisms linking the cause and outcome variables, and the role of 
context in mediating these causal processes. In order to facilitate some 
reflection on the current state of affairs in the Eurozone, it is useful to 
consider the more general process and outcome of the ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations 
 One of the most significant pieces of information, in this regard, is 
that the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP were dominated by France 
and Germany. This may seem an obvious point, given the evidence already 
presented of the superior negotiation performance of these states in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations, though this Franco-German dominance is 
decidedly unmatched by any Dutch dominance in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, despite the successes of that delegation in ‘reuploading’. Thus, 
the importance of this observation lies in the distinction between negotiation 
success and dominance.  
A state can achieve negotiation success in that the delegation secures 
an outcome nearest to their position over the issues under consideration, yet 
this does not necessarily mean that the state dominates negotiations, only that 
this state succeeds amongst the group of states vying for influence. This was 
indeed the case in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where the majority of 
states were active in shaping the outcome to achieve an agreement acceptable 
to all parties (interview, Luxembourgish finance ministry), but this was not 
the case in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, where a central goal was to bridge 
the gap between France and Germany in order to secure the wider goal of 
completing EMU (interview, British treasury).  While it was necessary to 
bridge the gap between the French and Dutch, for instance, to secure 
agreement in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, this was simply because these 
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states occupied opposite ends of the spectrum along which positions lay, 
rather than being part of a wider need for French and Dutch ascent, in 
particular.  
In contrast to this, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the need to balance 
seeking a politically acceptable compromise over the pact specifically, with 
the wider constraint of securing progress toward the single currency, had the 
effect of constraining all those states not essential to completion of the 
project, which led to Franco-German dominance. This is not to say that all 
other states were sidelined in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, as of course I 
have presented evidence on the role of other states in facilitating agreement 
over the SGP, and it is too far a simplification to argue that the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations were solely about France and Germany. Rather, the key point is 
that, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, it was essential, de facto, to keep 
onboard France and Germany, rather than any other state, in order for 
negotiations to be successful. This is in contrast to the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, where the ascent of all states was equally necessary, both 
practically and procedurally.  
 Without considering particular bargaining resources or the strategies 
states might rely on, this distinct environment between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ stands to impact on the general outcome agreement. 
Specifically, when there is a need to deliver agreement over policy as part of 
a wider, immensely important political goal, the likelihood of having a 
workable policy decreases substantially. This is apparent in the 
incompleteness of the Maastricht Treaty with regard to the specific operation 
of EMU, which precipitated the original SGP negotiations, and in the failure 
of the original SGP as witnessed with the crisis of 2003, which precipitated 
the reform negotiations.  
The following examples serve to illustrate this in the case of the 
original SGP agreement. One approach taken to overcoming divides between 
the French and German positions, when compromise did not appear possible, 
was to include the phrase ‘as a rule’ in drafting the agreement (interviews, 
British treasury, German finance ministry a, Dutch finance ministry a and 
Dutch finance ministry b). This can be seen in reference to the ‘exceptional 
and temporary’ circumstances clause in the original SGP, whereby the 
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member states commit to take, ‘as a rule’, a certain numerical reference point 
into consideration in deciding on the existence of an excessive deficit in the 
case of potentially ‘exceptional and temporary circumstances’ (OJ L 209, 
1997a). While such ambiguous language can have the effect of facilitating 
agreement over a policy, this also sets the stage for potential future conflict 
in implementing the policy.  
 Another example of this trend is in the resolution on growth and 
employment added to the stability pact in order to satisfy the new French 
Socialist government in June 1997. While it was made apparent that the new 
French negotiators would demand some concession on the question of 
growth, to sell to their domestic public, it was also clear that the German 
delegation would not accept any meaningful changes to the stability-inducing 
goal of the pact as it was. The solution to this was to add a vaguely worded 
resolution on growth and employment, which had no practical implications 
for policy (interview, Dutch finance ministry a and Council secretariat a; 
Lichfield, 1997; Webster, 1997).  
 While neither of these points was the direct catalyst for the SGP crisis 
of 2003, they are illustrative of the effects on agreement outcomes in the 
presence of high stakes and multi-level political pressure, which 
characterized the ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP. To be sure, the 
stakes were high in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations as well, given the potential 
stability risks to the single currency, though these were less political than the 
risk of a breakdown in ‘uploading’ negotiations and resultant failure to 
deliver the single currency. It is unsurprising, then, that the two states 
capable of halting progress toward this hugely significant political 
achievement would have dominated negotiations over the SGP, and that the 
efforts of other parties involved would aim toward bridging the gap between 
them. Further to that, the motivations for securing agreement at the expense 
of clarity of content are easy to comprehend. None of this is to say that, in 
the absence of such political expediency, the reformed pact that emerged 
from ‘reuploading’ negotiations in 2005 was a picture of implementable 
brilliance. However, this iteration of the pact did go some way toward 
addressing ambiguities in the original, and the most significant failings 
witnessed in conjunction with its design since 2005, had more to do with its 
  270 
excessive focus on deficits and, to a lesser extent debt, at the expense of the 
wider macroeconomic scenario in a member state, than with ambiguity as 
such.  
 To return to the aforementioned comparison of the stakes in 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, as well as having different meaning overall, 
the consequences of one outcome or another were, in the case of ‘uploading’, 
distinct for each member state, though this was not so in the case of 
‘reuploading’. For example, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, the agreement 
outcome, as well as even the positions states could defend, had implications 
for their membership in the future single currency. In the case of such states 
as Italy, Spain and Portugal, that very much wanted to gain first round 
membership in EMU, a strong stability pact was seen as something that 
could ease the concerns of stability-oriented states like Germany and the 
Netherlands, which saw membership of the former states in the currency 
union as a potential stability risk (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Along the 
same lines, these states could not take strong positions against such proposals 
as penalties for breaching the deficit ceiling, regardless their opposition to 
this, for fear of provoking the response that they should not join the currency 
union in that case (interviews, British treasury and Council secretariat a). 
Thus, the way delegations approached these negotiations was dictated 
somewhat by the risks to them from the stringency or otherwise of the 
outcome agreement, combined with the potential costs of non-membership in 
the single currency.  
 In addition to the content of any agreement that was reached, the 
costs to member states from failure to complete EMU were different, 
depending, for instance, on such political factors as domestic support for a 
single currency or the economic need for enhanced credibility in financial 
markets that was expected to result from currency union. Thus, to the extent 
that SGP negotiations broke down during ‘uploading’ and, with that, 
progress to the single currency, Italy would still have to suffer the high 
borrowing costs associated with an inflation-prone currency, whereas 
Germany would not have had this problem. In the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, 
on the other hand, a breakdown would have been equally costly, or not, for 
all member states, depending on whether a defunct SGP led to fiscal 
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profligacy and ultimately an unstable single currency.
31
 This had the effect of 
removing, in the ‘reuploading’ negotiations, the constraints that were present 
for some states in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, not only because the costs of 
failure would be spread evenly in the former, but also because there was not 




 Taking into consideration these points of difference between the 
‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations, it is clear that the theoretical 
argument regarding contextual changes between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ is supported by empirical evidence in the case of the SGP 
negotiations. In addition to evidence presented in the empirical section, 
regarding the impact of these contextual changes on the role of specific 
bargaining resources in each, there is reason to believe that the outcome 
agreements resulting from negotiations in these distinct contexts will be 
affected as well. Specifically, as outlined above, the wider question of 
whether a change will take place, as bound up with the outcome of reaching 
agreement or not in ‘uploading’ negotiations, can result in ambiguous, 
unworkable policy arrangements as the only way to prevent a breakdown in 
negotiations.  
When such a constraint is removed, as seen in the ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, the likelihood is that resultant agreements will not suffer from 
the same ambiguity as agreements concluded in an ‘uploading’ round of 
negotiations, because the motivation for this is limited in the context of 
‘reuploading’, rather than ‘uploading’. While this thesis does not aim to test 
such predictions, and existing data does not provide for conclusive findings 
one way or the other, the distinct features of ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations in general, and those in the case of the SGP in particular, could 
be expected to shape agreements from each accordingly, which is a possible 
causal relationship that certainly warrants further research.  
                                       
31
 With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the impact of an ineffective policy to ensure 
fiscal discipline in the Eurozone has not had the same costs for all member states, but this 
current situation is distinct from what would have occurred if the ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
had broken down in 2005, when markets still considered all members’ sovereign debt to be 
equally safe. 
32
 This is only so for negotiations amongst Eurozone states - new member states wishing to 
gain entry into the euro were wary of expressing a preference that might reveal budgetary 
weaknesses (interview, Council secretariat b). 
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 Turning to a more contemporary focus, the sovereign debt crisis in 
the Eurozone that precipitated a joint EU-IMF bailout of Greece in May 
2010, which was the first of many such bailouts for Greece and other 
Eurozone members, has led to a number of attempts to reform Eurozone 
governance, so as to tackle the current crisis and prevent the onset of future 
such crises. Among these was an agreement reached in 2011 to reform the 
SGP. This agreement makes a number of important changes to the existing 
SGP, including changing the voting rules under which the Council decides 
on a recommendation from the Commission to escalate the EDP against a 
member state that has failed to correct an excessive deficit. Specifically, 
under the reformed pact, a majority of states must vote against the 
Commission’s recommendation to implement the EDP in order for a state to 
avoid sanctions, whereas previously the Commission’s recommendation was 
only upheld if a majority of member states in the Council voted in favor.  
Had this rule been in place in 2003, it is unlikely that the French and 
Germans could have escaped sanction for their excessive deficits, the event 
which precipitated the first reform negotiations in 2004 (interview, Council 
secretariat b). Another significant change in the new pact is that, rather than 
the corrective arm focusing only on deficits, the broader macroeconomic 
picture will be taken into consideration, with the MIP. This widening of the 
focus is an attempt to address the failure of the SGP to detect problems such 
as those in Spain, which had appeared to be a shining example of budgetary 
sustainability, yet has turned out to be one of the gravest threats to the 
stability of the Eurozone.  
 While the discussion of differences between ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’, as applied to the case of ‘uploading’ and the first 
‘reuploading’ negotiations that have been covered thus far, is also relevant in 
considering the differences between ‘uploading’ negotiations and the most 
recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations, given that the question of completing 
EMU and membership in the single currency were not a feature of the latter 
negotiations, there remain important differences between the first and second 
‘reuploading’ negotiations as well. First and foremost, given the severity of 
the Eurozone debt crisis at the time of the most recent ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, neither continued membership in the single currency for some 
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states, nor the continued existence of the single currency generally, were 
certain. Further to that, securing a credible agreement to strengthen Eurozone 
governance was deemed essential if the single currency was to survive fully 
intact, and hence the political expediency of delivering a compromise 
agreement, notably one that could be sold as a significant improvement on 
current policy, was akin to the political significance of progressing to full 
EMU, the backdrop against which the ‘uploading’ negotiations took place. In 
this way, there are some similarities between the 2011 ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations and the ‘uploading’ negotiations, which would not normally be 
present between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
 The most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP had the 
unusual feature that the default condition in case of no agreement, albeit 
indirectly, could have been a return to domestic policy arrangements. In 
other words, had the negotiations failed to produce an agreement, financial 
markets might have responded with unsustainable borrowing costs for Spain, 
Italy or even France, prompting the exit of multiple members and/or the 
eventual breakup of the Eurozone, to name one possible scenario. With 
regard to the outcome of negotiations, then, the need to sacrifice clarity of 
content due to the political expediency of securing a compromise, which I 
argue led to an ambiguous agreement in ‘uploading’ negotiations, might also 
have been a factor in these most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
Of course, it is also possible to argue the opposite, that the particular 
political pressure in this case of ‘reuploading’ negotiations was such as to 
make far less likely an ambiguous compromise, which would have sent the 
wrong signal to financial markets, with highly deleterious consequences. 
Thus, negotiating parties, aware of this, were prepared to make compromises 
that they would not have made under different circumstances, in order to 
deliver a sufficiently clear agreement. Ultimately, this is an empirical, rather 
than a theoretical question, which relates to negotiators’ perceptions of the 
risks and costs of Eurozone breakup resulting from failure to deliver a 
credible agreement, as compared to the costs, political and economic, of 
compromising on a position in order to facilitate agreement over SGP 
reform. Regardless the actual outcome, and the extent to which the context of 
negotiations can be seen to shape this, the 2011 ‘reuploading’ negotiations 
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over the SGP represent a very interesting case where the default condition in 
case of no agreement is potentially more similar to that in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, than in the first ‘reuploading’ negotiations.  
 Another important question to consider is the impact of context in the 
2011 ‘reuploading’ negotiations, as compared to that in ‘uploading’ and 
previous ‘reuploading’ negotiations, on the process of member state 
influence. As mentioned in the previous section, one significant difference 
between the ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ negotiations was the fact that, in 
the former, some member states were severely constrained as a result of the 
EMU membership decision looming over negotiations, as well as the 
differential costs of a breakdown in negotiations for distinct member states. 
In comparison with the most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations, then, the 
question is whether the risk of some states having to exit the Eurozone 
effectively approximates the membership question that surrounded 
‘uploading’ negotiations. Along the same lines, there is the question of 
whether a Eurozone breakup can be considered equally costly for all member 
states, or differentially so, with the latter case approximating the differential 
costs for distinct member states of failure to complete the single currency, as 
in the context of ‘uploading’.  
 In order to treat these two questions separately, it is necessary to 
make the assumption that the exit of one or more member states from the 
Eurozone would not lead to the breakdown of the currency union as a whole, 
in which case the issues would blend together. It is by no means certain that 
this assumption would be true in practice, but nor is it certain that the reverse 
would be true, so for the purposes of discussion, I begin with the assumption 
that the exit of one or more member states would not prompt the dissolution 
of the entire Eurozone. Thus, in comparing the most recent ‘reuploading’ 
situation to the context in ‘uploading’, the argument is that those indebted 
Eurozone members that were dependent, for solvency, on the continued flow 
of rescue funds, could not defend positions in opposition to fiscal discipline, 
for fear of signaling a less than credible commitment to undertaking the 
structural reforms on which continued aid has always been dependent, at 
least in theory. To put this in more concrete terms, regardless of whether the 
Portuguese were opposed to changing voting rules in the Council so as to 
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make it more likely that Commission recommendations to implement the 
EDP would pass, the delegation may have felt unable to advertise any 
opposition, or bargain in support of it, for fear of losing the confidence of 
creditors and, without future funding, defaulting on sovereign debt and being 
forced to exit the Eurozone. This would be very similar to the constraints on 
Portugal, for instance, in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, where the risk was 
failing to gain, rather than losing membership in the single currency, but the 
effects, in terms of the context of negotiations impacting on the process of 
member state influence, specifically prohibiting Portugal from effectively 
promoting certain positions (interview, British treasury official and Council 
secretariat official a), would be more or less the same.  
 However, one point of difference in this regard might be the more 
widespread effect of constraints on member state influence, resulting from 
context in the recent ‘reuploading’ rather than ‘uploading’ negotiations. 
Specifically, in the latter, the only risk of Germany not gaining membership 
in the single currency was if the currency union didn’t come to pass, and in 
that case there would have been costs strictly from a counterfactual point of 
view, in terms of losses to exporters from currency exchange charges or the 
higher value of the D-Mark relative to what the euro might have been.
33
 It is 
this feature of the ‘uploading’ negotiations that appears distinct from the 
2011 ‘reuploading’ negotiations, in that the costs to Germany from exiting 
the Eurozone in 2011 would have been substantial, given the benefits to 
German exporters from a much weaker currency, in the form of the euro, 
than would be a new D-Mark, among other costs.  
It is questionable, then, whether the risks of Eurozone exit, which 
surrounded the 2011 ‘reuploading’ negotiations, approximate the risks of 
failing to join the currency union, which loomed over the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations, because in the former, this risk is arguably applicable to all 
member states, which was not the case in the ‘uploading’ negotiations. The 
practical effects of this, in terms of constraining member states and so 
                                       
33
 The political costs to Germany from exiting SGP negotiations would have been extremely 
significant, but only to the extent that the German delegation brought this about. In the 
context of this discussion, I refer only to the costs from a breakdown in negotiations that was 
not precipitated by the state in question - Germany in this example and Portugal in the 
previous one - purely to facilitate the comparison between negotiations.   
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impacting on the process of negotiations, is another empirical, rather than 
theoretical question. However, in terms of comparing the context in 
‘uploading’ with that in the most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP, the leveling of the playing field that occurs following conclusion of 
‘uploading’ negotiations, does appear to have changed the context in the 
most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations, just as it did for the first 
‘reuploading’ negotiations in 2004-05.  
 Turning to the second point introduced above, regarding the risks of a 
Eurozone breakup and whether that would be equally costly for all member 
states, it is not possible to argue with authority one way or the other, because 
of the host of variables involved in such an event, but it certainly appears that 
all member states would be equally constrained by this looming eventuality, 
which serves to distinguish the context in the most recent ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations from that in the ‘uploading’ negotiations. In other words, the 
costs to the Italian economy from maintaining the status quo of a national 
currency, and the constant struggle against inflationary pressures to keep that 
currency in the ERM, were clearly distinct from the respective costs to the 
German economy had the status quo been maintained in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). While such a 
counterfactual argument is not particularly compelling, it is sufficient to 
illustrate the differential way in which distinct states were constrained during 
the ‘uploading’ negotiations, as compared to the most recent ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations, where it is very difficult to predict which member state’s 
economy, if any, would be left standing in the case of a Eurozone breakup. 
Thus, with regard to the effects of context on the process of negotiations, and 
specifically the constraints on member states in defending, or even revealing 
their positions, there is a clear difference between the ‘uploading’ and most 
recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations, which lies in the asymmetrical 
interdependence between states prior to ‘uploading’ negotiations, compared 
to the more symmetrical interdependence thereafter.  
 Having outlined the broad contours of negotiation context in the 
‘uploading’, ‘reuploading’ and most recent ‘reuploading’ negotiations over 
the SGP, the focus turns now to elaborating the implications of this 
discussion, and of the more concrete findings presented in previous chapters, 
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for the current situation in the Eurozone. Many explanations have been given 
for the Eurozone debt crisis, which range from the general unsuitability of 
the EU for a currency union, to the poor design of EMU, to a lack of 
progress on painful yet necessary structural reforms, to name but a few (for 
example Krugman, 2012; Spiegel International, 2012; Reuters, 2013). On the 
question of why EU leaders have so far failed to find a convincing solution 
to the crisis, the answers are equally numerous and varied, but an 
overarching theme behind these responses points to the distance between 
economically necessary and politically acceptable measures (for example 
Eichengreen, 2011; Tilford, 2012). Whether that gap can ultimately be 
bridged appears to represent the answer to whether the Eurozone crisis can 
be solved.  
 There is a surprising continuity in the debate over Eurozone 
economic governance, which stretches back even before the start of 
‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP in 1995. Throughout that time, this 
has been, to simplify somewhat, a debate between the forces that would 
emphasize price stability and fiscal discipline and those that favor greater 
political discretion over economic policy to deliver growth and employment, 
rather than stability above all else (see chapter 2; Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999; Howarth, 2007). This was a feature of the ‘uploading’ negotiations 
over the SGP just as it is central to debate in the Eurozone today.  
While the two sides of this debate have generally been Germany, 
fighting the stability cause, and France, pushing the growth agenda, the 
reform negotiations over the SGP in 2004-05 represented something of a 
departure from the trend of France and Germany occupying opposite ends of 
the spectrum (Chang, 2006; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). However, as has 
hopefully become clear from preceding chapters, findings regarding the first 
‘reuploading’ negotiations that emerged from the study at hand indicate that 
considerable, if more subtle, differences still separated France and Germany 
in the 2004-05 ‘reuploading’ negotiations. Specifically, Germany had not 
departed from stability-oriented policy in the lead up to the 2004-05 
‘reuploading’ negotiations, but had run afoul of the original SGP in 
undertaking structural reforms to ensure stability in the long-term (see 
chapter 8). Thus, in arguing for a reform of the pact to encourage such 
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painful, yet necessary structural reforms, the Germans were mistakenly put 
in the camp of those states arguing for a weaker pact, as opposed to an 
increasingly workable pact, which was in fact the German goal (interviews, 
Council secretariat b, Commission d, German finance ministry b). 
 This interpretation of the 2004-05 reforms and, related, the German 
role in the 2003 SGP crisis, sheds some light on the German approach to the 
current debt crisis in the Eurozone, and can clarify some misunderstandings 
therein. With regard to the latter point, some commentators have looked on 
in horror as the Germans insist on ever more austerity from their fellow 
Eurozone members, and stricter rules to prevent them doing exactly what the 
Germans did in the face of hard economic times and looming sanctions under 
the then current SGP. However, when one considers German impatience 
toward states that did not use economically benign circumstances to 
implement difficult structural reforms, regardless of whether they were 
budgetary saints, as in the case of Spain, or sinners, as in the case of Greece, 
in light of the fact that Germany did undertake this difficult feat, it leads to a 
very different appraisal of the situation.  
Unfortunately, the result of this appraisal is to see how politically 
difficult it would be, at domestic level, for the Germans to compromise on 
their stance at EU-level. This recalls an earlier point, about the ambiguity of 
content that is sometimes required to secure agreement in the face of political 
expediency combined with conflicting positions. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty 
first, and then the original SGP, left some questions open to secure 
agreement in aid of achieving the politically monumental goal of a single 
European currency. However, in trying to do the same thing to achieve the 
politically monumental goal of preserving the single European currency, 
financial markets, on uniquely high alert, keep thwarting these efforts. 
Again, this relates to the point raised earlier, that in the unusual 
circumstances of the Eurozone debt crisis, it is difficult to determine whether 
an ambiguous policy compromise in aid of a wider political goal is a viable 
option, or whether genuine compromise to present a bold, credible solution is 
uniquely necessary.  
 With this in mind, the process of European economic and monetary 
integration may finally have reached a point where leaders must genuinely 
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reconcile their differences in approaching economic policy, or abandon the 
project. However, as has been the case throughout, and is perhaps more so at 
present, the political difficulty of compromise for any and all parties is 
staggeringly great. For the German leadership, this would essentially mean 
acknowledging that their domestic public had been misled in believing the 
currency union would not be a transfer union, and that the euro would be at 
least as stable as the D-Mark. For the French leadership, it would mean 
accepting that continued austerity, rather than growth, would be the 
Eurozone norm for the foreseeable future.  
This is to name only two examples of the national political costs that 
represent a constant constraint on the possibility for member states, and the 
supranational organs of the EU, to tackle the crisis in the Eurozone. 
However, regardless the unique nature of national concerns and constraints, 
the overarching point remains that politics must be separated from 
economics, if the crisis is to be meaningfully solved, and design flaws in the 
Eurozone addressed. This may seem like the holy grail for decision-makers 
everywhere, given that politics and economics are hopelessly intertwined, 
though the reality is that room exists for EU leaders to separate further these 
facets of policy.  
 Specifically, there is a need to determine whether maintaining the 
single currency remains a political goal, akin to the overarching goal of 
rendering impossible the onset of another European war, which has been 
bound up with European integration throughout its progression. The 
implication of this would be that economic costs must be subjugated and the 
commitment made clear that no amount of money is too much to save a 
Eurozone member. Of course, this would require some acquiescence on the 
part of Europe’s citizens, to what is ultimately a transfer union, rather than a 
mere currency union, and that acquiescence may prove elusive.  
This is surely preferable, nonetheless, to putting up still staggering 
sums of taxpayer money to arrive at half solutions, and without the direct 
consent of those taxpayers, not to mention demanding punishing austerity 
from other national citizens, absent a commitment to greater solidarity across 
the Eurozone. On the other hand, it would be possible for leaders to 
acknowledge that their predecessors had miscalculated the economic costs 
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associated with the political goal of currency union, and that there was a 
point at which the former costs would become too great for the single 
currency to be sustained. In that case, it would be deeply unfortunate that so 
much money had already gone into abortive attempts to save the Eurozone, 
yet less so than if this were admitted five years hence, after still more money 
had been sunk. Neither this nor the above approach would likely prove 
popular, but then that hardly distinguishes them from the approaches taken to 
tackling the crisis thus far.  
 With regard to potential for solving the crisis, it seems that three 
specific findings emerging from the analysis in this thesis must be taken into 
account. First, there is a tendency among the states involved in negotiating 
these agreements, to sacrifice clarity of content on the altar of political 
expediency. While this has proved to be of limited utility in past, excepting 
the short-term feasibility of such an approach, it has proved to be useless, if 
not highly damaging, in the face of vigilant bond markets and angry 
domestic publics.  
The second finding is that context matters. The strategies states 
adopted to influence the outcome of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP, differ from those taken to influence ‘uploading’ negotiations. It is 
highly likely that context mattered in the most recent ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations as well, and in-depth analysis into those negotiations would be 
of momentous import. With regard to negotiations still to come, it is essential 
that the member states involved, as well as supranational actors, take 
advantage of the fact that states are, to a large extent, locked into 
cooperation, making it very difficult to neutralize such effective resources as 
information, process expertise and content expertise. This has the effect of 
opening the way for influence from states that possess these resources, and 
perhaps even more so from the supranational actors that arguably possess 
them in greater quantity than any member state (Meerts and Cede, 2004; 
Beach, 2005), whilst lacking national constraints, and may thus be best 
placed to lead.  
Third, and finally, understanding why past agreements look the way 
they do, affects the capacity for negotiators to identify workable 
compromises (see chapter 9). This implicates a need to consider the history 
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of economic and monetary integration in Europe, and the compromises 
involved in the legal framework on which it is based, so as to identify the 
root of design flaws wreaking havoc currently, and the extent to which they 





11.3 Wider Implications and Future Research: Beyond the SGP 
This thesis has undertaken an in-depth analysis of ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the EU SGP, generating a number of 
interesting findings and contributions to existing literature, as well as 
propositions to be tested in future research. This section of the chapter 
articulates how the analysis conducted herein might apply to further 
instances of EU negotiations, beyond the SGP, with implications for 
potential avenues that warrant future investigation.  
Focusing on individual bargaining resources, findings regarding 
preference intensity point to the supreme importance of relative preference 
intensities in establishing policy at EU-level, where none yet exists. It is 
possible that features of the SGP negotiations, by which other negotiations 
are not characterized, such as the need for unanimous agreement, make 
relative preference intensities more directly explanatory in the former than 
latter situations, though this is not to negate the analytical leverage 
potentially gained from consideration of preference intensities in any 
negotiation situation. In other words, in the case of negotiations over policy 
that can ultimately be agreed by a qualified majority, it would nonetheless be 
possible to predict when a majority is likely to exist for agreement in a given 
form, if one were to observe the relative preference intensities and positions 
of member states party to the negotiation, and to consider voting weights. In 
general, the explanatory power of preference intensity, as seen in the 
‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, indicates that analyses of EU 
negotiations more generally should take this factor into account. Future 
research should aim to uncover the effects of preference intensity as a 
bargaining resource, in additional cases of EU negotiations, and, perhaps 
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more importantly, to test the effects of context in limiting the utility of 
preference intensity, in additional cases of ‘reuploading’ negotiations. 
 In light of findings regarding information as a bargaining resource, it 
does not appear that there is much potential for predicting the role of 
information in EU negotiations beyond the case of the SGP. However, 
findings from the case at hand certainly represent important points of 
departure for the direction of future research, including the question of 
whether information generally operates more through delivery than 
gathering, as indicated from the analysis of both ‘uploading’ and 
‘reuploading’ negotiations over the SGP. Existing contributions emphasize 
that the utility of information is in enhancing understanding of the 
preferences of other negotiating parties (for example Tallberg, 2008; Naurin, 
2009), more so than clarifying own positions to other parties, the latter being 
the role of information this analysis revealed. This indicates a need to update 
understanding of the role of information in intergovernmental negotiations, 
to determine when and why information is more likely to operate for the 
purposes of delivery, rather than gathering.  
 Another interesting direction for future research lies in tackling the 
question of whether certain features of ‘reuploading’ negotiations over the 
SGP that appear to have diminished the utility of information as a bargaining 
resource in this case, are characteristic of ‘reuploading’ negotiations more 
generally. A great deal of literature has thus far analyzed the role of 
information in explaining the process and outcome of EU negotiations, not 
only from the standpoint of intergovernmental negotiations and differential 
levels of information amongst EU member states, as the current contribution 
does (for example Bailer, 2004; 2006; 2010), but also from the standpoint of 
informational discrepancies between national and supranational actors (for 
example Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2006). Regarding the latter category of 
contributions, if the context in ‘reuploading’ were found to minimize 
informational discrepancies across negotiating parties, in additional instances 
of EU negotiations, there is reason to believe that supranational actors, often 
theorized to hold an informational advantage, will be constrained in seeking 
to exploit that advantage in the context of ‘reuploading’ negotiations (see 
Beach, 2005; Tallberg, 2006). This would have important implications for 
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debate over the influence of supranational versus national actors in EU 
decision-making, and thus warrants attention in future research.  
 Turning to content expertise, findings indicate that one question 
worthy of further investigation is whether the causal mechanisms through 
which the Dutch delegation impacted on ‘reuploading’ negotiations, with 
recourse to content expertise, are present in other instances of 
intergovernmental negotiations. Given the complexity of EU legislation 
generally (Tallberg, 2008),  there is reason to believe that the advantage 
enjoyed by the Dutch delegation, from having a representative present at 
‘reuploading’ negotiations who had also participated in ‘uploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, would be applicable to additional instances of EU 
negotiations, and this is supported by findings from Beach (2005) and 
Tallberg (2006; 2008), regarding the influence of both national and 
supranational actors. However, there remains a lack of clarity surrounding 
the specific causal mechanisms through which content expertise impacts on 
negotiation performance, and while findings from the case at hand certainly 
clarify the picture for this instance, further research is essential to determine 
whether content expertise typically operates through effectively preventing 
reforms outside the aims of the original agreement, and facilitating 
presentation of own positions as furthering said aims in an updated format, as 
seen in Dutch success in ‘reuploading’. 
 In terms of wider application of findings regarding both content 
expertise and process expertise, while it is not possible to assume that the 
effects of context in limiting the utility of these resources in the ‘uploading’ 
negotiations observed here, will be present in the wider universe of EU 
negotiations, it is certainly worth testing these findings in further cases, to 
determine whether they apply more generally. Both content expertise and 
process expertise are resources that could be cultivated by most any member 
state in the EU, and so an understanding of where these bargaining resources 
can be deployed effectively, would represent useful advice to states looking 
to maximize their influence with finite resources, as well as to researchers 
seeking to understand why states that might not appear likely to be 
influential in intergovernmental negotiations, sometimes are. 
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 Regarding process expertise specifically, the finding that the Belgian 
delegation deployed process expertise to achieve negotiation success in 
‘reuploading’, in combination with the finding that taking positions over a 
limited number of issues was the specific approach of the Belgian delegation, 
warrants further investigation. To the extent that this is an effective approach 
to influencing negotiations more generally, the implication would be that, 
rather than suffering from a deficit in terms of influencing EU negotiations, 
small states might have an advantage. This could be the case insofar as such 
an approach is uniquely suited for use by those states that anyway tend to 
take positions over only a selection of issues in a given dossier, namely 
smaller states (see Panke, 2012).  
Along similar lines, there is relevance regarding the question raised in 
chapter 4 and revisited in chapter 10, on the subject of how best to 
conceptualize negotiation performance in light of the differential number of 
issues over which states take positions. This is an issue Diana Panke (2012) 
has sought to address with the concept of ‘negotiation effectiveness’. The 
finding that the number of issues a state takes positions over might actually 
have explanatory weight in the influence they exert on intergovernmental 
negotiations, would move beyond Panke’s contribution, and generate fruitful 
engagement with existing literature that explores the role of issue 
characteristics as an explanatory factor for states’ bargaining strategies in EU 




11.4 Wider Implications and Future Research: Beyond the EU 
Turning to implications and the potential for future research, beyond the EU, 
regardless important differences between the EU and other IOs, the findings 
that emerge from this thesis demonstrate how analysis of negotiation 
processes and outcomes within these fora for international cooperation, 
should consider the relationship between negotiation context and states’ 
bargaining resources. Thus, one wider implication from the findings herein is 
that context matters, and it matters not only in affecting the likelihood of 
parties concluding an agreement, or the boldness of compromises that can be 
achieved (see Keohane, 1984; Ostrom, 1986; Scharpf, 1988; Dimitrova and 
  285 
Steunenberg, 2000), but also in impacting on the bargaining resources states 
can rely on to wield influence. Further to that, contributions that assess the 
general utility of different bargaining resources, or the extent to which some 
states are more influential than others (see Krasner, 1991; Zartman and 
Rubin, 2000; Bailer, 2004; 2006; 2008; Dür and Mateo, 2010), while 
providing important insight, leave open the key question of how negotiation 
context can alter this, even controlling for negotiating parties, forum and 
policy area under discussion. This thesis has sought to answer such open 
questions, by considering the effects of context on distributional outcomes, 
via bargaining resources.  
 In thinking about how findings from this study can apply more 
specifically outside the EU, it is useful to consider how the EU differs from 
other IOs, and what effects such differences might have on the processes 
observed here. Along those lines, a crucial feature of distinction is the 
densely institutionalized cooperation between EU member states, which is 
not characteristic of most IOs. The corollary to this is that when EU policy is 
initially established, states are effectively locked in and it is very difficult to 
depart from cooperation in future. This was the case with the SGP 
negotiations, and it is the case in other areas, including such salient policies 
as immigration and border control, as well as the more mundane fields of 
fisheries and agricultural regulation. The EU has sophisticated legal 
procedures to deal with compliance failure, and a high court to adjudicate 
disputes regarding discrepancies between national and supranational law.  
 This is not so in an organization like the WTO, which has a 
comparatively limited remit and no independent bureaucracy to sanction 
members, the dispute settlement mechanism being under the discretion of 
member states. While this indicates some reason to believe that changes 
theorized, and observed in this study, between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’ 
negotiations over the SGP, may not apply in the same way to less densely 
institutionalized cooperation between states, it also points to an interesting 
area for future research. Specifically, a comparative inter-institutional study 
of changes between ‘uploading’ and ‘reuploading’, across IOs that are 
characterized by variation on density of cooperation, or level of 
institutionalization, would be a highly useful exercise to enhance 
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understanding of how institutional design impacts on negotiation processes at 
different stages of cooperation, as well as whether the shift from ‘uploading’ 
to ‘reuploading’ can still be seen to mediate the utility of different bargaining 
resources in each.  
These findings could have important implications for the variety of 
states that are capable of influencing negotiations in different institutional 
settings. It is particularly important to understand such effects in institutions 
like the WTO or UN, where membership is far wider and features greater 
diversity than does the EU, with the result that resource capabilities should 
differ much more amongst members of those former organizations. 
Knowledge of how negotiation context might offer an advantage to states 
with individual-level resources that can be cultivated more easily than can 
structural resources, for instance, would have important practical and 
academic utility.  
 Further to that, this study reports in-depth on how specific bargaining 
resources, namely preference intensity, information, content expertise and 
process expertise can be deployed to affect negotiation outcomes, by EU 
member states. While there is reason to assume that the same causal 
processes would be at work in any institutional setting, not least because this 
thesis draws on literature from a variety of fields, beyond EU studies, in 
theorizing the effects of and operationalizing the independent variables 
analyzed here, it is essential to test this assumption through empirical studies 
of additional institutions. Learning that the causal mechanisms through 
which information affects states’ performance in IMF negotiations are 
distinct from those at work in the EU, would be an important contribution to 
the literature on international negotiations, and to enhancing understanding 
of how agreements are reached in these institutions. Assessing the extent to 
which these distinctions in casual process might relate to variation in 
institutional design, the subject of study outlined above, would have further 
utility still.  
 This study has demonstrated that a variety of bargaining resources 
can be used to influence intergovernmental negotiations in the EU, and that 
the more bargaining resources states possess, the more able they are to 
influence negotiation outcomes. Thus, Germany negotiated most successfully 
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in ‘uploading’, because Germany had a low preference intensity for reaching 
agreement, while the Netherlands negotiated most successfully in 
‘reuploading’ because of a high level of content expertise. Crucially, though, 
analysis of negotiation context has demonstrated that context matters, and 
that it is essential to consider the mediating effects of context on the utility of 
specific bargaining resources, to understand how and why member states 
achieve negotiation success. This serves to explain why Germany privileged 
preference intensity, despite possessing a high level of information and 
process expertise, in ‘uploading’ negotiations, and why Belgium negotiated 
successfully in ‘reuploading’, with recourse to process expertise, though not 
in ‘uploading’, despite deploying a high level of process expertise in the 
latter context as well. Thus, the wider implication of these findings is that a 
dynamic approach, which combines analysis of both resources capabilities 
and negotiation context, as applied in the study at hand, is essential to 
understand the outcome of negotiations between member states in the EU, 
and beyond. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Minutes from MC Meetings consulted for ‘uploading’ 
Negotiations (accessed via FOI request to DG-Ecfin) 
 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of  
 the 439
th
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 17 January 
 1996’, 18 January, MC/II/038/96-EN 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of  
 the 440
th
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 7 February 
 1996’, 8 February, MC/II/093/96-EN 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of 
 the 443rd Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 9 April 
 1996’, 10 April, MC/II/232/96-EN 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of  
 the 449
th
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 9 and 10 
 September 1996’, 26 September, MC/II/525/96-EN 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of 
  the 450
th
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 8 October 
 1996’, 29 October, MC/II/581/96-EN-rev.1 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of  
 the 452
nd
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 5 and 6 
 November 1996’, 14 November, MC/II/632/96-EN 
Monetary Committee of the European Community (1996) ‘Draft Minutes of 
  the 453
rd
 Meeting of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 19  




List of Interviews conducted by the author 


























via telephone German finance ministry b 
British treasury 6 February 
2012 





Amsterdam Dutch finance ministry a 
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The Hague Dutch finance ministry b 
Dutch finance 
ministry 
13 April 2012 via telephone Dutch finance ministry d 
EU Council 
secretariat 
21 June 2012 Brussels Council secretariat a 
European 
Commission 
21 June 2012 Brussels Commission a 
EU Council 
secretariat 
4 July 2012 Brussels Council secretariat b 
European 
Commission 




List of Publications returned and consulted from the Lexis/Nexis search 








Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau 
de Volkskrant 
Het Financieele Dagblad 














* The Lexis/Nexis search did not generate any results for Belgian media, 
neither in the category of Dutch Language results, nor French Language 
results. After trying to access the archives for leading Belgian publications 
directly, which was prohibitively expensive, it was necessary to rely on other 




List of Publications returned and consulted from the Lexis/Nexis search 




Agence France Presse 
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List of Publications returned and consulted from the Lexis/Nexis search, 
for data to aid in the Process-tracing Analysis: ‘uploading’ 
 
AFX News 




International Herald Tribune 
The Economist 
The Economist (US Edition) 
The Guardian 
The Independent 




List of Publications returned and consulted from the Lexis/Nexis search, 
for data to aid in the Process-tracing Analysis: ‘reuploading’ 
 
AFX News 
Agence France Presse 




International Herald Tribune 
The Associated Press 
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